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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

Poland Under Jaruzelski

Part I

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AT LAST, A JOURNAL OF OPINION THAT'S DECIDEDLY NON-LIBERAL

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

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Preface

WHEN General Jaruzelski introduced a " state of war " in Poland, many Western commentators saw it as the end of Polish resistance embodied in the Solidarity movement, and often drew parallels with Hungary after 1956 and Czechoslovakia after 1968.

Today, the period of General Jaruzelski's rule has already lasted longer than the era of Solidarity; it is clear that, as with other historical parallels, the comparison with Hungary and Czechoslovakia is not quite appropriate. Polish resistance continues under " self-occupation " and the General's hopes for " normalization " have not been fulfilled. The social, economic and political crisis in Poland has not been solved.

The forms of struggle vary, and the resistance itself finds many expressions, from the most innocuous symbolic manifestations of opposition to the regime, through to sullen refusal to grant it any form of legitimacy, to underground activities and public demonstrations.

The full extent of this resistance has not been realized abroad. Just as the emergence of the Solidarity movement (documented in two special issues of Survey, *Nos. 109 and 110) took the West by surprise, so now Western observers underestimate the continuing resistance of the Polish people. We decided, therefore, once again to devote two special issues of* Survey *to the present unequal struggle, in order to make it easier for the Western reader to understand and see Polish developments in a wider framework and with greater political and historical depth.*

Under martial law, Solidarity was first suspended and then formally dissolved, many thousands of its members were arrested, interned, imprisoned and harrassed by the authorities in one form or another. Workers and intellectuals, artists and actors, students and academics, have all seen their hopes for a better and freer future dashed. After the initial shock, however, the repressions met with a surprisingly steadfast refusal to accept " national salvation " from the barrel of a gun.

This unyielding attitude requires an unusual degree of courage, and the texts published below illustrate this amply. The contrast between Jaruzelski's people and Walesa's people is evident in the moral and intellectual calibre of the representatives of the two sides.

Underground Solidarity is only one element in the Polish refusal to acquiesce to a return to old totalitarian ways, the re-imposition of the lie and the whip, a relapse to the continuing rape of society by the state. But it is, of course, an important element. Its activities range from – surprisingly numerous – underground publications to other forms of organized resistance. These include a network of unofficial cells in factories, offices and universities, contacts necessary to coordinate public actions and demonstrations, and general efforts to maintain the morale of society and its " Front of Refusal." As before, underground Solidarity excludes violent action, and its strategy is basically rooted in passive resistance.

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Coordinating committees of Solidarity in important towns and regions are subordinate to the national Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) of Solidarity which provides the necessary links between local activists, through leaflets, radio broadcasts and illegal publications. It has maintained itself and strenghthened cooperation throughout the 18 months of the Jaruzelski regime, in spite of police persecution and the arrest of some of its leaders (such as Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Zbigniew Romaszewski, Piotr Bednarz and Jozef Pinior). The organized and non-organized resistance of Polish society depends on popular attitudes, on morale and solidarity (with a small " s "). These are in turn crucially affected by the position of the Catholic Church which tries to avoid involvement in political activities, even though it is clear that its position cannot but affect powerfully the political situation in a country where everything, inevitably, has a political aspect. The debates about the best way to deal with the complexities of the imposed situation illustrate the dilemmas of underground Solidarity, of the Church and, ultimately, of Polish society itself. At the 12th Party Plenum, Jaruzelski and Czyrek tried hard to present a positive picture of the regime's achievements and indicated that they would " firmly combat actions of an opportunistic-revisionist and dogmatic-sectarian character." However, this kind of " centrism " is irrelevant to the real, and not just Party, issues and cannot tackle the deeper problems of Polish society. The current rulers are confronting a situation in which economic reform cannot be successful without the cooperation of society, but compromise is not possible on the basis of a restitution of the customary communist political controls. The result is a stalemate in which the Poles, for geo-political reasons, cannot achieve even a modest " solution," while the Jaruzelski regime cannot achieve communist " normalization " because society will not accept this as normal. As Zbigniew Bujak said in an interview published in Tygodnik Mazowsze *(26 May 1983), the Polish resistance must think in terms of " years, not weeks or months." No short-term actions or manoeuvres can alter these basic elements inherent in the situation; Polish developments will inevitably be affected by them for a long time to come. The history of Poland demonstrates that these elements will not be eradicated as long as the Poles are who they are, and as long as the Soviet Union is what it is.*

L.L.

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Introduction

Leszek Kolakowski

MORE than a year ago Poland fell victim to massive rape, sponsored by the Soviet Union and carried out by the Polish military. The main target of the " state of war " proclaimed by the army leadership was Solidarity—the great civic movement which enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Poles—of workers, intellectuals and peasants. 13 December 1981 amounted for all purposes to a declaration of war on Polish society by the Polish generals. Thousands of people were arrested without charge and have since been held in camps and prisons. Some were released but in the meantime many others were jailed, killed, or savagely beaten up for acts which are not punishable in any civilized state: distributing leaflets, striking, peacefully protesting against the brutal violation of both the rules of natural law and of the Polish constitution.

The importance of the Solidarity movement went far beyond the borders of Poland. Solidarity stirred up world-wide hopes for the evolution of communist countries towards more humane, more democratic, less rigid and less oppressive forms of political life. Such an evolution would be of enormous importance in decreasing the danger and fear of war, when one considers that Soviet expansionism, the main source of such danger, is directly connected with the internal totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union.

The movement that initiated these hopes was entirely peaceful. Whatever violence was used—whether before martial law or after—came one hundred per cent from the side of the government. Solidarity has never incited, let alone employed, violent means. It encouraged gradual reform based on a compromise between the society and the government. The excuse offered for introducing martial law, that military dictatorship was necessary in order to prevent civil war, has never had the slightest foundation in truth.

These hopes were temporarily dashed, but not destroyed. Polish events opened up new avenues for change in the communist system that would be most fortuitous both for the peoples of those countries and for the world. The Poles have never given up, and will not give up now. Since September 1939, when the Polish state was invaded from the West and East by the allied armies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the Polish eagle has not ceased beating its wings against the bars of the cage. The cage is seriously damaged and the struggle continues, despite countless arrests, persecution and repression.

AFTER 13 December 1981 I expected that the ruling junta would soon try to take over the name, and some of the symbols, of Solidarity in restoring their pseudo-unions, organized on the old Soviet model as a branch of the state bureaucracy, entirely controlled and run

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by Party *apparatchiki*. After all, I told myself, they must have sent many secret police agents to the 10-million strong Union, who would now emerge as born-again repentant enthusiasts of Sovietism. They would break by intimidation and beating—or perhaps by bribing—some of the Solidarity activists, and build a " Solidarity " of their own on this basis: a pathetic caricature of the former movement.

I was wrong. The Polish junta proved to be incapable of even such a caricature. It failed to break or to bribe a single person from the known activists of Solidarity. And it did not dare take over the name or the symbols of the Union which had, for 16 months, embodied all the aspirations of Poland, all the hopes of Polish society for a self-governing—even if only in part—nation. The name and the symbols were too hot to handle for the generals: they remain for ever the historical property of the nation that, through them, asserted its rediscovered dignity and will to social and national sovereignty.

Both the Polish revolution and military counter-revolution were unprecedented events in the history of communist states: there are no historical analogies to help us predict their sequel in coming years. Nonetheless, the overall balance-sheet is fairly clear, even though the two sides are not really comparable.

On the credit side for the army-police-Party-government apparatus:

— several dozen people (the exact number not known) killed in street demonstrations or tortured to death in detention centres (admittedly a modest amount for a progressive country: Idi Amin or Pol-Pot slaughtered many more in the course of a year);
— several thousand people (the exact number not known) jailed—sentenced or awaiting trial—for political reasons; an incalculable number of people deprived of jobs;
— intimidation of a part of society;
— cultural devastation (not yet complete), destruction of the independent press, etc;
— less alarm among the privileged functionaries and officers;
— the generals' praises sung in *Pravda, Izvestiya, Rude Pravo,* etc;
— the increased misery of the population (people who spend all day trying to buy a bar of soap, a sausage or a pair of socks, are less likely to think of luxury commodities such as freedom).

On the credit-side for Poland:

— the absolutely ineradicable memory of the Solidarity period; a changed society;
— an organized underground, better and larger than in any period since the National-Socialist occupation;
— an unbridgeable abyss—wider than at any other moment in the history of communist Poland—between society and the machinery of power;
— the virtual collapse of the Communist Party (apart from salaried functionaries);

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— a spectacular demonstration of the noxious essence of communist rule.

Incomplete though they may be, these lists suffice to show that we are facing an entirely new situation. For the first time the apparatus of communist power was compelled to wage war—under this very name—against its own society. The ideological side of communism has long ago stopped being a target even for jokes; it has fallen apart to such an extent that even the rulers are hard put to employ it. The Party has been devastated and demoralized, and the military obviously does not feel like returning to barracks and relinquishing the power it enjoys. Direct military dictatorship has never been imposed in a communist country, and its very necessity has demonstrated one of the most painful weaknesses of Sovietism: the crisis of legitimacy. According to doctrine, the Communist Party rules because it embodies society's interests and aspirations, of which, being mentally retarded, society is unaware; the justification for Party despotism is its ideology. The army is supposed to be an organ of the same Party, whereby it protects socialist democracy from imperialist assaults. Once the army comes to power and the club commands the hand, where is the source of legitimacy? It would appear that a new brand of scientific Marxism-Leninism is needed to cope with the situation.

IN fact, the military dictatorship in Poland is not only to be seen as a setback, the defeat of a great democratic movement which has shown how totalitarian despotism might conceivably be corroded by peaceful, but powerful social pressure; it is a setback, to be sure, but it should be seen in its historical perspective, as a very important stage in the process of the degradation and decomposition of Sovietism. Sovietism will never be the same again. No uplifting slogans can hide its mortal disease. In coming years, Sovietism is going to face a choice which is crucial not only to its own future, but to the destiny of mankind as a whole: either it will try to escape from its own hopeless stagnation into further imperialist expansion, thereby leading the world towards the unspeakable horrors of global war, or it will concentrate on internal economic reconstruction, which clearly cannot be carried out without far-reaching political reform. No doubt, the choice is theirs, but it can be influenced by the West.

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Wielopolski in 1861

" WHEN I became the ruler of the Polish Kingdom, I hoped to restore peace to the country. The enemies of public order attribute the moderate behaviour of the government not to its real intentions, but to its weaknesses. The enemies of public order are getting bolder by the day. . . . The police not only lacks authority, but is subject to daily abuse. When the army is called in to restore order it is reviled. Inflammatory proclamations to the nation are being made everywhere. Under the pretext of religious activity political demonstrations are taking place. . . . Through the benevolence and unlawful cooperation of certain Roman Catholic priests, Catholic churches are being used for manifestations hostile to the government. Priests are preaching hatred of and disobedience to the highest authority. Forbidden hymns are being sung inside and outside the churches, and collections and donations are being made for revolutionary purposes. . . . Such activities, which threaten to overthrow the legitimate authority and cause anarchy in the country, compel the government to resort to more forceful means.

" For all these reasons, to secure peace for the inhabitants of the country and to restore general order, by command of His Imperial and Royal Majesty, it is declared that the Polish Kingdom is under martial law according to the rules concurrently announced. I call on all inhabitants of the Kingdom desirous of peace not to listen to the incitements of the agitators and not to submit to their intimidations, but to support the government for the purpose of ensuring the general well-being. I admonish heads of families to exercise strict control over their families, in particular over their under-age children who, through thoughtlessness, may have to bear the consequences of martial law, consequences which at times impinge on all people, whatever their age or sex, when street disorders have to be suppressed by force of arms. Poles! Through dutiful behaviour towards your monarch, through confidence in his goodwill and through submission to the authorities set up by him, you will bring forward the time when I will be granted permission to make a plea to His Majesty to abolish martial law, and again start to develop the institutions granted to the Polish kingdom. "

Count Aleksander Wielopolski

Count Aleksander Wielopolski was the Tsar's governor of the Polish Kingdom. The text of his proclamation of 14 October 1861 is published in Tadeusz Szpadkowski, *Zapiski Warszawskie* (Warsaw Notes), Ossolineum Publishing House, Wroclaw, 1969.

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Jaruzelski in 1981

" OUR country is on the edge of the abyss. Strikes, strike alerts, protests, have become standard. Even students are dragged into it. There are more and more examples of terror, threats, moral mob trials and direct coercion. Crimes, robberies and break-ins are spreading like a wave through the country. When I accepted the post of Prime Minister, I believed that we could pull ourselves up. Unfortunately the national economy became an area of political struggle. The deliberate torpedoing of government action has made the result not appear commensurate with our effort. It cannot be said that we lacked goodwill, moderation, and patience, sometimes there was probably too much of it.

" How long can one wait for a sobering up? How long can a hand reached for agreement meet a clenched fist? We have to say ' enough, ' to block the path of confrontation which was openly declared by the leaders of Solidarity.

" I declare that today a Military Council of National Salvation has been established. The Council of State, in accordance with the Polish constitution, has declared martial law as from midnight in all of Poland. I want everybody to understand the motives and the aims of this action. We are not striving for a military take-over, a military dictatorship. The nation is strong and wise enough to develop a democratic system of socialist government. And in such a system, the armed forces will remain where they belong, in barracks. None of Poland's problems can be solved by force.

" The Military Council of National Salvation is not a substitute for the constitutional government. Its only task is to protect legal order in the country, to guarantee restoration of order and discipline. The proclamation of the Military Council and other decrees published today define in detail the terms and standards of public order for the duration of martial law. The Military Council will be dissolved when law reigns in the country and when the conditions for the normal functioning of civilian administration and representative bodies are created. As the situation stabilizes, the limits on freedom in public life will gradually be overturned. But nobody should count on weakness or indecision.

" We cannot allow ourselves to take no notice of the derogatory opinions about the republic ' standing on disorder ' [as in the eighteenth-century period of liberum veto*] that are reviving again. We must do everything to put them away in the store-room of history. At this difficult moment I turn to our socialist allies and friends. We value their confidence and constant help. The Polish-Soviet alliance is, and will be, the cornerstone of the Polish* raison d'état.

" I turn to all citizens: the hour of trial has come. We must meet this challenge, and prove that we are worthy of Poland. "

General Wojciech Jaruzelski

Trybuna Ludu, *14 Dec. 1981*

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Marx, Stalin, Andropov, Jaruzelski

" Europe has one of two choices to make. Either an Asiatic barbarism led by the Muscovites will descend upon it like an avalanche, or it must restore Poland, and in this way separate itself from Asia. . . ."

Karl Marx, Speech of 22 Jan. 1867

" I would like to propose a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and above all to that of the whole Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations within the Soviet Union.

" I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people because it earned in this war general recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

" I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading nation, but also because it has a clear mind, a steadfast character and patience."

Joseph Stalin, Speech of 24 May 1945

" The nations of our country address particularly grateful words to the Russian nation. Without its selfless fraternal help the achievements of any of our republics would have been impossible. . . . Over 60 years the position of the Soviet State has changed radically, its authority and influence have increased enormously. . . . However, every step along the road to peace was and still is difficult and requires an intense struggle against the imperialist ' hawks.' This struggle is becoming sharper today. . . ."

Yurii Andropov, speech on the 60th Anniversary of the USSR, 22 Dec. 1982

" Today a situation has arisen which we did not believe possible. Stalin said that the class struggle becomes more acute in the process of the building of the communist state. We said later that Stalin was wrong. Stalin's intention was such that he probably was wrong, but now, in the case of Poland, it transpires that he may have been partly right because the class struggle has become sharper."

Kazimierz Kozniewski in the theoretical Party monthly, Nowe Drogi *(Warsaw), Nos. 1–2, 1982*

" Just frontiers were secured for Poland through the resolute support of the Soviet Union. Its help facilitated the post-war restoration and industrialization of Poland. In our present difficulties, Soviet help is again invaluable to us. We will never forget this. Poland found itself on the front line of the global class war. . . ."

General Jaruzelski, Speech in Moscow, 22 Dec. 1982

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A Polish-Polish Dialogue*

Slawomir Mrozek

A. You maintain then that you smashed my teeth in and ruptured my kidneys for my own good?
B. Yes. Somebody had to beat you up. If I hadn't done it somebody else would have. And you don't need me to tell you who. But he would have hurt you much more. Not only would he have smashed your teeth in and ruptured your kidneys, but he would also have broken your neck, pulled out your finger-nails and gouged out your eyes. So instead of hating me you should be grateful to me.
A. That means that it's not because you don't like me that you've crippled me.
B. I wanted to save you from an even worse fate.
A. And you had no interest of your own?
B. Of course not. What a nasty suspicion . . .
A. No personal benefits?
B. I detest personal benefits. They disgust me. I am only concerned with the public good—which is also your good.
A. That means you are sacrificing yourself for me.
B. Of course I am sacrificing myself. Do you think that smashing in teeth and rupturing kidneys is my idea of fun?
A. Isn't it?
B. Nothing of the kind. What a horrible suggestion. On the contrary, I was very, very sorry. I wept as I beat you.
A. Truly a sacrifice. Such unpleasantness, so many difficulties, and you must have tired yourself out doing it, no doubt?
B. Indeed. It was very heavy work.
A. Exactly. Such distress, such exertion—and all for me, so that I'm better and not worse.
B. Yes, yes.
A. All because you care about me, because you are concerned for me, for my own good.
B. Absolutely.
A. Nothing for yourself, all for me. Isn't that so?
B. Precisely so.
A. If you get no personal pleasure or benefit from what you have done, but on the contrary are prepared for every pain only to make my situation easier rather than more burdensome, I venture to ask you, because I feel that you are so well-disposed . . .
B. Well, what is it that you are after?
A. . . . I have a request for you. As you are sacrificing yourself to such a degree . . .
B. I'm quite willing to hear your request.
A. Well then, permit me to continue to hate you.

* S. Mrozek, " Rozmowka Polsko-Polska," *Kultura* (Paris), Jul.–Aug. 1982, pp. 3–4.

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The Dialogue Continues: the Case of Grzegorz Przemyk

" Nineteen-year-old Grzegorz Przemyk was stopped by uniformed police officers on Warsaw's Castle Square at about 6.15pm on Thursday 12 May. According to his mother, Przemyk's documents and those of two friends were checked. Then he and one of his friends were driven by car to the police station. There the two boys were separated. Przemyk apparently spent less than an hour in the police station. When his mother arrived after being summoned by the police, she found that he had already been taken by ambulance to a first-aid clinic. When she reached the clinic, Grzegorz was vomiting blood. Rejecting proposals that he be sent to a psychiatric hospital, she took him home and there he told her that . . . at the time of his detention he had gas squirted in his eyes, that he'd been beaten and that he'd heard policemen saying ' Don't leave any marks ' . . ."

Uncensored Poland—News Bulletin (London), No. 10/83, 20 May 1983

". . . An official statement later said that he had been involved in a drunken brawl and had had to be ' forcibly calmed ' when the militiamen took him to a first-aid station. Przemyk's friends denied the charge. Przemyk died two days later, after undergoing emergency surgery. In an emotional letter to Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Poet Wiktor Woroszylski wrote that ' the surgeons who opened up the boy's abdomen had nothing more to do: inside was a bleeding pulp.' He added that the doctors emerging from the operating room were weeping. Underground leaders of Solidarity issued a statement calling Przemyk a victim of ' paid militia torturers ' . . . ' Every death is painful, but this one is especially brutal. It will not be forgotten.' As the telegram from Lech Walesa, founder of the outlawed independent trade union Solidarity, was read, a hush fell over the mourners who had gathered in Warsaw's St. Stanlislaw Kosta Roman Catholic Church. . . .

" In one of the largest public gatherings since martial law was imposed 17 months ago, nearly 60,000 people thronged the church for the funeral service and joined the hour-long procession to the cemetery. Fastened to the front of the coffin was a red-and-white Solidarity banner. At the graveside, mourners tossed flowers on the coffin and then raised their fingers in the V sign that has become the symbol of Polish resistance to the authorities. . . ."

Time, 30 May 1983

" At Przemyk's grave site there were tears. The youth's mother, Barbara Sadowska, a poet and political activist, quietly wept, her lips trembling. She wore a bandage on one hand from injuries she received on May 3, when a band of men broke into a convent to attack a church-sponsored committee that aids the families of jailed or interned Solidarity activists. At the funeral she said nothing. Przemyk's high-school teacher, Wieslawa Gromulka, however, offered an apology to the dead youth. ' I have not managed to prepare you to cope in life,' she said tearfully. ' You went too young.' And poet Wiktor Woroszylski circulated an open letter to Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski urging him to punish those responsible for the youth's death. ' Will you use your influence to make elementary justice prevail just this once? ' the letter asked."

Newsweek, 30 May 1983

" The Voevodship Procurator in Warsaw has announced that intensive investigation continues in order to clarify the circumstances surrounding the death of Grzegorz Przemyk."

Trybuna Ludu, 26 May 1983

" It is an absurd lie and completely unwarranted to accuse the [Security] Services—and such accusations are on the increase—of abuse of power and, in particular, of violating the physical immunity of [Polish] citizens."

Czeslaw Kiszczak, Chief of Security Forces, [Minister of Internal Affairs]
Trybuna Ludu, 27 May 1983

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How to Conduct a Dialogue with the Terrorist*

Maciej Poleski

1. On 13 December 1981 the state attacked the people of this country and took hostages. The army-police-Party-government apparatus adopted the tactics of terrorism. It was the only way in which they, representatives of but a negligible minority, could force the majority to accept the official line. Solidarity remains the only authentic spokesman for the majority.

Today, the terrorist says to us: " I shall release the hostages and shall stop threatening you with a military solution if you renounce your present actions, ideas and leaders." In short, the terrorist will renounce terror if we renounce ourselves. Our answer is simple and to the point: no negotiations and no compromises with the terrorist. None.

2. In order to reach a compromise, one needs not the willingness to compromise, but the will to fight. A compromise results from a confrontation, and not from a discussion in which political points are thrown up. You cannot negotiate with a gun at your head, you can only surrender. Even so, we have no reason to capitulate. This war is also a war of nerves. It is obvious that the terrorist is as scared of gunfire as we are.

Two maxims should be placed above the bed of every Solidarity activist: " He who wants peace must prepare for war " (Vegetius), and " War is the continuation of politics by other means " (Clausewitz).

3. After seven months of war against the nation, it is clear that the authorities are geared for a repetition of the post-Yalta farce. Gradually lifting the restrictions of the state of war, the authorities want to force us to come into the open and give up resistance in exchange for a promise to stop repression. The whole scheme is a grotesque imitation of the Stalinist manoeuvre which led to the Home Army's emergence from hiding, and its liquidation. The bag of tricks has been dusted off and brought out again. First, the leaders, taken by surprise, were interned. The sporadic hounding of those in hiding has been abandoned. The acquiescence of people still nominally free (in the " external " prison of the country at large) is being extorted by means of blackmail and threats. Over the course of time some internees were released, and were replaced by others who had been arrested and sentenced by the courts. The tactics are clear: to isolate the elite of the Solidarity movement; to disarm the people by depriving them of their leadership; to punish those active in the underground and not those who are passive members of the Union.

* This text appeared in the underground publication, *Mazowsze Weekly*, 1 Aug. 1982.

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4. The Church was responsible for a serious case of bad timing when it came out with its suggestion of " social accord," at a time when the nation was being terrorized by the state. Compromise suggests voluntary concessions from both sides, given certain conditions. But in this situation, voluntary compromise would be fictitious: one side has declared, and continues to wage, civil war. As long as our threats, to answer a blow with a blow, remain only threats, the terrorist will not relent.

The Polish self-limiting revolution came to an end when the adversary stopped limiting himself. Kuron is right[1]: only by striking at the centres of power and repression can we force the enemy to make concessions. There is no need to compromise over the programme of reform. The authorities will have to free us whether they like it or not, just as the Tsar had to free the Polish peasants after 1863. The idea of autonomy was not so much the result of us restricting our demands, as of the realization by the invader that, as a consequence of rebellion and resistance, he had to give up certain aspects of his diktat. This is where unwritten compromises are preferable to written ones.

5. Nothing could be more dangerous in the present situation than simplistic thinking about organization: the leadership decides what to do, and the ranks establish how to do it. The situation demands the opposite: the Temporary Coordinating Commission [of Solidarity] should decide how to exert pressure on the authorities, using stronger means than the distribution of underground publications or the boycott of the official press, radio and television; the Commission decides how to attack the apparatus of coercion. We cannot go on arguing about taking over power from the authorities, which still have their gun-sights trained on us. But we can decide how we intend to wrest the guns from their must respond to the release of most of the terrorist's interned hostages. should respond to the release of most of the terrorist's interned hostages. While he continues to hold onto, let us say, 200 internees, he implies that 200 is not a number over which to go to war, although the rest of the prisoners are [silently] sentenced in court. The answer to the question " how? " should, in my opinion, be as follows: a limited terror should be answered by limited retaliation, which must not be allowed to escalate into counter-terror. Our aim should be to destroy the material foundation of the apparatus of violence, as well as its outward symbols. We should establish social juries and let them brand the collaborators among us. The basic question concerning strategy is " how? " However, at the level of groups of a few dozen people, the essential problem is " what? " There is no point in building a network of organizational cells for its own sake. Structures should be functional, organized for a purpose. Units of the underground should not spend their time discussing methods of warfare, theoretical manifestos or technical subtleties. Neither tactics nor methods, but specific and successful

[1] See p. 154.

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action against the terrorist gives a group its identity and strength, and helps to overcome individual fear of the seemingly omnipotent regime.

6. How, then, are we to fight Russia and her " Imperial Prince " Jaruzelski? We need strength. Above all, we must reclaim our army by helping it to organize itself from within. An uprising? No, what for? It is enough to paralyse the " pacifiers," destroy their will to fight against the people. Instead of coming out against the army, we must work within it. We must not count on its patriotic loyalty at the moment of testing, when Polish soldiers are set against Polish workers by an order. We must anticipate such situations by supporting the growing dissatisfaction and embitterment among the army officers who have been made to play the role of occupier.

7. When, a few months ago, Kuron appealed from prison for a change of tactics, and said that force must be met with force, the appeal seemed unrealistic. In the atmosphere of despondency the idea appeared absurd, inappropriate to the circumstances. In fact the idea is both sound and far-sighted. Solidarity found itself in the same trap into which the revisionists had fallen at an earlier date: it tried to achieve " socialism with a human face " by peaceful means, ignoring the fact that this type of socialism only ever existed as long as it was supported by continuous pressure for the liberalization of the system. We have again been reminded, by acts of of terror, that Moscow wants "real" socialism on the Vistula. Real socialism: in other words, " fascism with a human face." There is no reason to believe that one can persuade the terrorist by argument or even by mere threat of force. The actual use of force against terrorists need not turn into counter-terror. It is essential if the nation is to keep its identity intact.

The state terrorist went against the constitution by introducing a state of war; he imprisoned and maltreated his fellow citizens. By actively obstructing this method of wielding power, the people are not committing an act of violence, but are acting in justifiable self-defence.

8. We must not be content just to defend the positions for which we have been attacked. To struggle today, in the name of " realism," for independent trade unions in a country deprived of independence, a country still no more than a unit in a camp surrounded by wire fences provided by its fraternal neighbours, is a form of minimalism which can only lead us into contradictions between words and actions. Moscow is far more afraid of the solidarity of captive nations than of solidarity among Poles alone. We should therefore emphasize the former and spread the epidemic of freedom beyond the Polish section of the camp. There is no room for an independent Poland stranded between the Germans and the Russians, two nations which over the last 200 years have grown in power and number much more than we have. No general strike, however successful, will be able to move Poland from its borders between the Bug and the Oder. The Finlandization of Poland is an illusion similar to the nineteenth-century dreams about autonomy for the Russian-dominated part of Poland. The real alternative lies elsewhere:

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either Eastern Europe will regain its freedom, or the West as a whole will be Finlandized.

9. The foundation of our policy since August 1980 has been the assumption that the Polish authorities could act independently, and that it would be possible to talk with them as one Pole to another. The time has come to change our tune. We have to fight for a revolution in the camp, and not for a peaceful and responsible path to a democratic society. The apparent paralysis resulting from the Soviets' blackmail left us, in fact, with considerable freedom of manoeuvre. The Russians have a prescription for dealing with national uprisings (such as in Budapest in 1956) but they have no means of effectively stopping a " creeping counter-revolution," particularly when it has been planned and initiated by anti-communist socialists.

10. Another answer to the question of how to fight is the awareness that the underground Solidarity movement can work parallel with the Church, although it cannot march arm in arm, or synchronize its work on a day-to-day basis. The aims of the Church are everlasting, ours are temporal. The Church has to survive through centuries, Poland has to renew its sacrifice with every generation in order to survive. The freedom to practise Christianity can be fought for through love and humility. But Christian civilizations have always defended themselves with fire and sword.

We should not blame the Church for defending its power and its interests. But we must not surrender the independence of our movement for the sake of united action. We cannot subordinate ourselves to the Church. The Church wished to create a situation in which it would be assured of unquestioned spiritual control, without losing its temporal influence. The price it has to pay is to discourage open conflict between the authorities and the people. This was precisely the message of Cardinal Wyszynski's homily in Czestochowa on the eve of the signing of the Gdansk Agreements in August 1980, and this also seems to be the policy of Primate Glemp. If the Church preserves its moderation, and we our radicalism, then both sides—acting independently but parallel with one another—will make it more difficult for the government to continue its policy of terror.

11. We are by no means defenceless in our confrontation with the terrorist: our prison is also his prison. The terrorist is strong as long as we submit to his blackmail. It is not his aim to kill and imprison. His purpose is to rule over those who are prepared to acquiesce in the persecution of individuals, for the sake of preserving " the strength of the nation," its biological survival. Determination and courage, conspiracy when out of reach of the authorities, blows administered unexpectedly from under cover—all these undermine the rule of fear. Our arms are numb from being held up, but the terrorist has his gun to hold up.

12. We do not believe in good and bad terrorists. A terrorist becomes a liberal only when he is forced to do so. The authorities decided to restrict the number of arrests and administer the plan for repression with

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some moderation, because it pays them so to do. We must make this liberal concept less attractive to them. Let us not forget that such " liberals " have never yet " liberalized " communism on their own initiative. Their liberalism only came out into the open when the current ruling mob fell.

13. Conspiracy has never been a mass movement. Half of Poland may be plotting, but 10 million people cannot be members of a conspiracy. In the last war the soldiers of the Home Army numbered about 1 per cent of the adult population. The present movement will perish unless it continues to be selective. Let us not deceive ourselves and let us not exaggerate the merits of the people. In the cesspool in which we are forced to live, there are not too many brave individuals. The essential thing is to incorporate within the movement everyone according to his or her abilities. Dozens of " above ground " citizens should cooperate with every underground activist. Both groups should be aware of the limitations of their activity, and of their mutual interdependence. " Fighting Poland " [the symbol of the resistance to the German occupation] should be supported by the whole Solidarity movement.

14. We must at all costs retain this double life until the final victory. We must continue to press the government into liberalizing the state of war at every stage. It is the existence of a successful secret organization which forces the government into granting concessions. Even though half the country is involved in the struggle, only a few of us have to live on forged papers. Except for the small circle of our close associates, our activity should remain anonymous. We must not relinquish this principle. As long as the structure of the underground and the identity of individuals remain secret, our gradual emergence to the surface will be safe and will not carry the danger of exposure. By all means we have to preserve the underground life. Our double life keeps the Reds on the alert, we hold them in our hands. Our " outstretched fingers," which so annoyed Jaruzelski, will close into a fist.

15. In deciding what various organizations of underground Solidarity should do, we must first of all answer the question of whether an uncontrolled outburst of social anger is really what we should most fear. Now that we have a political centre for underground Solidarity, a spontaneous outburst need not pose a danger. Even the surprising demonstration of social strength on 3 May [1982] could have been (but unfortunately was not) used for political advantage. It is worth remembering that an uncontrolled explosion is not synonymous with a spontaneous outburst, but with one that lacks a properly formulated and attainable goal.

Many a Polish uprising (that of November 1830, for instance) lost impetus only because it lacked determined leaders able to channel the outburst and work out a strategy. The August strikes were spontaneous in a sense, in that they were not called by a central body vested with ruling powers. Luckily, the authorities were less well prepared for the conflict than the opposition.

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16. The importance and significance of strike action and, above all, of a general strike, has changed since 1980 when we were in the preliminary stages of organizing ourselves. In the early days, strikes made a contribution by throwing up able and determined people and by allowing the numerically insignificant opposition to influence events. The authors of " The State of War and Mass Resistance " claim that a general strike, even if successfully launched, would not paralyse the government because it would not strike at its main instrument—the apparatus of terror and violence. 13 December marked the limit of effectiveness of a general strike. In August [1980] neither the army nor the militia used arms because there was no one to give orders to this effect. The authorities were paralysed, there was no political leadership which would take effective action.

We can still use the strike weapon, but not a general strike and not a " strike to victory "—just as one does not shoot until victory, but only as long as the ammunition lasts. If we intend to fight to victory we must not begin at the wrong end by using up all our ammunition. It is fine to sing " this is going to be our last battle," but one cannot plan for it.

17. Our very existence is a threat to the rulers. The strength of a totalitarian regime lies in its absolute control of the means of social communication, in the atomization of society, and in the power to render impossible any form of self-organization by the people without the knowledge and consent of the authorities. A necessary but not sufficient condition for building the underground state and society is the " paper ammunition " of the popular song. Independent, alternative culture provided the basis for the leaders of August to emerge. Searching for the answer to what the underground should do, we must not forget the obvious. It should go on producing the underground press and literature of which there is still not enough, and which we lacked in Poland in the first period of Sovietization between 1944–48.

18. A general strike would make sense only if it were called with a very closely defined target in view, and one which the authorities would find difficult to reject out of hand. Had we organized a national strike, or some other demonstration on a national scale, against the forbidding of the Papal visit, it would have been a bitter blow indeed for government propaganda to have overcome. It would have been extremely inconvenient for them to have had to use repression against those who participated. Because we failed to organize ourselves on that occasion, they were able to postpone the visit until the following year. However, except in situations as clear-cut as this (when we may be sure of mobilizing the whole country into action), we should avoid confrontation. We should use guerrilla tactics; we must surprise the enemy without offering them a pitched battle. The stabilization and survival of the movement depends on such acts as the maintenance of Solidarity radio transmissions, the placing of a granite plaque to the memory of the Wujek miners in the middle of Warsaw's Victory Square, the beating given to the riot squad of the militia in Wroclaw on

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13 June, and the kidnapping from his hospital bed of the wounded Janek Naroznik.

19. This double life will enable us to achieve our aims not only in our struggle, but also in our work. It will enable us to work out a positive programme of cooperation with all those who want to build elements of a new order, and not perpetuate the status quo. Individual farmers, private entrepreneurs, cooperatives and craftsmen must be made to feel convinced that their efforts have the full support of the opposition, and are regarded as the basis for economic independence.

20. The pre-August opposition proved how much can be achieved by a few people. For someone who sees the liberation of Polish society as a process, and not as a single act, the period of Solidarity was a dramatic leap forward. Today the emotional temperature has cooled off. However, seen from the pre-August perspective the present situation cannot but be judged as very good. We have extensive influence in all strata of society. We have the leadership.

Before August 1980, KOR's nationally distributed newspaper *Robotnik* was printed in about 50,000 copies (i.e. before the strikes). Today the underground press serving Mazowsze province alone has a much larger circulation. We have done well in the battle for a free press.

21. The silence of 10 million people is also a form of dialogue. The only dialogue possible today. The only kind of social agreement that we need now is one among ourselves: to decide how and by what means we intend to fight state terrorism. The matter of negotiations and peace offers can be left to when the battles have been won.

13 July 1982

Mazowsze Weekly, No. 23, 1 Aug. 1982

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Jaruzelski's War

Michael Sadykiewicz

" Comrades, workers and friends! Do you want an army to run the government, as in South America and Africa? A government of colonels and generals? An army which if it did not like a decision taken by the legally elected authority would sweep that authority out of office? No, you do not! "

From Wojciech Jaruzelski's speech at a Gdansk shipyard on 24 January 1971[1]

ROMAN Zambrowski mentions[2] that in 1956, Marshal Zhukov told Gomulka that he would need only three days to occupy Poland.

How many days would Marshal Kulikov have needed in 1981? Perhaps a few more, perhaps one less. It does not matter. Jaruzelski who, better than anyone in Poland, knows the resources and power of the Soviet armed forces, knew that it would be only a matter of days. He also knew that the Kremlin would not hesitate to use any effective means, even the most severe. The Budapest massacre of 1956 would seem an idyll by comparison.

What then were Jaruzelski's options between August 1980 and December 1981? Theoretically, there were quite a number:

1. To use delaying tactics.
2. To call in the Soviet Army[3] in order to crush Solidarity by using the combined strength of both armies. (Under the heading " Solidarity " I group together Walesa's workers' Solidarity with Kulaj's peasants' Solidarity, the Independent Students Union and the whole organized democratic opposition of 1981, which had 12–13 million people behind it.)
3. If the Russians invaded, the Polish armed forces[4] could take a neutral position, as the Hungarian Army, or most of it, had done in 1956 and as the Czechoslovak Army did in 1968.
4. To fight, together with the whole nation, against the Soviet invaders.
5. To crush Solidarity using the Polish Army and the Police.

[1] Quoted from *Rewolta Szczecinska i jej znaczenie*, Ewa Wacowska (ed.), Seria, " Dokumenty," Biblioteka Kultury (Institut Littéraire, Paris, 1971), Vol. 214, p. 135.

[2] *Krytyka* (Warsaw, 1980), No. 6, p. 81. Zambrowski was until 1963 a member of the Party Politburo.

[3] The chairman of the State Council Henryk Jablonski, and the chairman of the Seym Stanislaw Gucwa, would extend such an invitation without a moment's hesitation, even without the consent of Jaruzelski. All they would need is an order from Moscow.

[4] See data on the Polish armed forces in *The Military Balance 1982–1983* (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1982), pp. 22–23.

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As we know, Jaruzelski chose the last option. How did it happen? What were the decisive factors which made Jaruzelski choose that option?

The following is an attempt to answer these questions. Let us remind ourselves first of Jaruzelski's position and the role he played in the spring and summer of 1981, when the decision to introduce martial law was being considered. How much real authority did he have, as Minister of Defence, as Prime Minister (since February), and as First Secretary of the Party (since October)? The last two roles carried only formal weight: the Party and the *apparat*, as well as the central and regional administration, were in ruins. Not only had they stopped working effectively, they had simply stopped functioning at all.

Of the mass media, Jaruzelski controlled only the central broadcasting system, PAP (the Polish Press Agency), the Party paper *Trybuna Ludu*, and the military daily *Zolnierz Wolnosci*. Of the three pillars of communist power (the Party, the army and the police), the first was " unusable," and Jaruzelski was left with the army and the police, but even they could not be relied on absolutely. In plain terms, Jaruzelski could in fact rely only on the army. His army. He had been one of its soldiers from the beginning, he went through the whole of its war (1943–45) fighting. For 20 years he held a succession of key posts: the head of the Main Political Administration (1960–65), the Chief of the General Staff (1965–68), and Minister of Defence since 1968.

Almost all the senior officers of the armed forces[5] owe their position, their high rank and decorations to him. Under Jaruzelski the Polish Army became the *third army in Europe*, smaller only than the Soviet and West German armies.

Jaruzelski enjoyed great military authority. He was very popular. Having taken over from Spychalski, an illiterate in professional military matters, lately a victim of senile sclerosis and the subject of jokes and anecdotes among army officers because of his professional ignorance, Jaruzelski created a new and, in their eyes, positive image: a brilliant staff officer, commander and organizer, he was free from suspicion of corruption. He was the model and embodiment of the virtues of the officer corps, and a faithful representative of its interests.

WHAT were the interests of the Polish generals, specifically in the spring and summer of 1981?

It is important to bear in mind the structure of the present armed forces, particularly the ratio of regular service soldiers to conscripts. In the pre-war Polish Army, which was numerically the same as the army of today, i.e. 350,000, the ratio was 1 : 6[6], today it is 1 : 1.[7] Under Rydz-Smigly,[8] there was one officer to 20 men; in Jaruzelski's army the

[5] Not only the generals and the admirals, but also the most numerous and influential group, that of the colonels.

[6] See Eugeniusz Kozlowski, *Wojsko Polskie 1936–1939* (Warsaw, 1964), p. 323.

[7] See *The Military Balance*, op. cit. p. 22.

[8] Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly was until 1939 the C-in-C of the Polish Army.

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equivalent ratio is 6 : 20. It is a professional standing army, or at least an army dominated by career soldiers.

In 1939, the Polish Army had 17,000 officers; now this army has over 60,000, always bearing in mind that the overall figure is the same now as then. Rydz-Smigly had 438 colonels, Jaruzelski has about eight times that number.

Only 4·8 per cent of Rydz-Smigly's officers received higher military education. In Jaruzelski's army the figure is 90 per cent. Since 1965 every newly commissioned subaltern undertakes a four-year course in a higher military training college, which also gives him a degree in engineering.[9] Every officer of the rank of major or above has to undergo a three-year course, prior to his promotion, in one of the five military academies.[10] Such are the qualifications of the present military commissars in charge of civilian institutions under martial law. About one-third of them also have Ph.D. degrees.

The structure of the officer corps is interesting, dominated numerically not by junior officers (second lieutenant to captain), but by the senior ranks of majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels! It was said that under Pilsudski and Rydz-Smigly, Poland was ruled by the colonels. If that were so then, what about the thousands of lieutenant colonels, and the many generals, now in charge as military commissars, voevodas, ministers, and even first secretaries of Party regional committees?

WHAT is the political image of this new caste of senior officers? It has first to be accepted that they are an organic living part of the Polish " New Class," its best educated and dynamic sector. Communist Poland, despite its poverty (except during the period of economic disaster which has been with us since the late 1970s), afforded its senior officers a relatively high standard of living. The new army regulations, introduced by Jaruzelski, also gave them other privileges and appurtenances never before enjoyed by the officer corps in Poland. Thus the colonels and generals are bound to serve the ruling system, to which they owe everything, for life. Permanently subjected to political indoctrination, the new " caste " accepted, although not necessarily with any inner conviction,[11] that this system alone and " eternal friendship with the USSR " would guarantee the future success of their country.

The constant purges within the army, throughout the 40 years of its existence, meant that not only had all officers not sufficiently enthusiastic about the USSR been removed, but so had all those who retained a degree of politically independent views, unless they were ready and able to demonstrate real devotion to the Polish People's Republic.

9 Or, depending on the kind of college, a degree equivalent to the B.A. degree.

10 And some of them, all Party members (about 100 per cent among the senior officers), should be graduates of the Marxist-Leninist University which has a two-year (evening class) educational programme.

11 An illuminating joke, alluding to those Catholics who believe but do not practise, says that the officers practise (the communist precepts), but do not believe.

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The intellectual elite of the army had been decimated in the 1960s. The purge included the few remaining members of the KPP and KZMP,[12] of whom not one is left among the 200 or so Polish generals.

The rise and growth of Solidarity represented a direct threat to the generals. Together with other groups within the Polish " New Class," but more fervently, the generals longed for the outlawing of Solidarity. In this matter the interests of the Polish generals were identical with those of the Kremlin.

During the period under discussion, Jaruzelski was obviously aware that despite his popularity and his authority in the army, one step contrary to the interests of the generals or the Kremlin would mean dismissal and replacement by someone else: General Tadeusz Tuczapski[13] perhaps, or General Eugeniusz Molczyk?[14]

WE may now reiterate, against a somewhat broader background, the options held in common by Jaruzelski and the Polish generals in the summer of 1981.

1. To call in the Soviet Army and crush Solidarity

This option was rejected. The generals were well aware of the mood and the anti-Soviet disposition of the people. They knew that an act of this sort would compromise the army in the eyes of the people for generations to come. Targowica[15] is, to this day, after more than 190 years, a synonym for national betrayal. Also, the entry of Soviet tanks into Polish cities would inevitably provoke a national uprising of workers and young people, possibly joined by many army units.

The resistance would be crushed (without too much delay) by the Soviet forces, but much blood would have been spilled and Polish Quislings would stand condemned by society for evermore.

2. In case of Soviet invasion—stay neutral

This option was not a real one. In the Poland of 1981, it would have been impossible to maintain a neutrality of that sort. There was a danger of polarizing the Army. Some military (notably the generals and most of the senior officers, the Air Force, the Navy,[16] the Units for Internal Defence[17]) would collaborate willingly, others (most of the conscripts,

[12] KPP—the pre-war Polish Communist Party; KZMP—the pre-war Polish Communist Union of Young People.

[13] Colonel General Tuczapski is one of the deputies to the Defence Minister and the main inspector for territorial defence.

[14] Colonel General Molczyk is one of the deputies to the Defence Minister and the main inspector for combat training. He is also representative of the Polish Army as a deputy of the C-in-C of the Warsaw Pact forces.

[15] The pro-tsarist conspiracy by Polish magnates, promoted by Catherine II, was centred around the village of Targowica in 1792.

[16] The Polish Air Force consists of 70 per cent carrier soldiers, the Navy of 73 per cent. See *The Military Balance*, op. cit.

[17] These are the Polish equivalent of the Soviet MVD units. Strength: 65,000 troops. Ibid.

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many junior officers, most units of the Force for Territorial Defence,[18]) would join the workers and young people on the barricades. Other units would not even leave their barracks.

Regarding the situation in the longer term, most, if not all, the officers who took a neutral position would be removed from the army as happened in Czechoslovakia.[19] Those who took an active part in opposing the invasion would, if still alive, find themselves in the Gulag Archipelago.

3. Declare a common cause with the nation and fight the Soviet invasion

Every Polish officer, and certainly every general, is aware, whatever his own political views, of the depth and range of penetration of the Polish forces by Soviet Intelligence.

Any attempt, however well camouflaged, to organize such action would be known about in Moscow within hours. It would hasten a Soviet invasion which would direct its prime attack against military objectives, thus paralysing from the start any idea of effective counter-action by Polish forces.

Polish generals know only too well the Kremlin's absolute determination in matters concerning Poland. Any military analysis of the situation would make it clear that, in view of Poland's position in the Warsaw Pact, and the balance of strength between the potential adversaries (even assuming that all Polish forces would be prepared to fight against the invading Soviet units), the Russians would be able to crush Polish armed resistance very quickly. The USSR would be able to confront 15 Polish divisions, only half of them up to strength, with 75 divisions,[20] fully manned and better armed.

The Czechoslovak Army would, of course, be only too glad to retaliate for the part the Poles played in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Other members of the Warsaw Pact, bar Rumania, would be willing to join forces, in more than a symbolic sense. The ratio of opposing forces to Polish would be 5 : 1 in land forces. As for air and naval forces, the imbalance would be even greater. At any rate, this is theoretical speculation: Soviet conventional forces are more than adequate to crush organized resistance from the Polish forces.

This option was therefore out of the question. It was obvious to everyone in Poland that the West would not lift a finger in the event of a Polish–Soviet war. No Pole, certainly no general, member of the officer corps or simple soldier, would dream of relying on Western armed support.

[18] This force (*Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej Kraju*) consists mostly of conscripts, who, for political reasons, are not included in the combat units.

[19] After August 1968 some 11,000 officers and 30,000 non-commissioned officers were removed from the Czechoslovak Army. See A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, Alexander Alexiev, *East European Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*, (Crane Russak, New York, 1982), p. 134.

[20] This figure takes into account only the divisions from the Soviet western military districts and 50 per cent of the Soviet divisions stationed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia (the overall Soviet strength is 180 divisions).

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In any case, speculation as to what would happen if the Polish armed forces resisted the Soviet invaders was purely academic. Professional soldiers, who constitute nearly half the total military force, were very far from such thoughts; as for the generals and the thousands of colonels, they form the very core, the mainstream of Poland's new class of " owners," and would defend to the end their own interests.

Naturally, the spirit of enmity towards the USSR, so widespread among the people, and the emotional tensions at the time (if an invasion were to take place), could conceivably spread to a sizeable group among the regular soldiers, but the officer corps was not likely to turn against the Russians en masse. There exist, however, other armed units in Poland, controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs: various military and paramilitary forces such as the notorious ZOMO, the SB, the Militia, ROMO and WOP.[21] Most members of those services, in total consisting of about 250,000 troops, are faithful henchmen of the regime and they would stand by the Soviet invaders without much, if any, hesitation. This " alternative " army, exactly as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Hungary in 1956, would provide outposts for the attacking Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops.

Polish generals thought that they were in fact left with only one solution: that of the self-occupation of Poland, a declaration of war against the nation. This they put into practice on 13 December 1981.

THE operation, let us for the sake of convenience call it operation " W," was performed to perfection by the Polish generals under the command of Jaruzelski. It was a professional *tour de force* remarkably executed by the armed forces and the police.

Jaruzelski employed, with considerable expertise, all the age-old precepts of the art of war proclaimed by Clausewitz, against the " enemy ": i.e. the millions of Poles on the side of Solidarity. All nine principles enumerated by Clausewitz were brought into play:[22] surprise, economy of effort, manoeuvre, offensive, freedom of action, etc.

It was a great tactical success: in the course of a single night and in the few days after, the short-term " military " objectives were achieved, with very few losses either to themselves or to the enemy, which was also important.

But to ensure a lasting victory, tactical success must turn into strategic success, according to the rules of the art of warfare. A year after the brilliant success of the short-term operation, it is possible to state that its strategic objectives (the conquest of the nation and the breakdown of national determination to resist) have failed.

The nation has been disarmed; it has not been conquered. Yet a

[21] ZOMO—the riot police, up to 25,000 troops, according to *Newsweek*, 25 Jan. 1982; SB—the Polish equivalent of the KGB; ROMO—paramilitary troops of the police reserve; WOP—border troops.

[22] Adapted to modern warfare techniques by American and Soviet military doctrine.

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" I thought ZOMO was a soap-powder, until I was hit . . ." (Polish saying)

Our Invaders

Recruitment to ZOMO: conscripts are offered two years' army service in ZOMO where they are better fed and much better paid. A soldier receives 600 zloty a month, a ZOMO man receives several thousand zloty plus bonuses for all the actions he is engaged in, and for the capture of each " counter-revolutionary." During the first two months he undergoes normal military training, followed by police training. ZOMO are therefore army units used for dealing with the civilian population. To regard them as policemen is a propaganda ploy designed to reassert the prestige of the army.

Information Bulletin of the underground Solidarity Committee for the region of Malopolska, no. 228.

The Structure of the MO (People's Militia)

Each chief of a KW (County Command) of the MO is responsible for three departments:

1. General, which includes the criminal and traffic control sections.
2. Matters concerning economic crimes.
3. Matters concerning political crimes.

Apart from this, each commandant has at his disposal several ZOMO companies—or motorized units of the People's Militia. Under exceptional circumstances, numerous ROMO units—Reserve units of the People's Militia—are called upon to support ZOMO. Also in exceptional circumstances, the commandant of a KW MO can be assigned WOP (Frontier Guards) units, the only army units which are not subordinate to the Ministry of National Defence, but to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Voice of Solidarnosc (London), no. 49/50, 5 Jan. 1983.

The Difference Between ZOMO and ROMO

ZOMO is a professional unit numbering about 25,000 individuals who are very well paid and excellently equipped. Their main functions are the dispersal of street demonstrations and the pacification of strike enterprises. In training for this, the ZOMO men are put through schooling in special camps in Czechoslovakia, are housed in barracks, and put through incessant " brain-washing." A large percentage of them are former criminals whose sentences have been reduced in return for service in ZOMO.

ROMO is a unit which was created during the state of war. Its members are called up from among the ORMO (Voluntary Reserve of the People's Militia), and from former WOP soldiers, for a period of three to six months. ROMO usually carries out patrol functions, and is rarely used in the suppression of demonstrations. Unlike ZOMO, they are not equipped with firearms.

Kronika Malopolska (published underground), no. 28A.

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military operation must aim either at destroying the enemy or at breaking down his will to fight. So say all the military textbooks. But the resistance continues. It seems that the entire younger generation, 60 per cent of the population in Poland, stands by the principles of Solidarity and against the communist government. In a few years' time, a new generation will take over, in the normal course of things. And never, throughout the 39 years of communist rule, has the system been as detested as it is now.

Osobka-Morawski, the first Prime Minister of post-war Poland, admitted recently that in 1944 only 5 per cent of the population supported the communists. Nearly 40 years later, anyone who knows the real mood of the nation would agree that the situation is precisely the same. There is a difference, but it is not a numerical one: 40 years ago, the 5 per cent consisted of some farm hands, landless peasants and a few of the proletariat; today the supporters of the system come from the " New Class " (the *nomenklatura*) and its henchmen: ZOMO and the rest.

WHY did Jaruzelski fail to convert the tactical success of Operation " W " into a strategic achievement? To put it simply, because he was faced with the impossible: bringing about a reconciliation between the Polish lamb and the Russian wolf; finding a *modus vivendi* which would dispel Soviet fears of Solidarity (justifiable in the light of Soviet interests) and satisfy the objectives of Solidarity, in which was expressed the will of 95 per cent of Poles driven to desperation by succeeding rulers of Poland.

What were the objectives, of 95 per cent of Poles, embodied in Solidarity? To get rid of the total monopoly of power exercised by the " New Class "; to get public control of the government, i.e. to give the public access to, and the right to take part in, the running of the country. Other objectives ascribed to Solidarity, such as leaving the Warsaw Pact, the liquidation of Party activists, etc., have no ground in fact. The leaders of Solidarity had far too much political sense, which they displayed right from the start. They knew the geo-political facts about the country, situated in the very centre of post-Yalta Europe and at the strategic nerve centre of the Warsaw Pact. Operation " W " succeeded. It was bound to: the " enemy," Solidarity, was unprepared. Solidarity underestimated the desperate determination of the *nomenklatura*, it failed to organize elementary precautions. There was no alternative set of leaders to take over in an emergency, no underground organization. The case of Frasyniuk was an exception, and it certainly did not prove the rule. The rule in this case was Solidarity's determination to continue the peaceful revolution without the use of force. The charges against Solidarity, of a planned armed confrontation with " honest communists," and the threat of civil war, have no basis in truth. The generals showed the nation that it was possible for Polish tanks to lay siege to Polish shipyards and

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factories, that Polish soldiers could act as reserves for ZOMO and that they could, together with ZOMO, attack workers' barricades. They also gave ordinary Polish soldiers an insight into the real Polish People's Republic: the incompetence of the *apparat*, and the fecklessness of the socialist economy, the hopeless muddle, decay and blight. The soldiers of the Local Operations Units (*Terenowe Grupy Operacyjne*) experienced all this both before and after 13 December. Both sides are likely to draw their own conclusions from the experience; these may be of much importance.

Pilsudski would have called the economic and political moves of the Junta since 13 December " perfuming the shit." PRON, OKON[23] and all the others, the operational economic plans and the unceasing reorganization, the deluge of hurrah-patriotic slogans: it is all nothing but perfumed shit. Unless radically reformed, the rotten system can do nothing but produce new crises and tensions. There is no question of its " opening up," which alone might give the people a part to play in the government of a country which calls itself a People's Republic.

THE total power of the *nomenklatura* continues. Only more so. And the Seym of the nominees of Gierek and Babiuch continues, a " dumb " Seym; and so do the repressions, involving numbers larger than ever before.

To cap it all, the outlawing of Solidarity was the burning of the last bridge, the last chance for coming to an understanding with society.

The most terse definition of communism since 1917 would, I think, be that it is the theory and practice of winning and keeping power. The *coup* of 13 December made a valuable contribution. All the communist regimes, from Havana to Moscow and Peking, are now studying it and will continue to do so for a long time yet.

How long can you go on galvanizing such a system? How long can it work? History is one day bound to give an unequivocal answer to these questions.

[23] Polish acronyms of the pro-government façade movements established under martial law.

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Colonel Wislicki Speaks

With the imposition of martial law in Poland military commissars (a term never before used in Poland) were assigned to state institutions, universities, factories, and enterprises to oversee compliance with the state of war. The following is an extensive excerpt from a speech made by Colonel Wislicki, the military commissar assigned to the official Polish radio and TV, to that institution's employees, all of whom are Party members.

SOME comrades say that this Solidarity was a kind of paper tiger that was destroyed overnight on 13 December 1981—that it is no longer dangerous and has ceased to exist. Such certainty has led some of us to declare that in principle we have won and it is time to celebrate our victory—time to curtail or abolish the state of war, that everything is back to normal. This is the attitude of those comrades who have installed themselves in their official armchairs under large potted palms—those who not long ago felt that there was something to fear, and are now under the protection of the military. Such a view of the situation is quite wrong. What is more, it is very harmful, because the situation, dear comrades, is very complicated, extremely complicated, and it is difficult to predict how it will develop during the coming months. Should any one of you ask how long the state of war will last, I think the answer is quite easy, but the solution is quite difficult. The state of war in Poland will last until the Party is reborn. And I'm not thinking here about the Party's bureaucracy, for that will be reborn quickly—I'm thinking about the rank-and-file members in large enterprises. For there are only two ways out of the state of war: dictatorship or democracy. There is no third choice. If we are talking about democracy—that is democracy in a socialist state—there must be a force around which this democracy will develop. In our situation, only the Party can be such a force. Political pluralism is out of the question. Any sort of opposition, more or less organized, is out of the question. The state of war cannot be lifted until the Party can take over the political direction of enterprises, which means that the state of war will continue for quite some time. It is not a question of months but of years.

(Commotion)

Yes, comrades, it is not pleasant, but it is the truth. I do realize that the question of the Party taking over enterprises is something that we speak about a great deal today. But the whole point in this political struggle is to make sure that this question is properly understood. I'm not talking about acceptance—we can't expect that from society. We are far from being accepted. So when answering the frequently asked question, " how

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long will the state of war last? " we can reply: " it will last a long time, " and for that, at least, the army is ready.

In this context there are other problems linked with ideological influences on society.

Lately we have noticed a great upsurge in the activities of the anti-socialist element within the country. After the initial shock caused by the introduction of the state of war—I have to admit, incidentally, that its introduction was easier than we had expected—the organizational system was introduced so smoothly, and there were so few victims—many fewer than we expected when the idea of the state of war was born. It was a great shock for the ideological opponent, but at the same time we must admit that the outward expression of shock passes and the enemy is beginning to gather itself together.

I would like to make a few comments on this subject. The question of Solidarity is linked with the question of the trade-union movement, and for the time being no one has any idea what to do with the trade-union movement. One thing is clear: it cannot be a trade-union movement with regional structures. This we know, for sure. But what next? No one knows. The Prime Minister said in the Seym that trade unions will be what the working class wants them to be. Personally, I would be more careful with this because I have serious doubts as to whether a trade union built according to the working class's wishes would be compatible with the proper functioning of the state.

(The audience shouts its agreement)

But what are we seeing now? We see that Solidarity, in, let us say, its underground state, is being better and better organized. Its organizations are beginning to function. I must say that I don't care much about the leaflets, but all sorts of bulletins that appear as periodicals, issue after issue, point towards a well-functioning organization. For example, in Warsaw, *War Weekly* is being published, with five issues already having appeared; that there is a group that publishes this weekly, and that it has a working system. As it so happens, there are many more such publications. Unfortunately, I don't have any data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What conclusions can we draw from the contents of these illegal publications? They want to convince the members of the Union that Solidarity exists and is organizing itself in the present situation.

Next, the articles in these illegal publications warn against terrorist activities. Indeed, they forbid terrorist-type activities. In his interview for American TV, Zbigniew Bujak—and we'll come back to him in a minute—said that Solidarity members should organize small, independent groups in a wide resistance movement—passive, not active, resistance. According to him, this resistance can take different forms. First of all, work should be slowed down because if people do this in the right way, they avoid repression. Other forms include all kinds of open

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letters to the government and to the Prime Minister—and such letters have started to appear. Another guideline is that, in extreme circumstances, strikes should be organized—but in a sporadic fashion, for it is known that if a strike is called, it will be broken one way or another. Let's say for example that some enterprise starts a strike. Then the riot police arrive to break the strike. Bujak and his comrades suggest that the strike should stop and work resume at that time. Then after the riot police leave, they can start the strike again. Some calls are for visible actions that will prove Solidarity is still around: turn off your lights at a given hour, light candles. We know that such actions are quite often successful.

Another directive is against any kind of cooperation. They call for the collection of evidence against " collaborators "—that's what they call them—so that they can get even with them when their time comes. They threaten members of Solidarity that if they cooperate in any way with the authorities they will be struck from the membership rolls when Solidarity . . . well . . . when it is reborn. Members of Solidarity are given instructions about what to do in order to hinder the functioning of military rule. These appeals are very frequent and they are signed by all sorts of leaders of underground Solidarity. They say, for example, that if a military commissar gives you an order, demand a detailed explanation and pretend you don't understand. If you think the order makes no sense whatsoever—obey at once. And so on. The situation is extremely complex. We're far from celebrating our victory. We may still face developments that we can't even conceive of at the moment. Everything is possible, comrades.

(Some in the audience call out: " *Comrade, what you are saying is terrifying.*")

Comrades, I can't say everything is OK if it's not. Whichever way you look at it, the situation is bad. I will not repeat what you can read in the newspapers or hear from the Prime Minister. The fact that I have managed to shock some of you, comrades, means that I have achieved my aim. Because that's what I wanted to do.

(The audience demands an explanation)

The point is that we must be ready and determined because that is what gives us the strength to do our work. I'm not holding anything back—that's the situation.

(Someone asks: " *Why haven't they caught Bujak yet? What the hell is the MSW [the Ministry of Internal Affairs] up to?* ")

Where is Bujak and what in hell is the MSW up to? We have no information from comrades who are dealing with this. I don't know whether the MSW knows where Bujak and the others are. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. For the time being it's difficult to get at them. If

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they are in a monastery, which is quite likely, or in a convent, it would be necessary to organize a company or a battalion to break up the whole place. I don't know if the internal and international repercussions would justify the effort to get Bujak.

(Another person asks: " *Should we negotiate with the Church then?* ")

Oh, my dear friend, who can come to an understanding with the clergy? I have no proof, but I am quite certain—and I could even bet—that a great deal of all those publishing centres operate in churches and monasteries. Anyway, if we had any certainty, if we were sure, if we had some idea of what trade unions will be like in the future, what will happen to Solidarity, then we could act decisively in this or that direction. If we don't have any idea, how can we know if this son-of-a-bitch Bujak won't come in handy one day. You are sure that he won't. I'm not so sure at all. Personally, I don't know what sort of game the security apparatus is playing. I don't know whether or not Bujak is being used as bait for someone else.

(" *Comrade, what is happening to Kania?* ")

As far as Kania is concerned, there are suggestions—for example, from our Soviet comrades, who judge him very critically—not directly of course, but at meetings—you know what sort of meetings. That's why he isn't First Secretary any more. Personally, I was very critical of his actions when he was First Secretary. But then, you see, Jaruzelski would also have to be criticized. These are complex problems. It won't be for another good few years, not before certain archives are available, that we will be in a position to answer the question as to whether or not the state of war was introduced at the right time. Perhaps too late, perhaps too early. Certainly not too early. But too late? Because all of us, as we sit here, demanded decisive action from the beginning. Only history will tell who was right—us or Jaruzelski.

(" *Comrade, why aren't the police arresting all those people who switch off their lights and light candles?* ")

It is not as easy as all that. First, this is a common occurrence and secondly, Jaruzelski stated that a state of war is in force in Poland but that no rights have been suspended. So what right have you to enter homes and ask people why they switch off the lights: they switch them off because they feel like it. They switch them off because they have the right to do so.

(Commotion. The audience shouts: " *What do you mean, they've got the right?* ")

Well, comrades, they've got the right. After all, what act of law can you use against them? There is no legal basis. It would have been an illegal act, an act of repression. Take Swidnik, for example. People go for a walk

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during the television news. They walk around peacefully, and what can you do about it? It is not an [illegal] gathering—no one delivers speeches, no one shouts slogans. They just walk around the main square, and what can you do about it? Send the riot police? You can't do that—that would be an escalation of terror. You talk about verifying people [ideological verification of state employees and workers]. We are verifying people wherever we can, and so what? We check a Solidarity member, saying that he doesn't work well. Or we verify him for political reasons. First—we have no right to check him because an amnesty has been declared—he might even have been a member of the KPN [Confederation of Independent Poland]. And when he comes to us and declares that he is giving up his membership, you can't tell him: " you've been a Solidarity member so you're fired! " The same applies to the academic community. To verify them? And what then? One has to think of the consequences. The verifications cause a great stir in those circles, and then I don't know whether such an academic, who is not with us but whom we control, wouldn't be more dangerous if he was chucked out of the university where he might organize without our control. . . . Well, I don't have an answer to that.

There are many such problems. Unfortunately there are no simple solutions. If there were, we wouldn't have got to the point that we have. You can't make the entire nation shut their mouths. There's no way it can be done.

Another topic, comrades, you wanted me to discuss is the issue of the Church. So, I think the Church is a time-bomb. To me it is clear that the Church's activity is, all in all, decidedly anti-state at this point. It is decidedly aimed against the current system in our country. But in the Church hierarchy there are differences of opinion. The most, shall we say, docile, is Glemp, who supports some dialogue with the government and who, on the whole, has accepted the necessity of introducing the state of war, considering it to be in accordance with the law. But Glemp doesn't accept all the consequences resulting from martial law: internments, the suspension of Solidarity, etc. He declares that the Church may guarantee that Solidarity will function as a trade union and not as a political organization. Macharski represents a more radical attitude though not an extremist one. As far as . . .er . . . what's his name . . . Gulbinowicz is concerned . . . he represents the very extreme in the Church. Those extremists include the older generation of the Episcopate, and it wasn't by chance that it was these three who went to see the Pope. Most probably they were chosen to represent all factions within the Church in order to work out a common stand. As far as the activities of the, say, rank-and-file clergy are concerned, more often than not they are decidedly anti-state.

Perhaps I should say a few words about a pastoral letter, dated 19 January 1982, which was to be read in all churches. It was an exceptionally perfidious letter calling, without mincing words, for armed resistance. Well, perhaps not directly, but there were statements which

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could be interpreted in such a way. For example, and I quote from memory, " The yoke, violence, could lead to retaliation and even to bloodshed." The authorities did their best to ensure that this letter would not be read out. In some parishes it was, and in others not. As I told you, those rank-and-file priests are decidedly anti-state and their activities are against the state. This is evident in sermons. On Christmas Eve, during midnight mass, three priests were arrested and two interned—because of what they were saying. All the cribs in the churches now have a uniquely political character. Religious symbols are pushed aside and the symbols of martyrdom have appeared—symbols of the Home Army—emblems of *Fighting Poland* [used during the Second World War by the underground army], banners spattered with blood, and so forth. Just as during Hitler's occupation. I repeat: I don't know if this time-bomb will explode. But we must be vigilant, because they are very cunning.

And at the end I should say a few words about us—about television. Right now—it's a bloody mess. There are four decision-making centres and each of them has something to say. And so, there are decisions from the Central Committee, from the government, from CROW [the Military Council of National Salvation], and from the Political Department of the Army. And the Commissar finds himself between the devil and the deep blue sea, not one devil but three.

(" *Comrade, there is one more point. How should we fight the propaganda from the Western radio stations?* ")

Comrades, there is a plan as to how to deal with these subversive broadcasts. It needs special equipment. We are going to organize broadcasts for eight hours a day on a wavelengh close to that of Radio Free Europe. From our Soviet comrades we will receive the range of RFE wavelengths, and we plan to organize a somewhat subversive programme. Anybody who wants to listen to RFE will look for that frequency, but he won't be able to tell whether he is listening to RFE or to our subversive programme. This will have to be done skilfully and intelligently.

(The audience bursts out laughing. Overwhelming applause.)

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The Soviet Angle

An Imperialist Plot

RONALD Reagan promised to turn the events in Poland into the beginning of the end of world communism even before he was elected president of the United States. An undeclared war against people's Poland soon followed.

Now that a great deal is known about the circumstances attending the events in Poland and documents have been confiscated from the counter-revolutionary groupings, the sources of the crisis which was deliberately provoked in Poland by anti-socialist elements with the all-too-willing support of several NATO countries have become obvious. An armed *coup* was in preparation and detailed plans for the dissolution of all Party, state and public organizations and the liquidation of thousands of people were drawn up. It was also planned to withdraw Poland from the Warsaw Treaty organization, to wipe out the socialist system and turn the economy into a capitalist one.

The foundations of the present Washington policy spearhead against the socialist countries were laid by Zbigniew Brzezinski when he was the US president's national security adviser. It was precisely Brzezinski who proposed that the United States set up pressure groups which would work towards destabilization in socialist community countries. It is abundantly clear that Poland held a special place in Washington's plans. By 1980, Western ideological attacks on Poland had become more concentrated and coordinated. The choice fell on forms of influence which would lead the economic and foreign trade executives, directors of training centres and trade union leaders to develop so-called independent concepts. These people were encouraged to embrace a pro-Western politico-economic orientation.

Through many international and national organizations which depend on the United States or are directly connected with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the subversive centres of the leading imperialist countries proceeded to lend moral, material and other forms of support to all sorts of renegades, dissidents and criminals, presenting them as fighters for civil rights. The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and other radio stations were doing all they could to make the Poles believe that their country's national interests were allegedly incompatible with socialism. The claim that the Poles have a natural hostility to the Russians was advanced. The fact that Soviet guarantees ensured the inviolability of the present Polish borders was hushed up—this was of particular importance when the revanchists of the Federal Republic of Germany had noticeably stepped up their anti-Polish activity.

Foreign subversive centres tried to spread tolerance among the Polish people and their leaders of the nationalists and counter-revolutionaries,

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portraying them as " fighters for the interests of the working people."

Western emissaries displayed special zeal in their efforts aimed at the ideological indoctrination of the Polish youth. The ambitions of the morally unstable sections of the younger generation were artificially encouraged. They were constantly told that they had a " special " role to play in modern society and that " fathers " and " sons " had incompatible interests. Immense sums of money were poured into these schemes. In 1981 alone the United States spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on " work " with the leaders of the Polish Youth Union, not counting resources coming through unofficial channels.

As requested by the White House, the US trade union centre AFL-CIO sent substantial sums of money to Poland, allegedly for the institution of what has come to be known as new independent trade unions. In reality, the money was designed to support the anti-socialist elements. Alongside the propaganda onslaught, the special services of the NATO countries were assigned to infiltrate agents into Poland in order to set up a ramified network of spies and saboteurs. . . .

Valeri Kuzavkov

" Poland: Miscalculation of Saboteurs," *Sputnik* (Moscow), Apr. 1982

KUZAVKOV's allegations about Brzezinski's sinister plan were followed by other " revelations." On 10 February 1983, Zycie Warszawy *reproduced, from the Spanish newspaper* Il Tempo, *the sensational " disclosure " of an alleged Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter (which Ronald Evans and Robert Novak characterized in the* Washington Post *of 30 March 1983, as a KGB disinformation plant*). It was then reproduced in the Soviet* Literaturnaya Gazeta *of 6 April 1983.*

We print below an excerpt from the " disclosure " and the accompanying comment by Literaturnaya Gazeta.

" On 17 March 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski gave President Carter his secret plan. 'The development of events indicates that the post-war division of Europe and the policy of *détente* are only a transitional phase,' wrote Brzezinski. 'The time has come to pursue a more active policy aimed at the development of a process of change, needed by us, in the communist world. After analysing the situation in various countries, we came to the conclusion that Poland is the weakest link among the countries of Eastern Europe.'. . ."

Comment by *Literaturnaya Gazeta*

" Thus we have before us a carefully prepared scenario for the counter-revolutionary overthrow of the Polish People's Republic which had been marked out already in 1978. Just think of it! There are still people who maliciously or naively assume that the events in Poland were the result of

* cf. Tomasz Mianowicz, " The Dept. of Disinformation at Work," pp. 36–41.

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some internal fermentation of minds and that the talk of external intervention is just propaganda! Well, propaganda indeed!**

" Let us look at the details of the proposals of the then US National Security Advisor. He ' perspicaciously ' drew attention to the Polish foreign debt. We all know how it turned out a few years later. He advocated fomenting anti-Soviet feelings. These appeals were taken up by all kinds of ' KOR-hustlers ' who defaced the graves of Soviet soldiers, the country's liberators from Fascism. Brzezinski called for the creation of a coalition government in Poland. This found an echo in the ' theoretical elaborations ' of the leaders of ' Solidarity.' In short, the Brzezinski scenario, worked out down to the last detail of the violent detachment of Poland from the socialist commonwealth, was put into operation by the Reagan administration. The new producers used all sorts of ploys: economic boycott, the nationalist attitudes of a section of the youth, religious feelings, etc. But . . .

" The author of the scenario considered Poland to be ' the weak link among the countries of Eastern Europe.' Here he overreached himself because he could not understand the strength and solidity of the whole chain of the socialist commonwealth which can defend its achievements from all, even the most perfidious, counter-revolutionary attempts.' "

** cf. " The Kubiak Report," pp. 87–107.

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The Dept. of Disinformation at Work

Tomasz Mianowicz

IN every country of the Soviet bloc there exists a so-called department of disinformation, that is, a department specializing in the dissemination of particular news items outside official propaganda channels. This department exploits the universal mistrust of society towards the means of communication which the government monopolizes: since the press lies, a whispered nugget of information purporting to come from a " high-up " source obviously carries with it the stamp of credibility. The department of disinformation in Warsaw is also known as the " rumour bureau." This does not, however, mean that all information emanating from this source is false; the degree to which the information corresponds to reality depends on the context of the situation and on the desired purpose. Sometimes, the rumour bureau reveals genuine facts, albeit unknown to public opinion, or popularizes political jokes, especially when the demise of some Party official is being prepared.

The atmosphere during the period of the so-called March events of 1968 could well be seen as an extremely interesting example of the way in which the department of disinformation works. " Could be " were it not the case that many facts linked to the March events remain unexplained to this day, which, in the history of communism, is nothing extraordinary. It is nevertheless possible to confirm that during that time the rumour bureau was able to exploit specific elements of public emotions, and was able to mobilize the Orwellian machine of external threats (international Zionism, the CIA, " imperialistic centres of diversion," etc.).

A later and extremely illuminating example of this kind of thing is the affair concerning the removal of the Soviet Ambassador Pilotovich. In Warsaw it was rumoured that this was initiated by Gierek, since the Soviet ambassador had meddled too brazenly in Polish affairs. The main point of the incident was obviously to ensure that the prestige of the First Secretary was not altogether lost—this was accomplished by exploiting the nation's nationalistic and anti-Soviet feelings.

The demotion of Jaroszewicz from his position as Premier was prepared by the news of his alleged death. This was accompanied by a whole series of jokes on the subject. Some weeks later, Jaroszewicz, already numbered among the deceased, undertook to die his real death—in politics.

WESTERN ignorance about the functions of the rumour bureau meant that, after 13 December 1981, the mass-media of the free world repeated " information " on a number of occasions which

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emanated from that very source. Official information, as well as public appearances by representatives of the military and state authorities, aids the work of the department of disinformation. All this established the fundamental psychological element in the junta's plan and played a most important role in the tactics adopted on 13 December. In Poland neither the squashing of the state nor the seizure of power by the army has been accomplished. Jaruzelski is at the head of CROW—he is nevertheless still the Premier of the Polish People's Republic (PRL); the decree announcing martial law was issued by the State Council department (Rada Panstwa), thereafter it was validated by the highest body of state government, the Polish parliament (Seym). The army, however, took over or supplemented only the administrative and executive organs. The real seat of decision-making remained untouched.

By 13 December, the news that Kulikov had told Jaruzelski that " if you don't do it, then we shall," had already spread all over Warsaw. According to a different version, the Soviet marshal was supposed to have brought a written ultimatum from Brezhnev with him. Leaving aside the naïve belief that the Warsaw public could know about Kulikov's conversation with Jaruzelski, it is necessary to point out that this information was calculated to appeal to the present anti-Soviet climate, all too often indistinguishable from anti-Russian sentiment. The authorities wanted to say: " we were unable to act in any other way—our Soviet comrades ordered it." But the department of disinformation wanted to create the impression that Jaruzelski's action was taken to defend Poland against a greater threat—an invasion by the Soviet Union. Officially, however, assurances were made that the introduction of martial law was to avert civil war, and this interpretation of events was taken up by commentators and politicians in the West.

At this point, let us remember that the department of disinformation had been building up Jaruzelski's social prestige for some months, unfortunately not without success. In August 1980 it was Jaruzelski who was supposed to have been opposed to the use of the army against the workers. Alongside the escalation of the crisis in Poland, half-rumours were circulating that the general " wants to act decently " and that he was going through a crisis of dramatic spiritual indecision. In an open letter written some time ago, S. Bratkowski said that the Party's last chance is " the personal authority, decency and goodwill of General Jaruzelski." A meeting with Archbishop Glemp and Walesa improved Jaruzelski's position in the eyes of Western observers and with a section of public opinion. Apparently, another member of CROW, Admiral Janczyszyn, was supposed to have been under house arrest in August 1980 as a consequence of his overly radical opposition to solving the question of " force."

The myth about Jaruzelski's role as a liberator is still being built up by propaganda. Radio Polonia laid great emphasis on the fact that for the first time since 1945, the First Secretary of the Party addressed the nation on Christmas Eve (the event in question was Jaruzelski's radio and

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television broadcast). Following a period of enforced inactivity because of martial law, Radio Polonia is now broadcasting once again in 11 languages. The disinformation broadcasts are intended for Poles living in the West, and for Western listeners in general.

The moves described above are intended to build confidence in members of CROW and enhance their popularity. Aside from such methods, many other aspects of national tradition are exploited. These aspects, after many years of ideological dictatorship, have taken on the character of symbolic substitutes for freedom, such as equipping the army with four-cornered hats.[1] These endeavours are nonetheless quite ineffective, since, in the case of Jaruzelski, we are dealing with a specific situation. Previously, all extreme political crises, as well as the massacre of workers, have led to a change in the ruling team: 1956, 1970, also 1976 (after June 1976, the fall of Gierek was only a question of time). With the help of various promises, and criticisms of the " bygone age," new rulers were able to gain public confidence for short periods of time. However, Jaruzelski acted in a completely different way, concentrating the maximum amount of power into his own hands in order to command his army to shoot at workers and throw thousands of people into prison. In this situation, in the eyes of society he is a finished man and no promises about a golden future, four-cornered hats or the like will help him.

On the other hand, a version of events which concentrates on Soviet blackmail has gained a great deal of popularity. Nonetheless, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn correctly observes, the affirmation that " the Kremlin forced Jaruzelski " does not explain anything. As early as January 1981 a number of documents were made public in Poland (the text is known as " How to destroy Solidarity "); in a number of cases the origins of such documents were the Party, government and military sources. These documents testify to the fact that the Polish authorities had been planning the annihilation of Solidarity for a long time.

It is evident that the military operation was conducted in strict accordance with Moscow and other " allies " of Poland. Some days before 13 December two significant meetings took place: one between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministers of the Soviet bloc countries. Marshal Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armies, presided over the smooth running of the whole operation. Of the many rumours circulating, one seems plausible to me: " the export " of Polish army uniforms to the USSR was certainly for the purpose of preparing Soviet troops for invasion, should the Polish army prove unwilling to fight. In the event, the army conducted itself in a satisfactory way, since only ZOMO and the UB fired their arms, and the army adopted the role of helper.

LET us return, however, to the various activities of the bureau of disinformation. Already by 13 December the news that Olszowski

[1] Four-cornered hats were traditionally worn by soldiers in the pre-war Polish army.

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and Grabski were under house arrest had spread through Warsaw. Jaruzelski made use of this opportunity to defend himself against the strictest dogmatists who were clamouring for blood, and who were in support of Soviet tanks. I was, therefore, not unduly surprised that, following the " release " of press correspondents in Warsaw, Western publications announced that the free world should change its opinion of Jaruzelski, who was, in fact, being threatened by so-called " hawks " lying in wait behind his back. The " liberal " Jaruzelski allegedly wants a compromise between the state and the Church, and he should be supported in this desire because otherwise the unbending dogmatists, Grabski, Olszowski and Siwak, will take over. I cannot overcome the temptation to cite a short verse by R. Krynicki in this context: " Apparently in the Politburo only liberals are in power. They only lack a strong hand to carry out their liberalism." Formerly, under Gierek, the Western press considered Grabski and Olszowski to be liberals.

There were other, similar " export " versions of events which served to mislead the West. During the period of the total blockade of information, journalists besieged airports and stations in Western Europe. " A certain lady " alighted from the express train " Chopin " in Vienna, and delivered some information about Solidarity extremists who wanted to blow up the steelworks in Katowice. Agency telex machines immediately went to work. At exactly the same time, the Soviet news agency TASS printed an identical piece of information.

The Western press has understood little about the Polish tragedy; however, it has excelled in reporting various " revelations," as for example, the " news " that " Walesa is shortly to be released! "—which regularly appeared as a heading to articles by reporters during the 11 months of his internment. Another example: the French television correspondent F. Gault devoted his first report about Poland to the tapping and monitoring of telephones in Warsaw. He dialled various numbers and on each occasion an automatic recording announced that " the conversation is monitored." The Polish authorities declared that *all* telephone conversations are monitored. The point was to make people frightened to talk openly, since the operation itself is technically impossible.

The mechanism of psychological terror may also be analysed with respect to Polish society—the rumour bureau plays an essential role in this case too. A few days after 13 December it was said that Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Walesa had died (according to another version Walesa had suffered a heart attack), Adam Michnik's back was broken (or his kidneys were kicked in), and Jacek Kuron was allegedly in a critical state. The purpose of the whispered propaganda was obvious: if the leaders of the movement had been murdered or massacred, then what sort of fate awaited the ordinary citizen if he continued to protest! The penalty for not coming to work in the newly militarized offices was death. By the same token, news was spread about the hundreds of thousands who had been arrested (a number—even in the gloomiest

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respects—greatly exaggerated). The Polish authorities deliberately hung back and did not deny the reported death of Mazowiecki. Warsaw newspaper " rags " turned Western reactions to all this news to their own advantage, rehashing the horrible details. Neither was the opportunity to profit from the whole situation by the use of propaganda lost on Comrade Marchais.

APART from the introduction of Draconian decrees, the terrorizing of the Polish population was also accomplished by the tone of official propaganda. Television broadcasts showed scenes of young, stony-faced soldiers taking an oath of allegiance to the state. They pledged " loyalty to the socialist fatherland "—the viewer was to understand that " in defence of socialism," the soldiers would shoot. The army brings order and discipline—every citizen must obey, since submission will be his salvation. In addition, a few days earlier, the news about the massacre of miners in the Wujek mine had shocked the nation. It was not only a matter of making the truth known (there are a number of versions about how many were killed); but of psychological terror and of demonstrating that the authorities will not be moved by anything.

Immediately following 13 December, supplies in the shops were more plentiful for a few days. This was achieved thanks to reserves which had been prepared in advance. The purification of the social atmosphere was supposed to be indicated by the suggestion that legal measures were being taken against Gierek and his comrades. (If such proceedings were really supposed to be an indication of justice then Jaruzelski himself should be sitting on the front bench with the accused.)

In official propaganda, the Orwellian machine of external threats already mentioned operates almost continually. It appeals to grossly vulgarized national feelings. Activists of Solidarity, KOR and the KPN (Confederation of Independent Poland) are accused of having links with " anti-Polish centres in the West " (the CIA, " West German revisionists," Radio Free Europe, and so on). According to *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Soldier of Freedom),[2] all such persons and institutions are a threat to the basic interests of the Polish nation. *Zolnierz Wolnosci* does not, however, express any opinion at all about the relevance to the interests of the Polish people of 30-odd years of Soviet rule.

Official propaganda magnifies by degrees the number of reports that claim to surpass production plans, the growth of discipline in work, the approach of " normalization." This fantasy is admirable, but even these endeavours had a specific psychological aim. The total blockade of information and the limited travel possibilities meant that all kinds of false news reports had a measure of credibility. In this situation the inhabitants of one region were unable to check whether the facts about the growth of discipline and record-breaking production levels in another region were true. In a number of instances local television programmes

[2] The official press organ of the Polish Army.

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have shown normalization taking place—but in other parts of the country these films are at least a year old, if not more.

The Bridge to Nowhere

During the recent visit of the Polish Primate Jozef Glemp to the USA, a number of regrettable demonstrations protesting against the head of the Polish Church took place. The organizers of these brawls—this is how they were described in the American press—were Poles [from the *émigré* " Pomost " (the Bridge) organization] . . . The Primate was not the first to encounter such incidents.

Stanislaw Lewicki, *Glos Robotniczy* (Lodz), 16 September 1982

The planned visit of Primate Glemp to the USA was cancelled. The above text is a description of an event which did not take place (ed.).

THE conclusion is clear: Jaruzelski's junta uses a specific psychological scheme as the basis for its action. I have in mind the reactivation of the characteristically Soviet mechanics of repression about which I have written here. The atmosphere of occupation is created by the ever-present army and by the police, by show trials and repressions. Such a psychological climate is aided by the functions of the official propaganda machine and by the rumour bureau. Their aim is to terrorize the population. Let us remember, however, that in the conditions of this system, hatred goes hand in hand with terror.

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Jaruzelski, Walesa and *The Guardian*

" POLAND'S last, best hope remains—as it has done all along—an understanding between Government, Solidarity and the Church which would permit the emergence of a genuine ' Front for National Unity.' "

Editorial, 7 Dec. 1981

" There can be no doubt that General Jaruzelski, a man of patriotic and moderate reputation who has often repeated his refusal to turn his guns on restive workers, acted out of sheer desperation. . . . If Poland can survive the next couple of days, the General will still have the opportunity to try for the accord he has long claimed as essential between the Government, Solidarity and the Church."

Editorial, 14 Dec. 1981

" The truly urgent need now is for an offer of relief aid on an unprecedented scale, coupled with Western governmental guarantees to commercial bankers to cover their Polish loans. . . . That offer should be made fast and publicly—and linked specifically to a successful conclusion of the talks now taking place between the military government, Mr Walesa and, according to some reports, the Church."

Editorial, 15 Dec. 1981

" The strains on the Western alliance imposed by President Reagan's clumping attempt to veto the natural gas pipeline is the most glaring (and most depressing) result of General Jaruzelski's constitutional *coup*. From the start the Europeans and the Americans tended to put a different gloss on that take-over. Despite EEC sanctions, Europe was grudgingly prepared to give the General time to prove himself. Perhaps he was a realistic reformer coming down hard on anarchy (a government which had lost the will to govern as much as a union which was filling the vacuum) before the Russians did the job for him. The view from Washington was that anybody who did not see the Muscovite snow on Jaruzelski's polished jackboots was soft on communism."

Editorial, 13 Aug. 1982

" The Polish parliament (the Seym) has been called into session later this week to pass legislation banning Solidarity. . . . It will allow the gradual emergence next year of government-licensed unions in individual plants. But it will forbid for ever and a day the use of the name Solidarity by the new unions. If all goes well, these sanitized shop-floor unions (forbidden to indulge in political debate and forced to accept the leading role of the Communist Party, the socialist nature of the state and

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Poland's place in the Warsaw pact) will be allowed to form themselves into ' vertical ' industrial unions (metal-workers and the like) in 1984. By 1985 they may even be permitted their own TUC—if they have behaved themselves in the meantime. . . . Government sources insist that the local unions will be allowed genuinely free and secret elections and that there will be no serious limitation on the right to run for office. . . . It may not be Solidarity. But it is a sight better than anything the Poles have known—except for those heady months in 1980–1981."

Editorial, 6 Oct. 1982

" General Jaruzelski is in Moscow today for Mr Brezhnev's funeral. Endless public tributes have already been paid here to the late Soviet leader. During our interview the General added that he was ' genuinely sad about Mr Brezhnev's death.' He knows Mr Andropov personally, and was obviously pleased that he had been elected to the leadership of the Soviet Party.

" ' I believe they elected the best man. He is very experienced; a statesman as well as an outstanding party leader. He is a person of high intelligence and considerable culture who has a profound understanding of the Soviet Union's internal problems as well as of the international situation,' he said."

Hella Pick from Warsaw, 15 Nov. 1982

" Poles with access to the foreign press or the BBC World Service will know by now that martial law will almost certainly be lifted on December 13. . . . The suggestions that the Party would retain control over foreign policy, defence and internal security, whilst allowing the people to have more say in social and economic matters, can only be welcomed. . . . There are also reports that press censorship is to be greatly relaxed and put on a properly codified and published statutory basis. As for the already public trade union legislation, it is a sight better than anything enjoyed elsewhere in the ' people's democracies' though a sight less than existed before martial law. . . . The government's task now . . . must involve both the release of the remaining detainees and an amnesty for the thousands more, tried and severely sentenced for infringements of martial law. It must involve an end to the harassment and dismissal of those deemed unreliable in the early months of the military regime. It must include an end to cackhanded attempts by the secret police to smear Mr Walesa by the circulation of forged and doctored tapes. Mr Andropov (if he was indeed the liberal and sophisticated KGB boss his PR machine claims) must be squirming at the big-booted and self-defeating clownishness of his Polish opposite numbers."

Editorial, 6 Dec. 1982

" Lech Walesa, the Solidarity leader, will probably be allowed to address a meeting next Wednesday in Gdansk, called to commemorate the

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anniversary of the 1970 riots. His speech—the first since his release from internment last month—is expected to echo a letter which he sent this week to the Polish leader General Jaruzelski. . . . Apparently the Walesa letter comes close to joining with the government in calling for an end to all ' illegal activities.' Mr Walesa is believed to have suggested that General Jaruzelski should find a place in the new trade unions, perhaps in PRON, for former Solidarity leaders who might now be willing to work for what is seen as the common good."*

Hella Pick from Warsaw, 10 Dec. 1982

Lech Walesa's Letter to General Jaruzelski

The Original

Dear General,

The forecasted lifting of martial law has prompted me to address you once again. It is certainly not the time for assessing the events and matters of the past years. It is, however, a valuable occasion to look to the future and show true hope for a better life. The people are in much need of this hope.

The deep and prolonged crisis can be overcome primarily by the efforts of the whole of society. It is also indispensable that we get foreign aid, which is now withheld for political reasons. The wakening of social efforts and strengthening the position of Poland in the world is possible only through rebuilding mutual trust between society and Government.

This goal can be achieved only if the August 1980 agreements are taken as a basis. Since the introduction of martial law, the Government, and you personally, have stated repeatedly that there will be no return to the pre-August 1980 state of affairs.

Meeting the expectations of the nation is the only way to awaken hope and contribute to social stability. This will require general amnesty for those tried during martial law for union activity and protest actions. I assume, of course, that this will be done in accordance with the decrees that were explained to me when I was released (and that) all internees will automatically be released with the lifting of martial law.

Secondly, that those dismissed from work during martial law for either union activity or just for mere membership in the union will be reinstated in their jobs. This issue has very wide social impact and arouses many painful feelings.

Thirdly, a breakthrough on the trade union impasse by the return to the principle of pluralism. The fact that the working class has not accepted the solutions implemented by the Government is now clear to all those who do not close their eyes to reality.

Without the acceptance of the Government's position by the working class we will not get far. These steps would open the road to a true social agreement.

I am ready to take part in work leading to this aim. None of us is doing each other a favour and none of us has to ask for agreement on our knees, because agreement is a necessity if you care about the good of the country.

Each one of us who has the good of the country in mind has to be open for agreement.

Lech Walesa, 4 Dec. 1982

The Guardian, 13 Dec. 1982

* This report was evidently based on the falsified text of the Walesa letter " leaked " to Western correspondents in Warsaw by official Polish sources (cf. T. Mianowicz, " The Dept. of Disinformation at Work " p. 36–41). *The Guardian* eventually published the authentic text on 13 Dec. 1982 without mentioning its correspondent's *faux pas*. (*Le Monde* printed both the genuine and the fabricated text.)

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The Forgery

General!

The announcement of the ending of martial law induces me to write to you, General. This is a precious opening on the future which allows a hope of progressive improvement. The nation has great need of such hope. It must be, above all, through the efforts of the whole nation that the deep crisis through which we are living can and will be overcome. In order to achieve this aim—there must be no room in Poland for quarrels and divisions. The only way to bring about an effort of the whole of society and the only way to reinforce Poland's position in the world—is through a spreading of trust—and also the people's trust in the authorities. Those who know only how to poison things do not understand this. The agreement must be given a real and valid content. I am ready for this job. Mistrust and grudges must be overcome. The only way to awaken hope is to contribute to social stability and to meet these expectations half-way.

For this, we need the following:

1. An end must be put to those illegal activities which are inflaming the situation—and all the militants who have taken the incorrect road of conflict with our State, the only State we have—must come out from underground and into the open.
2. The composition of the Patriotic Movement for National Agreement must encompass all those who are sincere and responsible and care about Poland.
3. All the ex-members of Solidarity who followed me should be guaranteed a place in the new independent and self-governing trade unions, acting in accordance with the Constitution for the good of the workers and without any political tendencies. We shall not get far without the support of the working class for the Government—a working class organized as above. It is by going in the directions indicated above that . . .

(*The last two paragraphs of the original were repeated here.*)

" So, Poland is to be kept on probation, while further efforts are made to eliminate the underground and to reduce all influence of Solidarity, while leaning on the Church in the hope that a national consensus can, after all, be fashioned out of the long-lingering crisis. . . . Instead of lifting martial law, as had been widely forecast by even senior members of the Polish leadership, General Jaruzelski has now chosen to mark the first anniversary of the imposition of the ' state of war,' by keeping it in suspended animation. . . . Internment will cease on December 31. But it still remains far from clear whether the members of Solidarity's national commission and other key advisers to the now-outlawed union will both regain and retain their freedom. Certainly there is no intention to allow either Lech Walesa, or his former colleagues to play a decisive role in the search for national reconciliation."

Hella Pick from Warsaw, 13 Dec. 1982

" Today is the anniversary of the riots in 1970 which led to many deaths in Gdansk. Mr Walesa has been told that at best he might be allowed to deliver a much abbreviated version of his planned speech. . . ."

Hella Pick from Warsaw, 16 Dec. 1982

" Lech Walesa was spirited away yesterday by the Polish authorities,

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presumably for interrogation, and long enough to keep him from an emotional reunion with some of his followers at the giant Three Crosses monument outside the Lenin shipyard."

Hella Pick from Gdansk, 17 Dec. 1982

" Poor Mr Lech Walesa. He has an apparently insoluble problem. The very source of his strength is also the source of his weakness. He will insist upon acting as if he lives in a democratic country. This week his crime was to attempt to attend a memorial meeting at a legal and official monument outside the Lenin shipyard, Gdansk. . . . But Mr Walesa's presence at the meeting—even preaching peace and love—was deemed too provocative. He was not, however, arrested. Merely given a nine-hour circular tour of the Gdansk ring road system in the company of a car load of armed Zomo men.

" When Sophia Loren was imprisoned in Italy for non-payment of taxes, the communist members of the Italian parliament gnashed their teeth because the great actress was such a beautiful woman. The Catholic members were red-eyed because a lady of great heart (and already past her prime) had been slighted in this way. However, the Polish parliament stoically endured the drama of this famous Italian citizen and did not table any motions of protest.

The Polish government has every moral right solemnly to condemn King Charles of Sweden over the action of the Swedish fiscal authorities, who, by demanding payment of taxes from the great film director Ingmar Bergman, forced him to emigrate. The moral right to protest about the severity of the Swedes comes from the fact that in our country, Andrzej Wajda, for example, has been granted far-reaching tax relief. Nonetheless the Polish government bravely kept quiet and our navy was not sent out to help Bergman. . . . Our self-restraint, however, has not been reciprocated. The visit of a Polish citizen, with the well-known name of Lech Walesa, to the fiscal department of the city of Gdansk, has caused the Western world to go completely ' over the top '. . . . The ordinary act of taking a Polish citizen to the tax office for clarification purposes has prompted heads of great states to stop in their tracks. The temporary absence of Walesa from his flat provoked the ' extreme concern ' of government leaders: the Senate of an important country organized a silent protest; Western statesmen, authorities, large organizations, television and press went mad. One would think that the Western world was so humanitarian that it could only relax and go to sleep knowing that, in faraway Poland, Mrs Danuta Walesa was bringing her husband his slippers."

Trybuna Ludu, 20 Dec. 1982

Mr Walesa would be foolishly optimistic if he now attempted to test the democratic validity of his detention in the courts. . . . In retrospect it is possible to argue that the West, too, showed a certain lack of realism in its response to martial law."

Editorial, 18 Dec. 1982

" Lech Walesa is now, officially, ' a private citizen.' Yet citizen Walesa is an international symbol. The government is surprised when his release

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does not end Western sanctions. His domestic symbolism is such that he must be prevented from laying a wreath at the memorial or clocking on for work. Walesa, meanwhile, plays things cool. . . . Beyond his demand for a general amnesty and guarantees for those underground or abroad, Mr Walesa wants reconciliation based on ' pluralism.' "

Editorial, 15 Jan. 1983

" Beware the Soviet bloc leader who advocates the use of ' administrative measures ' to deal with political dissidents. After all that has happened since the death of Stalin, such language is a calculated affront. It suggests—and is meant to suggest—that the machinery of state and party will be used to wreck the prospects of those who do not, eagerly and actively, toe the line. As such the remarks of Poland's General Jaruzelski to a Communist Party meeting at the weekend can only be greeted with a sense of gloom and foreboding. . . . The growing danger is that Poland's leaders will push the nation into sullen Czechoslovakian repression whilst protesting their determination to lead their compatriots into prosperous neo-liberalism, Hungarian-style."

Editorial, 2 Mar. 1983

". . . last winter's phony peace was just that—a period of sullen, unstable cowed silence rather than an indication that the nation had come to its senses and put all the romantic nonsense about Solidarity behind it."

Editorial, 19 Apr. 1983

" Mr Lech Walesa is a ' has-been.' He will not be ' a partner for our government.' The words are those of Mr Jerzy Urban, the official spokesman for the Polish regime, as quoted in Wednesday's (Communist) *Morning Star*. . . . On Tuesday, in an editorial, the same paper pointed out that the recent demonstrations took place ' in the face of a massive display of force.' In context, said the leader writer, the demonstrations cannot be dismissed as the work of ' a handful of agitators.' They testify to the deep feelings of dissatisfaction within Polish society. The leader concludes that 'it is unrealistic to continue to deny its (Solidarity's) existence as a legitimate social movement.'. . .

" We quote the *Morning Star* in the hope that those within the Polish administration who have grown used to our words, will look longer and harder at those of their natural friends and allies. . . . General Jaruzelski looks with envy at decentralised and prosperous Hungary. . . . Hungary reached its present, relatively happy, state over the bodies of 25,000 dead and over the corpse of unquestioning loyalty to Soviet edicts. Could Comrade Jaruzelski reach the same goal without the bloody prelude it would be achievement indeed. But, to steal a phrase from the *Morning Star*, it will not happen without a new recognition of Poland's legitimate social movement."

Editorial, 6 May 1983

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The Significance of Solidarity

Timothy Garton Ash

READING many Western treatments of Solidarity I have found myself recalling Jung's reading of seventeenth-century alchemists. Jung read the alchemists not to discover anything about the physical realities which they ostensibly described, for of course they could tell him nothing about those realities, but to discover the hidden patterns of the unconscious, the myths, fantasies and archetypes which lay beneath the scientifically meaningless surface. Similarly with these Western accounts of Solidarity, which tell you nothing about Solidarity but a great deal about the dominant myths, fantasies and archetypes of our own political culture. Examples of this contemporary alchemy can be found from all points of the political compass, but the richest examples undoubtedly come from the Left.

Here you find, for example, the terrible phantom of the reactionary, bigoted, nationalist, anti-socialist, anti-feminist, anti-semitic Polish Church, which lives an extraordinarily vigorous afterlife in the mind of the Western Left. I need hardly say that this phantom " Church " bears as much relation to the real Church of Wyszynski and Wojtyla, the Church described by Adam Michnik in *The Church, the Left: a Dialogue*, as the alchemists' speculations about the composition of gold do to the real facts of metallurgy. Here, too, you find the phantoms of " nationalism " in Solidarity and " liberalism " in the Polish United Workers' Party (*homo rakowskiensis*). The aspiration to national independence, which is to be praised and encouraged in Africa and Central America, must be deplored in Central Europe—for here it is directed against the Soviet Union. Solidarity reveals once again how strong the residual myth of the Russian revolution still is in the subconscious even of the non-communist Left. Contrariwise, " liberalism," than which no illusion is more to be deplored in our own domestic politics, becomes the saving grace, the very *lapis* itself, in Polish communists.

Curious as these mental acrobatics are, they are obstacles to understanding. Any real understanding of the significance of Solidarity must start from a recognition that the phenomenon is *sui generis*, unique and novel. There is no single ideology or heuristic system which can explain it; it simply does not " fit " into the existing intellectual frameworks with which we have tried to make sense of Europe and the world for the past 30 years; it obstinately refuses to " translate " into the available moulds of " Left " and " Right," " East " and " West," " communism " and " capitalism." What other movement anywhere in the world could be supported by President Reagan and Signor Carillo, Mr Berlinguer and the Pope, Mrs Thatcher and Tony Benn, peace

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campaigners and NATO spokesmen, Christians and communists, conservatives, liberals and socialists? And how embarrassing for so many of those people to find themselves *on the same side*! One of the most frustrating aspects of the Western reception of Solidarity was the amount of time spent distinguishing *our* kind of support from *their* kind of support: *our* support, said the European socialist, has nothing in common with the " hypocrisy " of President Reagan—*our* support, said the Reagan adviser, must not be confused with the fraudulent pretence of a Mr Berlinguer.

Beside these obstacles, there is the obvious obstacle of proximity. What would we think today of a " balance-sheet " of the English revolution drawn up in 1662, of the French revolution in 1798 or the Russian in 1920? The first of these dates is perhaps the most relevant, since it is now clear that Jaruzelski's possible Bonapartist role is invoked in vain. We are watching a Restoration, a counter-revolution with no effective incorporation of revolutionary change by institutional reforms in any sphere. This effectively obscures the longer term changes wrought by the revolution. Minerva's owl may have flown at dusk, but it has not yet reached the altitude for clear vision.

Nonetheless, we can see already that by all the scientific historical laws of Marxism-Leninism what happened in Poland in 1980–81 was impossible. The first genuine workers' revolution in history developed under the sign of the cross against a " Workers' State "! Solidarity blew a hole the size of Poland through the central claims of communist ideology: the impossible happened. This is surely one reason why the Soviet Party attaches such importance to the KOR trial. It is urgently necessary for the Party itself, in the Soviet Union and in other Soviet bloc countries, to have some half-way plausible ideological explanation of what happened in Poland. The myth that KOR " hijacked " the mass movement, that it was to the Polish revolution what the Bolsheviks were to the Russian revolution, will provide this ideological fig-leaf. In fact, while it can be argued that *before* August 1980 KOR did play the role of the Leninist vanguard, raising the political consciousness of small groups of workers in key industrial centres, *after* August 1980 its role was quite different. Far from injecting radical utopian perspectives into the mass movement, far from nourishing those fantastic illusions which had accompanied previous European revolutions, the intellectuals who are now to be made scapegoats did all they could to puncture the utopian illusions which undoubtedly surfaced among the young workers who led Solidarity (especially at the regional and large factory levels). It was precisely the Kurons and Litynskis who constantly pointed to the limits of the possible. But, *weil nicht sein kann was nicht sein darf*, the truth will be turned on its head to accord with the ideological fiction.

IT seems improbable that such fictions will restore self-confidence, let alone a minimal credibility, to the still comatose *Polish* Party—which is currently, in Adam Michnik's excellent characterization, " a trade

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union for the rulers." It therefore seems probable that the military and security apparatuses will continue to play a more important role in the front line of the politbureaucratic dictatorship. In this respect, Poland has gone further, faster down the road of militarization that we can observe in many other areas of the Soviet empire, both at the centre and on the periphery. The dangers of this development are obvious. Yet it is still possible that there are opportunities as well as dangers. As Leszek Kolakowski pointed out 12 years ago in his famous essay on " Hope and Hopelessness,"[1] Soviet regimes have *in practice retreated* from the logical extremes of totalitarianism over the past three decades: they no longer dictate the precise kind of brush-stroke with which an artist should paint, or the particular theory of evolution which a biologist must believe. Is it not possible that this retreat could be hastened by the developments we have discerned? That a society could win for itself more areas of freedom and self-determination under a more traditional kind of military despotism than under an ideologically militant, totalitarian one-Party dictatorship? I have myself more than once referred to the example of the Ottoman empire, which, over a span of centuries, underwent such a transition, so that in its later phases it even tolerated *Christian* governors in Serbia. Could we not see an " Ottomanization " (rather than a " Finlandization "!) of the Soviet empire? (Of course this does not answer the long-term question of how a sickening empire finally dies. The Ottoman empire did not *die* peacefully.)

Does Poland today give any credence to this faint hope? I think it does. Take, for example, the regime's monopoly of information, and, in particular, of the written word. Would the regime like to restore this crucial totalitarian monopoly, smashed in 1981? Of course it would. It appreciates that the Lie is central to its power. In fact, Poland in 1981 confirmed the first part of the prophecy which Solzhenitsyn made in his 1970 Nobel speech. Between the lie and violence, he wrote, " there is the most intimate, most natural, fundamental link. . . . Once the lie has been dispersed, the nakedness of violence will be revealed in all its repulsiveness, and violence, become decrepit, will come crashing down." The truth of the second part of this prophecy has yet to be confirmed. Clearly the regime tries to restore its monopoly—witness, most recently, the preparations for an ideological *Gleichschaltung* of the Writers' Union. But how partial is its success! How far from total the restoration! For reasons of tactics—vis-à-vis the Church, perhaps even vis-à-vis the West—and simply because of the limits of military and police power over a society transformed by revolution, officially tolerated (*Tygodnik Powszechny*) and unofficial pluralism in the written word is still greater than in, say, East Germany.

Of course the regime will constantly try to claw back these lost areas of control. General Jaruzelski's recent speeches confirm that its ideal, its aspiration is still totalitarian; but the way in which it rules in practice

[1] Leszek Kolakowski, " Hope and Hopelessness," in *Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (80), pp. 37–52, 1971.

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falls far short of the ideal. It will sound incredible to many Western ears (in which the praises of the Kadar model have been long and sweetly sung), but I believe it can be argued that there is a sense in which Poland today is in a *better* condition than Hungary. It is, self-evidently, in the realm of consciousness rather than of being: but then, Solidarity suggested that ultimately consciousness will determine being.

From the inadequate historical altitude of one year it is naturally hard to describe the lasting transformation of consciousness wrought by Solidarity. One element of this transformation was the mass *re*-affirmation of certain traditional, European primary values. For 16 months we in " the West " were privileged to watch the Poles fighting, with extraordinary courage, dignity and self-restraint, for values which we could hardly (though some did) fail to recognize as our own—individual freedom, democratic government, the rule of law—values born from the common culture of old Europe. At a time when many young people in the West seemed to doubt the primacy of these values, in the face of economic recession and the threat of nuclear war, young Polish workers, who had lived all their lives under communism, were daubing on a crane in the Lenin Shipyard the words " Man is born and lives free." It was Polish *schoolchildren* (in Gdansk) who chose as the motto of their unofficial journal: " Dangerous freedom is dearer to me than safe bondage." Now there is a somewhat mysterious simultaneity in the post-war histories of " East " and " West." The years of crisis in the East, 1956, 1968, 1980–81, have been years of crisis—or at least of startling new developments—in the West as well. In the case of those two burgeoning social movements of 1980–81, Solidarity and the Peace movement, it was hard to avoid the impression that the old Europe (speaking through Solidarity) had been called in to redress the balance of the new.

BUT Solidarity was not merely what Poland was to G. K. Chesterton, the heroic defender of Latin Christendom against the diabolical materialism of the East, the embodiment of traditional European values. Anyone who troubles to read the Solidarity programme will see that it in fact embodies a quite original mixture of ideas, goals and proposals, drawn from very diverse traditions and experience—" right," and " left " and " centre." A few years ago Leszek Kolakowski published a " credo " entitled " How to be a conservative-liberal-socialist."[2] Solidarity produced a conservative-socialist-liberal programme. In culture and education, for example, it might justly be characterized as " conservative-restorationist ": that is, it proposed to *restore* the knowledge and values which had been *conserved* in the Church, the family, and in the preservation (unofficial and *émigré*) of the continuity of Polish culture, to their proper place in the schools and universities.

[2] Leszek Kolakowski, " How to be a conservative-liberal-socialist," in *Encounter*, Vol. LI, No. 4, October 1978.

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The main political institutions which it envisaged for the " self-governing republic " were those of a classical, Western liberal democracy. But the priority it gave to equality, the welfare state, and full employment, can be characterized as " socialist."

Clearly, the use of the label " socialist " in this context is very problematic, since the Solidarity delegates who drew up the programme deliberately *deleted* any mention of " socialism " from it, since for them " socialism " meant the bankrupt system under which they had lived for over 35 years. Yet, the aforementioned priorities are a large part of what distinguishes " socialist " parties in the West from other parties, and what distinguished, for example, the pre-war Polish Socialist Party from other pre-war parties. Really one should prefix the word " socialism " every time one uses it with the qualifier " real, existing " or (as important) " ideal, non-existing," to indicate the sense in which it is used. It seems to me evident that the young generation in Poland has internalized some of the " socialist " (ideal) values taught by the " socialist " (real) system, and that some of these ideals are expressed in the Solidarity programme.

This eclecticism brought down the charge of rag-bag incoherence on the Solidarity programme. This charge was unfounded, except to some extent with regard to its economic proposals, which were not so much incoherent as inchoate. There is nothing logically incoherent in the *idea* of combining elements of the market, central planning, and workers' self-government, but clearly Solidarity was not allowed to work the mixture out in practice. No doubt, with experience, some of their ideas on self-government would have changed beyond recognition in a year or two. Similarly, as Kolakowski indicated, there are conservative, liberal and socialist goals which are by no means mutually exclusive. All political programmes contain elements of inconsistency, all promise more than they can deliver, but the Solidarity programme will stand comparison with any other political programme produced at the time. Compared with the programme of a younger generation who have lived all their lives under parliamentary democracy—the West German " Greens "—it is a miracle of coherence and lucidity. It is a pity that this Solidarity programme was overtaken by events, and soon forgotten in the West, for I think it should provoke us to question our own stereotypes about the shape of society and the state.

A third element of transformed consciousness which has a significance beyond Poland's frontiers is Solidarity's use of the concept of " society." I will not dwell here on the *dis*advantages of the terminology which became current in Solidarity, characterizing the essence of the conflict in Poland as a Manichean struggle between " the society " (*spoleczenstwo*) and " the power " (*wladza*). It is a terminology which was crystallized by KOR before 1980, and was initially more prescriptive than descriptive. It indicated what should be

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rather than what was. It combined the Enlightenment idea of a " natural identity of interests " in " Civil Society " with the Romantic idea of the organic unity of the nation. The reality in the mid-1970s was still a society which was quite skilfully divided against itself by the economic " divide and rule " tactics of the Gierek team. Only in the quite exceptional circumstances of 1980, when economic collapse robbed the regime of the economic means to " divide and rule," and the opposition (and the Pope's visit) spread the idea of solidarity, did the subjective reality of social/national unity overtake the objective reality of socio-economic divisions.

Probably never, except in wartime, has a European society been so united for so long. In the past, the Russians had of course exploited the divisions within Polish society to fragment the insurrections (e.g. in 1863/4)—class struggle had frustrated national struggle. Not in 1980–81. True, the client ruling class—and a larger class of people whose power, privileges, and status depended directly on the perpetuation of the unreformed system—fought the revolution tooth and nail, in their own and Moscow's interests. But Solidarity transcended all other social and economic differences—to the end. If there was an erosion of belief in Solidarity's capacity to change the condition of Poland in autumn 1981, it was a general falling off, not a falling out of class against class. This was an extraordinary achievement—a quantum leap in consciousness.

This central idea of self-organized " society " versus " power " has, moreover, a larger potential importance for the future of opposition throughout the Soviet empire. All revolts against Soviet domination, against " Yalta," inevitably become (if they do not actually begin as) movements of *national* liberation. Given the history of nationalism in Eastern Europe, however, this national dimension invariably militates against the desirable—no, the indispensable—solidarity between the oppressed peoples of the Soviet empire. In this respect, Solidarity was no exception. Not only did it give rise to a wave of animosity in East Germany, where the crudest anti-Polish sentiments were voiced by the working class and quietly encouraged by the regime, but even in Hungary, a country with strong historical ties of friendship with Poland, enthusiasm for the Solidarity experiment was confined to small groups in the intelligentsia. Among the workers, resignation (after the experience of 1956 and the subsequent terror) and fear for their hard-won, moderate prosperity, so dependent on good East-West relations, seem to have been dominant emotions. If " divide and rule " failed inside Poland, defeated by that deliberately created consciousness of social unity, one must admit that it succeeded (in the short term) on the international level. The importance of the perspective of " social self-defence," of emancipating " the society " step by step, piece by piece, from " the power," still seems to me that it offers a *common* basis for resistance in the diverse nations of the empire. The " nationalism " which many scholars see as the greatest threat to the empire, by contrast, is a double-edged sword.

That is one more reason why the experience and the lessons of

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Solidarity must not be forgotten. For as Milan Kundera writes, out of the bitter experience of Czechoslovakia's " normalization," in the Soviet world " the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting."[3]

[3] Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, Faber, London, 1982.

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Resistance to Totalitarianism*

Aleksander Gella

THE younger generation of Polish sociologists' " countdown "[1] to the events which led to Solidarity are inclined to start with changes which took place in 1956. But in fact the beginning of the dramatic events which paved the way to the present situation began in 1939. Since September 1939, Poland has been the arena of a permanent struggle between totalitarian invaders and native democratic forces.

Those who try to forget the set of catastrophes which have befallen Polish society since 1939, have consciously and unconsciously considered Poland a communist state by choice, and therefore have been unable to see the conflicts between the Polish communists and Polish society which began in 1944.

The Polish struggle against twentieth-century totalitarianism has had the longest history of all such struggles in Europe.[2] Was Solidarity really the first non-totalitarian mass movement in twentieth-century Europe? After the German invasion of 1939, the inhabitants of Poland, the country which a contemporary British historian has rightly called " God's Playground,"[3] already saw the first non-totalitarian movement on a mass scale: this was the Polish anti-Nazi resistance movement, which, from its small beginnings in 1939, had grown by 1944 into the greatest underground movement in occupied Europe with its own state and its own army. The second was the anti-Soviet movement which took place during the first post-war years.

Between 1939 and 1945, the citizens of Poland also witnessed three geographical mass movements caused by the totalitarian policies of the powerful neighbours of Poland. The first lasted only a few weeks, when, in September 1939, several million civilians left their villages, towns and cities in the western part of Poland, and with a small suitcase in hand escaped from the German war machine which gave the world its first lesson in the *Blitzkrieg*. The second movement in this category was well organized but not spontaneous. It happened in 1939–41, when the

* This is part of a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 16 Oct. 1982, Washington, DC.

[1] The term is borrowed from the book by Jakub Karpinski, *Countdown. The Polish Upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980* (Karz-Cohl Publishers Inc., New York, 1982). Karpinski devoted the first 36 pages to the events between 1939 and 1956, so he knows that the upheavals of 1956 and after had their roots in the tragic past of Poland. In general, one can observe, however, a distinctive difference in the perception of Polish events by older and younger generations: between those who have their own experience of the Second World War and the Stalinist terror, and the generation born in the Polish People's Republic. For the latter the " great " events began in 1956, while the 1940s belong to that period of history about which they have contradictory information: that from textbooks and that from private sources.

[2] One can say that priority belongs to the civil war in Spain. It was seen by European democrats as the defence of democracy against " brown " totalitarianism. But in 1936 the West did not yet know that it was really the first struggle between two totalitarianisms: the " brown " and the " red," although the latter presented itself in democratic dress.

[3] Norman Davies, *God's Playground. A History of Poland*, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.

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NKVD deported 1,693,000 Polish citizens[4] to Kazakhstan and Siberia. The third one took place in 1945–46, when, by the grace of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, " the great friends " of Poland, several million men, women and children were transplanted from the eastern part of Poland, where their families had lived for centuries, into the new Polish (formerly German) territories.

One should also remember that this nation helplessly saw the transplantation of about 2·5 million Polish Jews from their small towns into ghettos built in the bigger cities, and then the deportation of the masses of Jews from other countries, and from these ghettos to the death camps in Poland.

Of course, all these deportations and transplantations, which affected Polish citizens some four decades ago, do not fit any definition of a social movement; however, they are worth mentioning because they also were the results of totalitarianisms which, over a period of 43 years, have deprived Poles of freedom and independence. Almost all Poles who are over 43 years of age have some personal experience of these mass events, while the younger Poles know of these dramas only from family stories.

AT first glance one might think that, because of the Nazi and then anti-Soviet movements, Solidarity does not deserve the name of the first anti-totalitarian mass movement. However, one must remember that these movements took place in war-time conditions and had a military character, while Solidarity was a working-class movement that took place in peace-time and was born not out of well-organized forces, but out of the mood and experiences of the Polish workers. It presents a classical form of that which sociologists categorize as a social movement.

Official Polish propaganda successfully convinced the West that Poland regained its independence in 1945, though contained in new and better boundaries and under a new political system. The West, enjoying peace and post-war reconstruction, did not want to know what was actually going on in the country which had been its most faithful ally, and where show trials, mass arrests, tortures and the physical liquidation of all forms of opposition, civil and guerrilla, lasted until 1949.[5]

Even after Stalin's death in 1953, totalitarianism was still dominant in all fields of Polish national life: in politics and in education, in the exploitation of the workers and in the oppression of the peasants, in the brain-washing of the intelligentsia and in the censuring of all acts of creativity, in the intimidation of religion and in the undermining of family ties. During this time the new cultural elite developed the art of double-speak and the rhetoric of agitation. While they bowed at the

[4] Data from the largest collection of documents on the Poles in the USSR, 1939–42, elaborated by Col. Jozef Lis, MS. (Archives of the Jozef Pilsudski Institute, London, England).

[5] It is astonishing how little this period of Polish history is known in the West. Even the Polish *émigré* centres have been victims of misinformation. The first documentary works showing the drama of this period were published recently: Stanislaw Kluz, *W Dziejowym Potrzasku, WiN na Szlaku AK* (Veritas, London, 1978), and Leslaw Jurewicz, *Zbrodnia czy Poczatek Wojny Domowej* (London, 1980).

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feet of the " Great Lie," the masses of workers and peasants, being closer to the base of social reality, saved the rudimentary elements of the socio-psychological infrastructure of the national culture. This was possible because of the tremendous changes which these social classes had undergone since 1945.

THE most demanding question concerning the formation of Solidarity as an independent trade union of the working class in a communist state is: " What happened to the industrial workers in Poland, who in 1944–45 formed that part of society which Soviet propaganda conquered most easily, and yet 35 years later became the most powerful force of opposition to the Party's manipulation of national affairs? " The answer may be found in three socio-historical changes which occurred in Poland.

The first was the influx of the peasantry into the ranks of the urban workers so that by 1965 over 50 per cent of the industrial workers were born into peasant families and 25 per cent spent the first 14 years of their life in villages.[6] They brought into their new social environment many characteristics of the peasant archetype. Politically important are three of these characteristics: the distrust of any ruler, stubbornness and doggedness in the struggle for their limited but rightful demands, and a deep religious spirit.

The second socio-historical change was the rapid growth of education related to the expanding role of technology and scientific research and methodology used in industry. The index of educational growth in Poland for the years 1950–62 was actually a little higher than that in Western European countries.[7] The average years of education for Polish workers in the socialized economy increased between 1968 and 1971 from 7·91 to 8·38 years.[8] The workers' general knowledge and culture " also began to be changed by the dissemination of information by the press, books, radio, various educational actions, ideological training, the popularization of knowledge, etc.," as noted by Jan Szczepanski in 1973.[9] The elevation of the workers' education and general knowledge helped the workers to distinguish between reality and propaganda, as well as made more possible and fruitful their cooperation with the advisers and experts of their independent union.

The third socio-historical change was the transformation in relations between the working class and the Church. This was related to three facts:

1. The new working class by and large discarded the anti-clericalism and atheism of the old proletariat. This was partially a result of its

[6] Adam Sarapata, " Klasa robotnicza w Polsce Ludowej," in Adam Sarapata (ed.), *Przemiany spoleczne w Polsce Ludowej* (PWN, Warszawa, 1965), p. 496.

[7] Janusz Gorski, " Preface " to Z. Bokszanski et al. (eds.), *Wspolczesna polska klasa robotnicza* (KiW, Warszawa, 1975), p. 9.

[8] B. Nowakowski, " Poziom wyksztalcenia robotnikow w przemysle Lodzkim," ibid., p. 231.

[9] Jan Szczepanski, *Zmiany spoleczenstwa polskiego w procesie uprzemyslowienia* (Instytut Wydawniczy CRZZ, Warszawa, 1973), p. 211.

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peasant background and the fact that 25 per cent of the working class still dwell in their native villages,[10] which were always the strongest bastions of Polish Catholicism.

2. The position of the Church in post-war Poland has been significantly changed. Prior to the Second World War, the Church was seen by the workers as the ally of the exploiters, the ruling class. During and after the Second World War, the Church gained the trust of the workers, not only because of the peasant family background of the majority of the new working class, but also because the Catholic clergy, who had first been persecuted and murdered by the Nazis[11] and then oppressed by the communists, had become the strongest ally of the oppressed people. The arrest of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, the Primate of Poland, was the greatest insult to the Catholic nation. Thus, while relations between the Party and the working class deteriorated, the attitude of the workers towards the Church was gaining positive dimensions. In the post-war period, the percentage of priests of lower-class origin, not only in the ranks (as was the case previously), but also in the Church hierarchy, became dominant. This facilitated the deepening of trust even in old anti-clerical minded workers.

3. Polish religious life in general was elevated both at the moral and the intellectual level. During the 35 years (1945–80) when the nation was deprived of its native political leadership, and those leaders accepted by Moscow were not outstanding individuals, the Church in Poland was lucky to have several great leaders whose wisdom was as great as their strength of will. They were Prince Cardinal Adam Sapieha and then Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski. Both presented a unity of courage and reason. Both won the respect of the entire nation. It was due to their activity that a great revitalization of Catholicism in Poland took place. This phenomenon gave the world " Papa Wojtyla," as the Italians used to call John Paul II, who grew up in the religious life which was guided by those two great leaders and spiritualized by the mass suffering of the nation.

The efforts of the Polish intellectuals, the foreign influences, the American " love at long distance "[12] for the Polish workers, and even the nonsenses committed by the crumbling state authorities were unable to unite this nation and show it its own strength to the extent that the Great Pilgrim did when he visited his country in 1979, one year after his

[10] Adam Sarapata, op. cit. p. 496.

[11] " About 2,000 Polish Catholic priests died during the Nazi occupation, of which number 610 were murdered within the area of their dioceses, 1,062 in concentration camps, 80 in prisons and 188 as a result of the operations of war. Thirty-six priests were missing. In 1939–45, 270 monastic priests, 70 clerics and 180 friars were murdered. About 90 nuns were killed and about 460 arrested." This information has been given by Prof. Czeslaw Pilichowski, Chairman of the Main Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland, in his article, " From Severe Restrictions to Extermination; the Nazi Policy of Exterminating the Polish Clergy of Various Denominations," *Poland* (monthly) October, 1981. (The cited data concerns only the Catholic clergy.) See also: O. Biskupski, *Ksieza polscy w niemieckich obozach koncentracyjnych* (Miller and Sons, London, 1946); and Wieslaw Zylinski, *Sytuacja Kosciola katolickiego w Polsce (1939–53)* (M. Chaplin and Co. Press Ltd., London, 1953).

[12] Alexander Cockburn and James Ridgeway, " Love at Long Distance: Polish Workers and the US," *Village Voice* (New York, 17 Dec. 1980).

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election to the Holy See. Then it was evident that the working class and the peasantry still felt the deepest attachment to their fatherland's cause. All the years of the Party's campaigns against the Church and atheistic propaganda did not stop militiamen of this Marxist state from bending their knees and kissing the Pope's hand. They did this not in secrecy but in front of TV cameras from around the world.

Before the main agreements between the Inter-Factory Strike Committee and the Polish government commission were signed in 1980 in Szczecin (30 August), in Gdansk (31 August), and at the " July Manifesto Coal Mine " (3 September), the workers' unrest and their contact with the intelligentsia's opposition and dissident groups created a social ferment which was waiting for some organizational form. The demands for the formation of " free " trade unions were known from 1977. During the next two years this idea spread throughout the country. As two journalists said: " Polish workers are in a perhaps unique position to know both what labour unions are not and, even more importantly, what they should be."[13] Around the entire country the workers appeared basically to have the same goal. What was unique in this period was that all other working people united with the workers and supported their demands.

THE establishing of the Independent Trade Union Organization injected new hopes into the nation. This organization did not limit itself to the traditional role of unions but expanded into a mass anti-totalitarian social movement. The anti-totalitarian attitudes of the workers were best expressed in the " 21 Demands " of the Gdansk Agreement. The workers went far beyond the conventional demands of trade unions; they did what the parliament of the Polish People's Republic was never able to postulate. In point No. 3, the Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS) required the state " to respect freedom of expression and publication, as upheld by the Constitution of People's Poland, and to take no measures against independent publications as well as to grant access to the mass media to representatives of all religions."[14] Point No. 4 required it to re-establish the rights of people arrested after previous strikes (1970 and 1976), to re-establish the rights of students excluded from higher learning institutions, to free three political prisoners (names given), and " to cease repression against people for their opinions."[15]

In general the demands of the Polish Independent Trade Union Solidarity went much further than their authors' counterparts from the East and West had ever dreamed.

The great process of national renewal under the flag of Solidarity was possible due to the identification of the Polish workers and peasants with

[13] Ibid.

[14] The Gdansk Agreement 31 August 1980, quoted from Denis MacShane, *Solidarity, Poland's Independent Trade Union* (Spokesman, Nottingham, England, 1981), Appendix 3, p. 153.

[15] Ibid.

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the heritage of Polish history, a heritage whose flag-bearer had until then been the intelligentsia. The long-lasting policy of the " sharpening of class struggle " produced in Polish society an unwanted and unexpected unification of the entire nation, not a " classless society " but a united national organism. Unfortunately, the harmony of such a large and complex body as modern society is fragile by nature, and is exposed to internal centrifugal forces as well as to the conflicting interests of external powers.

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The Founding of KOR

Jan Jozef Lipski

THE events of June 1976 in Ursus, Radom, Plock and many other Polish cities did not find the opposition movement, which had already begun forming in Poland, unprepared. Through the defence of a few persecuted students from various universities, and especially through the campaign of December 1975 against the introduction of changes into the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, the students and intelligentsia became integrated into one oppositional force. Poland's rapidly deteriorating economic situation led people to believe that the authorities would be forced to seek a solution in, among other things, price increases; this heralded a new outburst, similar to that of December 1970, on the coast. The intelligentsia opposition movement, which by now was gaining a firmer footing, was both morally and psychologically prepared to counter any acts of repression with acts of solidarity with the repressed. The events of March 1968 and December 1970 had shown that an open and active stand must be taken. At the outset, in March 1968, the majority of workers were indifferent to the student pogrom, in some cases (although not as frequently as the government press would have one believe) even taking part in it: donning police uniforms, they took up truncheons when the occasion arose in the conviction that they were re-imposing the law and order that had been violated by hooligans and idlers. In December 1970, the students and intelligentsia, in their turn, did not react to the massacre of workers on the coast.

This mutual indifference, by putting into question the strength of existing social bonds, created doubts as to whether society could still be spoken of in terms of a cohesive whole encompassing various layers whose social, moral and, above all, common national interests were opposed to the central bureaucracy of a totalitarian state. The question subsequently arose as to whether the scope of this pathological social disintegration, towards which the totalitarian state had worked for decades, was not such as to endanger the very existence of the Polish nation. For there can be no nation if the bonds that unite various social layers against loss of sovereignty and totalitarianism imposed upon them have ceased to exist.

That the opposition movement, then, decided actively to support the expected workers' protest had both social and national causes. An understanding of this is essential for a correct interpretation of the history of KOR.

The anti-KOR propaganda, issuing both from opposition circles negatively disposed towards the committee, and from the Party and government, exploited in roundabout ways the nationalist and, in

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particular, anti-semitic slogans used in 1968 to combat the students' and intellectuals' movement (in the pro-governmental version, incidentally, this nationalism was of a type peculiar unto itself, namely, a nationalism that advocated dependence on and submission to the Soviet Union). It was hinted among other things that KOR and its circle lacked patriotic motivation; this was then explained by the fact that several members of KOR were of Jewish origin. Once this latter argument, fuelled by anti-semitism, is disposed of as being neither refutable nor worth refuting, it remains to be said that some knowledge of the biographies of the co-founders of KOR, people who by 1976 already had some 10 years of public activism behind them, should alone suffice to counter all accusations of indifference to patriotism. The membership of KOR included members of the Polish Legions, soldiers from 1920 and from the Second World War, soldiers from the Home Army, representatives of the government-in-exile in the Polish Underground, and prisoners under Stalin, not to mention those who have made lasting contributions to Polish culture. Since, however, accusations of indifference to patriotism levelled at KOR were, from time to time, received in good faith, they require some explanation.

One of the arguments used to support these accusations leans on the fact that in 1968 the student movement did not emphasize independence and nationalist slogans, and that a significant number of KOR members came from that movement. This, however, rests on a misunderstanding. In the first place, it is not insignificant that this movement should have started from a protest against the censor's suspension of Adam Mickiewicz's play *Dziady*, a masterpiece of Polish romantic literature which was playing at the National Theatre in Warsaw. For Poles this play is an object of national devotion. At the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, in the course of discussions which took place after the release of Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, it became evident that any far-reaching programme of social and political reform had to encompass the problem of independence and national sovereignty; this was emphasized especially by Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik. It was also evident that the abolition of the Soviet protectorate in Poland would be a necessary condition for significant reforms of any kind. (By the time of the founding of KOR, to this idea was added the conviction that the retrieval of sovereignty, dependent to a great extent on international circumstances, must be preceded by a rebuilding of social bonds and public consciousness independent of the state.) One such discussion, in which about 30 people took part, took place at the flat of Jadwiga Staniszkis, and I recall that in those circles which centred around Kuron, Michnik and Modzelewski, this position was even then quite clearly defined. If these discussions had taken place a few months earlier, before the eruption of the student movement, if they had had time to crystallize in a tentative programme, these problems would have found much more definite expression in the declarations of the student movement of 1968.

In 1975, 1976 and the years following, the " commandos " had

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already had a period of time in which to consider this problem. In the case of Kuron and Michnik, these thoughts found their expression in publications—a fact which a part of public opinion stubbornly refused to acknowledge, preferring for reasons unknown to lend an ear to the insinuations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs rather than to the texts written by the very activists in question.

Thus, let me stress once again: the opposition movement which crystallized in the years 1975–76, was prepared to support the expected workers' movement by means of protests motivated by both social and national concerns.

It is worth mentioning here that this readiness to support the workers was the result of an evaluation of the workers' movement in Poland which was rarely voiced at that time. The majority of the intelligentsia misinterpreted the 1956 and 1970 workers' protests, believing them to be of a purely economic nature; it was a popular belief that workers were prepared to go to battle only over the price of sausages and things of that sort. Hence the surprise when, in August 1980, the strike movement went far beyond economic demands. This was a misunderstanding which the founders of KOR were never taken in by. It would of course have been strange if the workers were completely indifferent to their economic situation; nevertheless their aspirations always went further, and they had the potential to articulate political demands. On the other hand, all the outbursts did have direct economic causes, these being the most effective catalyst if only because in a single day they caused masses of people to explode. In such conditions the price of meat acquired symbolic importance: it was on this issue that worker discontent was concentrated, but it had an incomparably wider scope.

By 1976 the intelligentsia of the opposition movement was already well aware of this. But it also knew that this time a letter protesting about the repressions, and declaring solidarity with the workers, would not be enough: their support would have to be institutionalized.

IDEAS which are born suddenly amongst people more or less aware of their aspirations tend to become collective, even if their ultimate formulation is the work of one particular person. The idea of a committee that would institutionalize the intelligentsia's support for the workers arose in a similar fashion, and had two protagonists who lent it its specific shape: Jacek Kuron and Antoni Macierewicz.

The idea crystallized in July. Immediately after the events of June, a group of people who wanted to do something in connexion with the workers' protests met at Laski.[1] There Adam Michnik, in a room previously inhabited on many occasions by Jerzy Zawieyski,[2] was writing his book, *The Church, the Left: a Dialogue*. At that time there was no

[1] A place near Warsaw famous for its Institute for the Blind.

[2] Jerzy Zawieyski, a Catholic member of the Polish parliament, resigned from his post in 1968 after his famous speech addressed to Gomulka from the floor of parliament.

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talk as yet of a committee. But by the time of the first Ursus trial (17 July), the idea had taken definite shape.

What was the essential concept behind the idea of KOR? Several things must be listed simultaneously, since they were all, from various points of view, fundamental.

It was above all an idea of an activism that would appeal to, would be rooted in, ethical values and general moral principles, and not come from a political stand. This is a complex point, but it must be grasped in order to understand what KOR was. Obviously, if anyone takes a stand, to whatever degree, against a totalitarian regime, that stand is by definition a political one; in the same sense a painter who, in the quiet of his own studio, paints an abstract or surrealist work during a period of Zhdanovism, commits a political act, classified as hostile to the system and its ideology. This is the essence of totalitarianism: ultimately, everything becomes political because the authorities want complete control. But they want above all to regulate and control the human conscience in the realm of public affairs in order that it should react in accordance with their decisions and enactments. Thus, whoever claims, in condemning acts of solidarity with those who are persecuted by the totalitarian system, to be acting apolitically is in fact taking the view that submission to the authorities and conformity with their position on moral standards and values should be the highest and most absolute human principle. Such a view ought to seem absurd to anyone who is not a totalitarian ideologue; and yet, in practice, it often serves as justification for people and organizations who, through fear or opportunism, voice and practise " neutrality " towards any evil which bears the government stamp. Anyone who has fought against communist totalitarianism (more effective than fascism in finding smoke screens and " dialectical " justifications for evil) knows that it is just as important to break through this sort of opportunist stance as it is to break through the barriers of fear and inertia. Thus KOR assumed from the outset that it would be an institution which urged people to fight totalitarianism on a plane which left no doubts about the fact that they were defending ethical values, and above all with the aim of bringing organized help to those who were being persecuted by the totalitarian authorities. KOR's members and collaborators included people of definite political views—even activists of great political ambition and temperament—as well as others who on the whole were rather uninterested in politics, and the sum of whose aspirations in this respect amounted to democracy and sovereignty for Poland, with no attempts even to sketch an outline of a programme towards these ends. Those KOR activists, moreover, who were interested in politics, represented a wide range of views and orientations. It was clear under these circumstances that KOR would never become a political party. But a conscious anti-totalitarian stance, combined with a programme of defending moral and humanitarian principles, allowed for a very wide basis for agreement and a claim to popular support.

KOR was also an idea for open activism. No attempts were made to

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conceal the committee's existence or its membership: addresses and telephone numbers were publicly available. The idea was an offshoot from previous forms of protest: the signatory of a letter, petition or declaration, would sign his full name, thus revealing his identity to the public. There was fear of repression, but at the same time the credibility of the document in question was increased. The founders of KOR knew that overcoming the barrier of fear was not merely a necessary condition for the success of their undertaking, but, indeed, was one of its aims; it had moral, as well as social and political, significance. It was therefore clear that those who were the initiators must set the example of breaking through the barrier of fear.

Finally, KOR was an idea for an activism which would be not only open, but legal. International agreements, such as the Helsinki Final Act, ratified by the Polish People's Republic, the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, and many other acts and statutes, provided a basis for legal activity, if one refused to accept the arbitrary interpretation given them by the Security Services. Even the committee's very existence, the legality of which was put into question by the police (KOR had never taken steps to obtain official permission for its activities by registering with the authorities), had a legal justification: there is an old act in force in Poland, paradoxically enough from the 1930s, the period between the wars (there was a dictatorship in Poland then; albeit a relatively mild one, and not totalitarian, it was a dictatorship nonetheless, directed against communists, amongst others), which provided for the possibility of forming ad hoc committees (to provide help for flood and fire victims, etc.) without registering them as such. Furthermore, KOR only had one characteristic of an organization, namely, a membership. It had no statutes, no president, no dues. And there was another aspect of the law: an association seeking registration became illegal the moment permission was refused, and continuation of its activities led to penalties. This was not the case in simply failing to register, which was merely an administrative misdemeanour. In these, and all similar matters, KOR knew that acts of repression or their absence would depend, not on the state of the law at any given time, but on the authorities' confidence in their own power. Nevertheless it preferred to have the law on its side whenever possible.

IN the course of the meeting at Laski described above, the first document was drawn up: a protest, signed by a group of people from the intelligentsia circles of the opposition, declaring solidarity with the oppressed workers.[3] For a variety of reasons some of the people who participated in this discussion did not sign; on the other hand, there were

[3] *Letter of the Fourteen* expressing solidarity with the workers (full text: *Kultura*, no. 9, pp. 63–64, Paris, 1976). This text was given its title by the editors of *Kultura*. A declaration not addressed to anyone in particular, it took the form of an open letter to the public as a whole. The editors of *Kultura*, who could not have known the exact chronology of events, placed this document after several others, whereas it should properly head the " Documents " section. Of the letter's 14 signatories, 9 were members of KOR, and the remaining five collaborated with it.

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a number of signatures of people who had not taken part in the meeting at Laski. The documents which followed were: Jerzy Andrzejewski's "Letter to the Repressed Workers"[4]; the "Declaration of the Eleven"[5]; and the "Letter of the Thirteen to Western Intellectuals."[6] Andrzejewski's letter had an enormous effect, and became more widely known than the other collective letters. No wonder: he was a prominent, well-known writer whose name was familiar to the young workers from their schooldays.

Another collective protest which deserves mention was the "Letter of the Ten to the Head of the Council of State," 24 August 1976. The letter appealed for an amnesty for the workers who had been arrested and for those already sentenced. It was signed by a group of activists from the Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK), one of whom later became a member of KOR.

The date of the birth of KOR—the date, that is, of the first real action undertaken by a group of people before the formation of the Committee—is not, I think, in question: on 17 July 1976, in the court at Leszno in General Swierczewski Street, the first Ursus trial took place. On that day contact was first made with the families of the repressed workers.

In this way, on that particular day, an important barrier was overcome. The entire social system of communist countries, with the political police at its head, has as one of its main aims the prevention of communication between different layers of society. Pre-war Poland had institutions such as the TUR (The Association of Workers' Universities), The People's (i.e. peasant) Universities, and many others, not counting political parties, which enabled the intelligentsia to have contact with the workers and peasants, or at least with their young elite, an elite in terms of intellectual and educational ambitions. Under the Polish People's Republic such institutions were either abolished or deprived of their genuinely autonomous nature; subject to the state and Party bureaucracy, they were no longer capable of fulfilling their multifarious functions in society. Thus a wall was erected between the workers and the intelligentsia, a wall difficult to penetrate. Those from among the intelligentsia who did have some sporadic contact with workers (not counting contacts between engineers and workers which did not begin to play a significant part in broadening social communication until the time of Solidarity) were few and far between. The primary problem for the movement which was taking shape was the question of how to initiate direct contact with the brow-beaten and cowed workers of Ursus and Radom.

[4] *Letter from Jerzy Andrzejewski* to persecuted participants of the workers protest (ibid. p. 60).

[5] *Declaration of the Eleven* expressing solidarity with the workers (ibid. pp. 64–65). This title was also given by *Kultura*. Four of the signatories were KOR members; the remaining seven were collaborators.

[6] *Letter of the Thirteen to Western Intellectuals* (ibid. pp. 58–59). The title comes from *Kultura*. Six of the signatories were KOR members, the rest future collaborators of KOR, *Zapis*, and TKN (the Flying University).

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The halls of the provincial courthouse in Leszno on that day were an unusual sight. Police troops blocked off the part of the corridor which housed the courtroom in which the trials of the Ursus workers were taking place. It was not even possible to read the court calendar displayed on the courtroom door, which angered and shocked foreign correspondents. It was simple to pick out, from amongst the public gathered there since the morning, the few workers and the families of the accused; the much more numerous civilian security agents, some familiar faces among them, likewise left no doubt as to their profession. There were also a dozen or so people from opposition circles, among them Jacek Kuron, who at the beginning of July had been conscripted into the army and was still struggling, with the aid of medical certificates, to remain a civilian; Jan Jozef Lipski, who on that day had at his disposal, thanks to his collaboration since 1968 with the charitable sections of the Church, a small sum of money from them—small for general purposes, but significant for those first few days; and some others.

In spite of everything it was clear from the outset that making contact would not be easy. It was not without reason that the families of the accused looked distrustfully at what was, in the end, a large audience; the civilian security officials did not for a moment allow their gaze to wander from those opposition members familiar to them, continually photographing them in a way that was hardly discreet, and attempting at the same time to listen in on their conversations. It is not everyone who is able to approach and initiate a conversation with complete strangers, manifestly distrustful ones at that; and being under police surveillance poses some further psychological difficulties. Thus the point at which these barriers were overcome was a decisive one for the entire operation. During a court recess, one of the weeping women was approached by two girls, Malgosia Lukasiewicz and her friend Ewa. A few words expressing warm interest and sympathy, and the ice had been broken. The families of the accused were not happy with their official government lawyers. They had no way of contacting others (in this respect those of the accused, mainly from Radom, for whom this was not the first encounter with the " distribution of justice," were in a better position, for they already knew what to do). Thus one of the first things suggested to the defendants' families was that they be supplied with lawyers in whom they could have complete confidence, and that they not be liable for any subsequent fees. When one of the women was worried that she would not be able to attend her husband's trial the following day because the neighbour who normally took care of her children would not be able to that morning, the scout master Piotr Naimski offered that a group of uniformed scouts come to her flat early the next morning to look after her children, and assured her that they would do it professionally, having had some experience with kindergarten children at summer camps. This form of help was immediately accepted and put into effect. We now knew that, given a little time, we could enter the Ursus grounds.

Some resourceful and enterprising scouts from the " Gromada

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Wloczegow " (A Band of Wanderers) scout group of the Rejtan High School immediately went to work at Ursus, helped by Henryk Wujec, a young activist from the Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) in Warsaw. They were soon being assisted by a whole group of his friends from KIK. It would indeed be difficult to overestimate the huge amount of work which was done then. The young men and women, passed among the workers' families from hand to hand, door to door, soon gained their trust and popularity, and often even their help; they kept a record of acts of repression, collected accounts of the 25 June workers' protest, gathered information about the fate of people who had been arrested or laid off; they began to distribute the first benefits, to find lawyers, doctors for the sick, and often for those who had been wounded and beaten up on 25 June, and who were now deprived of medical aid because they had been dismissed from work. KOR began to keep files and documents. On 25 August 1976, a " Description of the repressive measures initiated against workers of the Ursus mechanical factory and other plants (based on many eyewitness accounts)," was published, or rather distributed in some several dozen copies. The first problems began to arise. Where would the money come from? By what criteria should it be distributed? How should expenses be registered, how and to whom should account of them be given? In the meantime, however, things were done spontaneously. The idea of collecting money, bandied about among the opposition, soon went beyond the active opposition circles and became popular first in Warsaw, then in other cities and even in the country, despite the fact that it was more difficult to reach there. The money began to flow in. Other problems, easy to anticipate, also arose: opposition activists were kept under surveillance (this was, for some, merely an increase in the surveillance under which they had been kept since December 1975); flat searches and the first 48-hour arrests began. At that time also began the first attempts to terrorize the workers: police and security officials made " house calls "; " talks " warned against foreign intelligence and agents of Radio Free Europe, against . . . Jews. None of these talks had much effect.

Shortly after the first Ursus trial, Jacek Kuron was drafted into the army, despite medical certificates testifying to traces of an infarct in the back wall of the heart, visible on ECG readings. It was during his army training that he wrote his " Open Letter to Berlinguer " which caused something of a stir and proved later to have been a fortuitous tactical move.[7] (This letter was later cited as evidence by those who called Kuron a Eurocommunist, which was a misunderstanding.) It was clear by now that a committee that would be accountable for the public funds collected to help the workers would be formed; it would appeal to the public for help and cooperation, concentrate volunteers, organize protection for persecuted activists, and provide information about the June events, their results, measures of aid and assitance, and new acts of repression.

[7] *Open Letter from Jacek Kuron to Berlinguer* (ibid. pp. 61–62).

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THE matter of membership of the committee was a simple one, owing to the experience of many letters of protest which showed that while it was relatively easy for the authorities to arrest young people " without a name," they were much more reticent in the case of those who could boast greater authority with the public and whose names were well known at least in some specific circles which could not be ignored. Thus the committee, it was decided, ought to be composed both of authoritative, well-known people " with a name," often advanced in years, and of young people, known as yet very little or not at all, who were in fact already doing and directing the main bulk of the committee's work.

The person who would undertake to organize the committee would have to meet some necessary requirements. These included having a wide range of contacts in the intellectual circles of the opposition; the most appropriate candidate in this respect was Jan Jozef Lipski, and it was he who took on the task. (Adam Michnik was excluded very early on, having managed to procure an invitation to France from Jean-Paul Sartre, and anticipating, with good reason as it turned out, that he would be given a passport. It was obvious in these circumstances that the organizational possibilities and publicity that Michnik would have in the West would far outweigh in importance his future activities in the sphere of helping the workers. Hence the decision that he should avoid crossing the path of the Security Services before his departure. Once in the West, Michnik accomplished a great deal for KOR, showing great initiative, intelligence and intuitive understanding of the situation. Upon, or rather the day before, his return, he formally became a member of KOR.)

The organization of the committee was a complicated and time-consuming task. It was not until September that a meeting of possible KOR members was convened, but it brought no definite results. The meeting took place in Professor Edward Lipinski's flat. About 20 people took part in it, people mainly from literary and scientific circles, as well as some older and middle-generation activists. The younger generation comprised Antoni Macierewicz, Piotr Naimski and Miroslaw Chojecki. Lipski began by presenting the situation as it had evolved since the June events, the scope of repression, the necessity for and current state of aid measures, as well as numerous reasons for convening a committee. At the time it was thought that this body would take the name " Committee for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights," which would recall the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, as well as an older tradition: the League for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, an institution active in Poland in the 1930s, and for a period of time having Professor Edward Lipinski as a member of its governing body.

The notion of convening a committee was something of a shock for many of the meeting's participants. No wonder—these were new ideas being expounded, it was unprecedented and difficult to predict whether they would lead to effective action. Few people wanted to stop at the

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staging of a demonstration, which would only lead straight to prison. Those who took part in the discussion, moreover, were serious people, well aware of the great responsibility they were taking upon themselves; they wanted a chance to think over this proposal, although the time for new ideas was running out. One may assume that if Kuron, with his pertinacity and " powers of persuasion," had taken part in that September meeting, the committee would have been formed there and then; as it was, it was resolved that a commission would be called together to prepare the committee (this commission, if I remember correctly, was composed of Ludwik Cohn, Jozef Rybicki and Aniela Steinsberg, and perhaps others as well), and everything was delayed. In the meantime, however, September had brought with it new circumstances. The movement was spreading very rapidly. By the beginning of the month, the aid measures for workers also included aid to workers from Radom, where the needs were different from those in Ursus, and new, hitherto unknown problems arose: for example, the high percentage of criminals among the accused workers in the Radom trials. This " mix " was the result of a conscious and cynical manoeuvre by the Security Services trying to influence public opinion, which was unaware of this manipulation and was in need of someone authoritative to explain it. Then there was heightened surveillance, and acts of repression were also on the increase. Young activists who were helping the workers were also beaten up for the first time. On 16 September our friend Ludwik Dorn was beaten up at the police station in Radom. Arrests became more and more frequent. A committee, by guaranteeing the young activists public credibility, would thus diminish the risk of the most dangerous acts of repression.

This situation resulted in something like a *coup d'état*: the young activists demanded the speedy creation of a committee, threatening, if this did not take place, to form their own. They were wholeheartedly and enthusiastically encouraged by Jacek Kuron, who kept in touch with the movement from his garrison in Bialystok with the aid of go-betweens, and who made constant use of this method to encourage Lipski. As a result, an " Appeal to the Public "[8] was " rounded up " and put together, the committee was named the Workers Defence Committee (at the suggestion of, I think, someone from the scout group, the " Black No. 1," possibly Macierewicz himself), and signatures were collected.

Here I must digress slightly to explain the meaning of the phrase " rounded up." The heightened surveillance, increased frequency of searches and 48-hour arrests, which took place in September, augured badly for the committee's chances of organizing a meeting. Thus another method was decided upon: liaisons. Generally the younger and middle-aged members of KOR themselves took a rough draft of each proposal to all concerned, collected any opinions and suggestions for changes, and

[8] *Appeal to the Public and to the Government of the Polish People's Republic,* along with the letter proposing Jerzy Andrzejewski as head of parliament (*Kultura*, no. 11, pp. 161–162, Paris, 1976).

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repeated the " round " after the second stage of editing. During the first month of KOR's existence it was in this laborious fashion that all the documents published by the committee, including those concerning its foundation, were written.

Owing to various doubts and reservations, both formal and substantive, not everyone who was at the September meeting in Professor Lipinski's flat signed KOR's founding " Appeal." However, all these people took part in the later activities of KOR and its sister institutions. Others who had not taken part in the September meeting also signed. The following is a complete list of the first signatories:

1. Jerzy Andrzejewski (*d. 20 April 1983*)
2. Stanislaw Baranczak
3. Ludwik Cohn
4. Jacek Kuron
5. Edward Lipinski
6. Jan Jozef Lipski
7. Antoni Macierewicz
8. Piotr Naimski
9. Antoni Pajdak
10. Jozef Rybicki
11. Aniela Steinsberg
12. Adam Szczypiorski
13. The Rev. Jan Zieja
14. Wojciech Ziembinski

Today all these names are known, if not to the entire people of Poland, at least to that part of it which maintains a lively interest in public life; in September 1976 some of these names were known only to a few. I should nevertheless give a brief sketch of who's who, in order to show the kind of people who would have the confidence of the public.

1. Jerzy Andrzejewski

No recommendation is needed for this author, one of Poland's most prominent modern writers. One can only add that he made his mark on the public memory, at a time closer to the period of KOR's foundation, not only by his strictly literary works, but also by such acts as his letter, written after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in 1968, to the head of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, Emil Goldstücker, and again by his letter to Polish workers after the June events. During the time of KOR's existence he was also co-editor of the uncensored literary quarterly, *Zapis*.

2. Stanislaw Baranczak

One of the most distinguished poets, literary critics, and historians of the young generation. For some years a member of the PUWP. A permanent resident of Poznan, he became KOR's representative for the Wielkopolska region. He, like Jerzy Andrzejewski, also joined the

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editorial board of *Zapis*. In the period following August 1980, he left Poland to take up a professorship at Harvard University. This ended one of the episodes which had most discredited the attitude to culture adopted by the authorities of the Polish People's Republic. When Professor Wiktor Weintraub retired, the chair of Slavic Studies at Harvard became empty. The study of Polish literature and philology is not in general a significant part of the Slavic Studies curriculum in the United States; not so at Harvard, where the chair of Slavic Studies had for many years been occupied by an excellent scholar of Polish literature, and a Pole at that. Harvard, upholding this tradition, offered the chair to Baranczak. It was extremely important, both for the spread of Polish culture within the United States (for instance, within the Polish community there) and for maintaining the chair's Polish character, that this position be offered to a Polish scholar. For the Polish authorities, however, all this was insignificant; more important was the vengeance which could be wreaked on Baranczak as a co-founder of KOR. The position stood open for years, in anticipation of his arrival. At one point, when Harvard offered it to the German scholar Viegut, the author of many works on Polish literature, it seemed that the opportunity had been lost. However, he declined, unwilling to exploit the political discrimination practised on a colleague in Poland. Polish literature and culture at Harvard were saved by the arrival of Baranczak in August 1980.

3. Ludwik Cohn

A barrister who served as counsel for the defence in many political trials, and later as legal adviser to a number of publishing houses in Warsaw. A prominent activist in the Union of Independent Socialist Youth, the Association of Workers' Universities (TUR), the Youth Organizations of the TUR and the PPS, and after the war in the underground PPS-WRN,[9] which led to his being sentenced in the Puzak trial. He is also known in the field of international law. He took part in the battle for Warsaw in 1920 and in the defence of Warsaw in 1939, and was three times awarded the Polish equivalent of the Victoria Cross. He was a prisoner in a concentration camp.

4. Jacek Kuron

Trained as an historian, his interests and talents lie rather in the field of pedagogy. A scout master. Twice expelled from the PUWP, once in 1955 and again, this time for good, in 1965. His function in KOR was particularly significant: an extremely dynamic activist, a talented strategist, full of ideas and initiative, he naturally attracted associates and co-workers. By the time of his participation in the founding of KOR, he already had two political trials and sentences behind him, and nearly

[9] WRN: *Wolnosc, Rownosc, Niedpodleglosc* (Liberty, Equality, Independence), the name of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) when it functioned underground during the occupation.

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six years of prison. In some he inspires confidence and close friendship; in others, animosity and often hatred. His wife, Grazyna, a faithful companion to him throughout all his experiences, played an especially important role in KOR in 1977, when, after the May arrests, those of the members and associates of KOR who remained at liberty had to bear the responsibility for the fate of the organization. Their son, Maciej, also collaborated with KOR.

5. Edward Lipinski

An eminent scholar, economist and historian of economic thought, a socialist for all his adult life. A member of the Polish Academy of Sciences and of many foreign and international scientific associations, he contributed greatly to higher education in the Underground during the German occupation as director of the underground Main Trade School. In 1948 he became a member of the PUWP and the PPS, being the only KOR member to have a Party card, which was not taken from him until a few years later. Despite his age (he was born in 1888) he took a genuinely active part in the work of KOR, participating in discussions and decision-making, giving interviews at plenary sessions as a member of the Board of Trustees and of the Editorial Commission. He impressed everyone with his iron logic, the clarity of his reasoning and his bold and unhesitating way of thinking and speaking his thoughts.

6. Jan Jozef Lipski

A literary critic and historian, he passed the qualifying examinations for the post of assistant professor. A soldier in the Home Army, he took part in the Warsaw Uprising, was wounded and awarded the Polish equivalent of the Victoria Cross. From 1957 until 1962 he was a member and president of the board of the " Klub Krzywego Kola "(the Crooked Circle Club) in Warsaw, and joined the editorial board of the journal *Po Prostu* in 1957. In 1964 he was among those who organized the " Letter of the 34." The Polish authorities several times took vengeance on him for his activities by refusing to allow him to publish. His children, Jan Tomasz and Agnieszka, also participated in the KOR movement.

7. Antoni Macierewicz

A scout master, he was imprisoned subsequent to his participation in the 1968 student movement. He formed the centre around which were concentrated the dynamic student groups connected with the old scout group, " Gromada Wloczegow."

8. Piotr Naimski

A biochemist, he wrote his Ph.D. during the time of KOR. A close friend of Macierewicz from the days when they were scout masters together.

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9. Antoni Pajdak

A lawyer, Doctor of Law. A legionary, active in the PPS, and member of the civil government of the Polish Underground. In 1945 he was betrayed and arrested by the Soviet authorities, subsequently tried and imprisoned in Moscow. He returned to Poland in 1956.

10. Jozef Rybicki

A Doctor of Classical Philology, he was headmaster of a high school (*gymnasium*) and a secondary school before the war. A soldier in 1920 and 1939; an officer in the Home Army, in 1944 he commanded the Khediv of the Home Army in the Warsaw region. He took part in the Warsaw Uprising and in many military actions. A member of the governing body of WiN[10] and for many years a prisoner in the Polish People's Republic. He was awarded the Virtuti Militari Silver Cross. An activist against alcoholism, he collaborated with the Episcopal Commission to combat alcoholism.

11. Aniela Steinsberg

A lawyer who served as counsel for the defence in many political trials; before the war she, amongst others, defended the workers who were tried in connexion with the strike at the Cracow Semperit plant. She played a major role in organizing public pressure to be brought on the authorities of the Polish People's Republic to conduct rehabilitation trials for soldiers of the Home Army and activists in the Polish Underground. (These trials were initiated by the lawyer Wladyslaw Winawer, who served as defence counsel for Kazimierz Moczarski.[11]) She later served as counsel for the defence in these trials and described them in her book of documented memoirs entitled *From the Lawyer's Bench*, published by the Literary Institute in Paris in 1977. She was an activist in the PPS and the Crooked Circle Club.

12. Adam Szczypiorski

An historian, Professor of History at the Institute of the History of Material Culture of the Polish Academy of Sciences, specializing in historical demography. Active in the PPS, and later in its revolutionary

[10] WiN: *Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc* (Liberty and Independence), the name of an underground organization created in September 1945 after the dissolution of the Polish Home Army. Jozef Rybicki, who directed WiN for the Central Region of Poland, was arrested in November 1945.

[11] Kazimierz Moczarski (b. 1907), one of the founders of the Democratic Party, served in the Home Army from January 1940 and was awarded the Golden Cross of Merit for his participation in the Warsaw Uprising. Arrested on 11 August 1945, he was sentenced, on 18 January 1946, by the Military Court of the Warsaw Region, to 10 years' imprisonment, commuted in 1947 to five years as a result of a general amnesty. In November 1948, however, he was accused, on a trumped-up charge, of having murdered 16 people belonging to Leftist organizations under the occupation. There followed over two years of investigation in prison. By the time of his trial in 1955, he had spent nearly 10 years in prison. He is the author of the well-known book, *Conversations with the Executioner*, which describes his conversations with a German officer who was with him in the same cell. An excerpt from the book appeared in *Survey*, Vol. 23, no. 4 (105), Autumn 1977–78, pp. 163–80.

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faction. He contributed greatly to the organization of Polish education in the West after the war.

13. The Rev. Jan Zieja

A social activist before the war, connected, among other things, with Laski (a convent and home for blind children near Warsaw) and with the rural educational and cultural movement, " Wici." During the occupation he was the main army chaplain of the Grey Ranks, and of the " Baszta " regiment during the Warsaw Uprising. He was awarded the Virtuti Militari Silver Cross. The Rev. Jan Zieja won particular esteem in opposition circles for his sermon of 17 September 1974 in Warsaw cathedral on the anniversary of the invasion of Poland by Soviet troops. He said: " Let us pray for freedom for our brothers in Lithuania, in Byelorussia, in the Ukraine; let us pray for those who are praying for freedom, and for those who are waiting for freedom."

14. Wojciech Ziembinski

A technical editor, the author of many works on graphics in printing and publishing. During the war he was a prisoner in Nazi labour camps, after being apprehended in France as he was making his way to join the Polish Armed Forces in Great Britain. He was an activist in the Crooked Circle Club.

A few days later, on 29 September, Halina Mikolajska, a well-known actress, joined the ranks of KOR. Mikolajska was among those KOR members who, like Dr. J. Rybicki or the Rev. Jan Zieja, did not adhere to any particular political line, apart from a general one of democracy, anti-totalitarianism, and independence. It was for purely ethical reasons—in order to help the wronged and fight lawlessness—that this type of person joined KOR. An additional motivation for KOR activists of similar outlook was Catholicism, as in the case of Mikolajska, a practising believer. Catholicism was seen among other things as a moral imperative to combat evil in public life.

The third communiqué of the committee, of 30 October 1976, announced three new KOR members: Miroslaw Chojecki, Emil Morgiewicz, and Waclaw Zawadzki.

Miroslaw Chojecki had been active in the KOR movement since the beginning, even before the founding of the committee. As a man of enormous industriousness, dedication and organizational talents, he stood at the head of a large team of activists concerned with helping the workers of Radom and, as a result, shortly thereafter became an object of particular attention for the Security Services. His membership of KOR, the logical extension of his work within the movement, offered him relative protection, for until the security police began to deal with KOR as a whole, younger members of the committee were in a somewhat safer, because more anonymous, position; such at least was the conviction which prevailed within KOR itself. Chojecki, a chemist by

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profession, worked as a researcher at the Institute of Nuclear Research (IBJ) near Warsaw. He was a scout master, although not from the " Black No. 1 " scout group.

Emil Morgiewicz, a journalist, was active in the secret organization " Ruch " which functioned towards the end of Gomulka's government and was broken up by the security police at that time. After his release from prison in 1972 (despite opposition from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, " Ruch " activists were freed after the intervention of Professor E. Lipinski with Gierek, for whom Lipinski's voice still counted at that time), he sent some well-composed documentation concerning conditions in Polish prisons to Amnesty International, with which he then became connected. He was therefore welcomed in KOR both as an expert in a field of particular interest to the committee, and as a representative of a section of the population which, although not yet at that time active in KOR's work, was nevertheless regarded by the committee as a necessary link, and as one which had similar aims. After the transformation, in September 1977, of the Workers' Defence Committee into the Social Self-Defence Committee KOR, Emil Morgiewicz, along with two other KOR members, Wojciech Ziembinski and Stefan Kaczorowski, left the committee and joined the ranks of the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO).

Waclaw Zawadzki was an activist in the KOR movement even before becoming a formal member of the committee. Active in the PPS, he was expelled from it in 1948 because of his opposition to the merger with the communists. He nevertheless became a member of the PUWP after October 1956, believing that renewal was possible. In 1967, after the expulsion from the Party of Professor Leszek Kolakowski, he resigned from the Party for good. A bibliophile and member of the Polish Writers' Union, he had a wide knowledge of publishing, and was for a time the director of a large publishing house, " Wiedza," connected with the PPS. After 1956 he served for a period of time as deputy-editor-in-chief of the State Publishing Institute (PIW). He published the works of Polish memoirists.

KOR's fourth communiqué, dated 13 December 1976, contained the names of two further KOR members: Bogdan Borusewicz and Jozef Sreniowski. Both these young people had been active in the movement from its beginning; as members of KOR they were in a way representing larger sections of their local population. Jozef Sreniowski, a sociologist and ethnographer, represented Lodz, and Bogdan Borusewicz, Gdansk. In this way KOR intended gradually to encompass various regions of the country, concentrating its work around people who were particularly active within a given section, and who then became members of the committee. However, this was not realized: Wroclaw and Cracow, for instance, as well as some other, smaller centres, were not represented in KOR. This was due mainly to difficulties in finding appropriate and non-controversial candidates whose committed, effective work, and authority within their own circles, were not in doubt.

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Bogdan Borusewicz, an historian from Gdansk, had his ideological roots in the Gdansk Academic Priesthood, which was for some time competently directed by Father Ludwik Wisniewski, a Dominican, later transferred to Lublin prior to the formation of KOR. From this same school came the group connected with the uncensored Gdansk journal, *Bratniak*, headed by Aleksander Hall. This group later went on to join with ROPCiO, and later still proceeded to form a separate movement, RMP (the Young Poland Movement). Borusewicz, however, opted for KOR.

KOR's members represented, from first to last, an entire spectrum of political and world views. One could at most point out that at least 50 per cent of KOR's founder members had ties or sympathies with social democracy. They included activists in the pre-war PPS as well as those who, like Kuron, had evolved towards social democracy from the initial viewpoint of a communist, and those, like Lipski, whose social-democratic views were an offshoot of his emotional and intellectual ties with the non-communist tradition of the Polish Left, represented in the post-war period by, among others, the group of people centred around Stanislaw and Maria Ossowski.

WHAT did it mean to be a member of KOR? Within the circle which formed around KOR, it was clear that those who accepted responsibility for acting in the name of the committee could not remain the mere signatories of some declaration or appeal, but would be the genuine leaders of a broad popular movement. Hence the only really formal feature of KOR was one's membership of it. The public had to know exactly who was signing the appeals and declarations, who was responsible and accountable for the funds collected, and so forth. At the same time, it was one of KOR's principles that there be no distinction between the more and less important members, to the extent that KOR had neither a secretary nor a president (each meeting decided on its chairman, and a number of people, most frequently Ludwik Cohn, performed this function), nor even a press spokesman. A number of misunderstandings arose from the fact that foreign correspondents, who for the most part would meet with Jacek Kuron, tended, of their own initiative, to dub him KOR's spokesman; it was impossible to dissuade them from this, and this often led to discontent within the committee.

KOR's resolutions and documents were either " rounded up " or written at meetings. (With time an editorial commission was formed, whose task was not only to prepare rough drafts of declarations and appeals for the general meeting, but also to issue appeals in KOR's name if these concerned intervention in specific, individual cases, and did not commit KOR in any way, politically or ideologically.) But everyone knew that KOR depended on hundreds of thousands of helpers and collaborators who maintained and broadened contacts, mainly among workers, peasants, and students, who collected information, distributed

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funds, organized self-education and discussion groups, groups to distribute material, to edit KOR's bulletins and other uncensored press publications connected with the movement, to operate mimeograph machines, to bind, transport, store and distribute books, journals, etc. A special group was formed of those lawyers who were prepared to take on cases for workers from various parts of the country (which often involved long and tedious journeys), as well as the defence of KOR members themselves. Other people collected and kept funds, offered their flats for meetings, mimeographing and bookbinding work, as distribution and pick-up points, for paper storage, and so on. They also typed out KOR's communiqués and declarations, lent their cars to take lawyers and observers to trials and transport published materials to distribution points. In the public eye, KOR consisted precisely of these people; the group which officially bore the name of KOR was but the governing body of a huge popular movement.

As a movement which saw as its aim the introduction of a programme of democratic reforms in Poland, KOR was more than once faced with the possibility of transforming itself into an elected representative body. But this had its obstacles, the greatest of which was a problem of definition: how was one to define a member of the movement? On the other hand, detailing a formal definition did not seem very desirable. Another obstacle lay in restrictions on communication within KOR itself, which, although operating openly, was obliged to keep secret some of its branches and the people working in them. Another significant, albeit purely technical, problem was the fact that any reorganization of this kind would have to aim at broadening, and not constricting, the membership of KOR; it was limited quite simply by restrictions of space; Professor Lipinski's flat, which had become KOR's permanent meeting place, could accommodate at most the number of people already in KOR, and that only thanks to some absentees at even the most crowded meetings.

The problem of representation, or at least of an unobstructed exchange of opinions between KOR's governing body and its collaborators, was, nonetheless, a constant presence, and there was a general awareness that it had not been properly resolved. This state of affairs gave rise to a situation where one could have named at least as many KOR collaborators as there were people in the official governing body of KOR; their role and influence on KOR's work was so significant that their absence from the list of KOR's membership was, to say the least, peculiar.

One of the necessary conditions for assuring KOR's effective operation was its communiqué. *Communiqué No. 1* was published on 29 September 1976. It contained no information about the founding of KOR, but began in mid-stream by giving information about the scope of assistance being brought to the workers of Ursus and Radom, about acts of repression against people present at open trials, about the appeal and subsequent trial of the Ursus workers sentenced in July by the Supreme

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Court in Warsaw. From this time forward a list of KOR's members, including their addresses and telephone numbers, became a permanent item in the committee's communiqués.

No less important than KOR's communiqués within the country was the need to send information abroad. Here new prejudices, new barriers and fears, had to be overcome gradually. Passing on information beyond the country's borders was taboo: as much as people feared arrest for issuing the communiqué, especially when mimeograph machines were used, so, too, in the case of passing on information to the outside world, the state propaganda partly succeeded in convincing quite a large number of people that this was something suspicious and unsavoury, rather like washing one's proverbial dirty linen in public. No one in KOR shared this belief; nonetheless, the fact that there were many others who did, could act as an inhibiting mechanism. It was resolved by KOR quite early on that Poles abroad had the same right to information about Poland and its internal events as we who live in Poland; hence the practice of passing on, by every possible means (including telephones which were bugged), declarations and the more important news to our friends from *Aneks*. Some time later Jacek Kuron succeeded in overcoming another barrier: he not only gave interviews to Western correspondents but even called press conferences.

With the first communiqué and the despatch of KOR's first news bulletins and documents abroad, the work of founding the committee came to an end. What then began was a period of hard work, work that was to last, as it turned out, for the next five years, in a social environment and in national conditions that were constantly changing.

(This is a chapter from the forthcoming book by Jan Jozef Lipski on the history of KOR.)

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From Freedom to Prison

A Question of Solidarity

JAN Jozef Lipski came to London under rather unusual circumstances for medical treatment. In December 1981 he was arrested in the Warsaw Ursus factory where the workers were on strike resisting General Jaruzelski's coup. *Charged with violating martial law, he was unable to appear in court because, in the meantime, he was hospitalized as a result of heart trouble. After some publicity in the West (including a correspondence in* The Times*) he was permitted to go to London to be*

To people of good will
From Mr Jan Jozef Lipski
Sir, On February 25 *The Times* published a letter signed by Professor Sir Alfred Ayer, FBA, and 13 other academics. The letter was an appeal to the military rulers in Poland to release me from prison and to allow me to come to London for a series of medical tests following a major heart operation which I had undergone here a few years ago. This was especially important as I had a heart attack after my arrest.

This appeal, together with the many efforts of other people of good will, achieved its aim. After my release, the Polish authorities gave me permission for a temporary visit to London. I have seen the medical specialists and I am returning soon to Poland.

Through the generosity of your esteemed newspaper I would like to take this opportunity of thanking, most sincerely, all those people who, motivated by feelings of humanity and common solidarity, spoke out on my behalf.

Yours faithfully,
Jan Jozef Lipski,
The Times, 3 Aug. 1982

examined by the surgeon who had performed a heart operation on him four years previously. Jan Jozef Lipski is not an ordinary man. He personifies the indomitable qualities of the Polish freedom fighters of his generation. A writer and literary critic, he was decorated with the Military Cross for Valour in the anti-German Warsaw Uprising of 1944. After the death of Stalin, he became a member of the editorial board of the celebrated journal Po Prostu *(the periodical which paved the way for the Polish liberalization of October 1956). Soon after, as chairman of the Warsaw intelligentsia Crooked Circle Club, he was involved in the attempt to salvage at least some of the liberties acquired in the Polish October. Twenty years later he became a founder member of the Workers' Defence Committee—KOR—the forerunner of Solidarity, and subsequently one of the leaders of Solidarity's Mazowsze regional organization, as well as its representative in the negotiations with the government about the relaxation of censorship.*

After the military authorities in Poland announced the prosecution of

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The Charges Against KOR

On 31 August 1982, mass demonstrations took place in many cities throughout Poland. They were called by the Temporary Co-Ordinating Commission of the Independent Trade Union Solidarity (TKK). Their aim was to support the demand that the state of war be lifted and that social peace be restored in Poland, through negotiations between the government and the Polish workers represented by the Independent Trade Union Solidarity.

On 1 September, a meeting of the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), headed by General Jaruzelski, took place. The subsequent communiqué published by WRON states as follows:

> These demonstrations are organized and conducted by radical activists and ideologists of the anti-socialist opposition, in particular, the Workers' Defence Committee, KOR. There is proof to this effect. The Military Council of National Salvation asks the Attorney-General and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Polish People's Republic to take steps leading to the speediest possible conclusion of the investigation under way against the leaders of KOR, and to charge them with offences committed against the state and society.
>
> (*Trybuna Ludu*, 2 Sept. 1982)

On 2 September 1982, Jacek Kuron, interned in Bialoleka prison, was transferred to the Military Prosecutor's headquarters. His status was changed to that of an arrested person, indicating that a speedy political trial is being prepared. One may surmise that this will not be an ordinary criminal trial. In a normal trial, generals do not evaluate the evidence and make decisions in what can only be the province of an independent court. Everything points to the conclusion that the trial will be an illegal farce in the style of the Kirov murder trial or of Dimitrov's trial for setting fire to the Reichstag.

KOR is an institution that ceased to exist a year ago. And despite my unquestionable sympathy with it, I must say that WRON's audacious claim that the 31 August 1982 demonstrations were organized by KOR members interned since 13 December 1981, is somewhat far-fetched praise for their abilities. The absurdity of the charge leaves no doubt as to the significance of the whole enterprise. No one can have confidence in an exhibition of justice that functions according to the dictates of generals wielding power.

I write these words not only because Jacek Kuron is my friend. Nor from fear that I myself will soon be charged by the state. I write this in the conviction that the truth is undeniable, and that we, General Jaruzelski's prisoners, also have a right to the truth.

Adam Michnik's open letter to the international community, Bialoleka prison, 2 Sept. 1982

On 2 September 1982, seven members of KOR, which formed in 1976 and dissolved at the First Congress of Solidarity in September 1981, were charged under Article 128 of the Polish People's Republic's Penal Code. The seven charged are Miroslaw Chojecki (presently abroad), Jacek Kuron, Jan Jozef Lipski (released from prison on medical grounds), Jan Litynski, Adam Michnik, Zbigniew Romaszewski, and Henryk Wujec.

The following are the offical charges levied against the seven members of KOR on 2 September 1982:

> Article 128: Those who undertake preparations for the crimes defined in Articles 122, 123, 124, paragraphs 1 or 2, 127, or 128, are subject to imprisonment of one to two years.
>
> Article 123: Those who, aiming at the deprivation of independence, or at the detachment of the territory, or at the overthrow of the political system by force, or at the weakening of the national security of the Polish People's Republic, or who thus undertake, in cooperation with other people, any activity aimed at the realization of this aim, are subject to a penalty of imprisonment no shorter than five years, or to the death penalty.

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the six leading members of KOR (including Lipski), he decided to return to Poland to face the charges against him and his colleagues. He was arrested within 24 hours of his return. He gave the following interview prior to his departure for Poland.

What do you think of the present situation in Poland and in particular of the forthcoming KOR leaders' trial at which you will be one of the accused?

Lipski—I see the situation as bleak and the more so because the side which is in charge, i.e. the Military Council of National Salvation, has no idea what to do. Trials cannot achieve anything. Acute social and economic problems must be settled, but I do not believe that the authorities are capable of doing it. I think that the only rational perspective for both sides is, after all, some kind of compromise in which both would have to abandon some of their cherished goals. The authorities would have to accept a far-reaching liberalization of life in Poland and Solidarity would have to give up its political ambitions. But such a compromise is very difficult because there is no confidence on either side and the authorities have not acted in good faith anyway. Before December 1981, Solidarity was always willing to accept a compromise in its negotiations with the government; it was being deliberately pushed towards more extremist positions but only a minority was ready to adopt them.

The criminal charges against KOR assert that it intended to overthrow the regime by force. Nobody in KOR was so obtuse as to entertain such an idea: muscle alone is not sufficient to take over power. This kind of charge is pure fiction, not even science-fiction.

Why did you decide to go back?

Lipski—First, as the charges are not to be taken seriously, I do not intend to become an *émigré*. Secondly, as I was arrested after the Ursus strike was broken, I do not want to give the government propaganda machine the possibility of telling the workers that an intellectual will always get away, while the workers will have to face the consequences of their actions alone. I hope our authorities' policy will not always be lunatic.

How then do you see the prospects for this policy?

Lipski—I think that in the near future it will still be silly, until social and economic realities compel it to change course. In the difficult situation in which Poland finds itself, only a common effort can bring us out of the impasse. Under martial law this cannot even be dreamed of. It would be nice if the rulers were to think about it right now, today, and

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not the day after tomorrow, because with every month that passes the solution to the crisis becomes more difficult. But I think that at some point they will realize that they need at least some social support.

What role do you envisage for the intelligentsia and workers' milieux *in which you were involved, from* Po Prostu *to Solidarity*?

Lipski—First, I hope that these *milieux* will not disappear as active centres in social life. Secondly, that they will successfully resist attempts to isolate them and separate them from each other. Thirdly, that the majority of the intellectuals will not permit themselves to be forced once again into playing a role which many of them have played in the past. If these three points are maintained, there is hope that some kind of compromise will be possible in the future and that the country will benefit.

And in the meantime you are ready to go back and face the charges with which you and your arrested friends are threatened?

Lipski—Yes, it seems to me that this is necessary. It is a question of solidarity.

L.L.

Why I am Returning to Poland

" I DO not want to be considered so naïve as to think that I can convince my accusers of the absurdity of it all. They know it well enough without my pointing it out to them, and they need no evidence. In spite of that, they can do with me and with my friends almost anything they want. Almost—for they still attach some weight to world opinion, even to Polish opinion.

" But could not standing up to this absurdity be done equally well by those who are already in the clutches of CROW [the Military Council of National Salvation whose acronym, WRON, means crow in Polish]? Of course they could manage without me, but together we can manage better still.

" KOR was both an institution and an idea, and part of the idea was that we should pursue our aims without attempting to use force. It might be said that this is not particularly meritorious when one has no force available anyway. But it is not quite like that. Even a small group can make use of terror, the more so such a widespread movement as KOR [KOR was officially dissolved with 34 members at the Solidarity Congress in 1981]. It is precisely because we are against terror that we shall be accused of being terrorists; it is a convenient way in which to smear and confuse the image of KOR.

" KOR, quite simply, had two goals: democracy and independence, or independence and democracy, because the two must not, and in present-day Poland cannot, be separated. However, we have always been aware that these are distant aims which can be achieved only step by step, in

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stages, by preparing the ground for them. We have never tried to fool anyone into believing that this will happen tomorrow. We could not pretend that we were strong enough to give Poland independence and democracy, let us say, by next Monday.

" Instead, we were struggling day by day against abuses of the labour laws, against violations of the rule of law, against the suppression of thought and information by censorship. We accomplished a great deal for laying the foundations for future independence and democracy. . . . CROW will do a great deal to ensure that we are not heard, but we shall be heard.

" I also have an emotional motive that prompts me to return to Warsaw and take my place among the defendants: I was there when KOR was formed, and I want to be there when its last chapter is written. I have written a book about KOR[1]—perhaps it will appear in time for the trial. But the final chapter will not be in it. It will have to be written by others, in the underground press and by authors abroad, in Polish and in other languages."

Jan Jozef Lipski

Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London),
14 Sept. 1982.

The Trial Concerning the Setting on Fire of the Polish People's Republic

Gustav Herling-Grudzinski—You are among those who are to face charges at the KOR trial which is now in preparation. Initially, only four of the accused were named: Kuron, Michnik, Litynski and Wujec; later, your own and Chojecki's [now in Paris] names were added to these four. This information reached you while you were in London receiving medical treatment. I hear that in a few days' time you intend to return to Warsaw, perhaps straight to prison, and then to take your place among the accused. Why?

Jan Jozef Lipski—The accusations are absurd. It is alleged that I wanted to overturn the regime by force. What force? Perhaps with the force of my muscle? I haven't got much. I think, therefore, that there is no reason for me to alter my earlier decision to return, a decision with which I came to London in May. Indeed, one could say that if someone comes out with such absurd accusations, he must have a screw loose somewhere and it is better not to put oneself in his hands. This is true. But as a co-founder of KOR, I think that my presence in the dock will be useful in order to show with my friends the nonsense of the charges, which amount to nothing more than vengeance.

[1] See pp. 61–79.

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G. H.-G.—What do you think is behind the Jaruzelski junta's decision to put the six leaders of KOR on trial?

J. J. L.—I repeat—vengeance. KOR played an enormous role in the events of 1976–81, hence the rather nasty attitude which the PRL authorities have shown towards it. One has also to understand that they are frustrated to a high degree. They do not know how, and are unable, to improve the economic and social situation, because martial law is not the way to go about it. Therefore, they do what is easiest for them: they repress. But this is not a solution.

G. H.-G.—Why have they selected just these six particular people, passing over the other members of KOR?

J. J. L.—It is impossible to answer this question. Perhaps they threw dice. Obviously this particular legal procedure has not been used for Kuron and Michnik because the authorities have always had it in for them. Their names would have been included in any combination.

G. H.-G.—What is your opinion of the preliminary formulation of the charges: according to the press, the trial is supposed to be conducted against the Trotskyist-terrorist elements?

J. J. L.—Quite. The more one hears about the details of the prepared trial, the more absurd it all becomes. At his first trial in 1965, they were already trying to pin the charge of Trotskyism on Kuron. Sheer nonsense. But a sentence is a sentence. Making Kuron, Michnik, or any of us, out to be a Trotskyist is, perhaps, calculated to play on the political illiteracy of Polish society. The Prosecuting Authorities, however, overestimate this. The accused—I apologize, formally they are still " suspects "—represented rather social-democratic views rooted in the traditions of the PPS, the party that was not only socialist, but also democratic, anti-totalitarian and the defender of Poland's independence. *NB:* the Trotskyists do not proclaim a programme of individual terror, and could therefore hardly be called terrorists, but who cares? Certainly not the Prosecutor. One nonsense more, one nonsense less—what's the difference? I want to draw your attention to the fact that recently the term " Trotskyist " has been used in the PRL press in the same sense as was the word " Zionist " in 1968. Perhaps that's what it's all about? Truly, the problem transcends my powers of comprehension.

KOR stubbornly insisted, for the entire five years of its existence, on the rejection of the use of force by the social movement which we are trying to create. We are sufficiently well-known in Poland for the people not to believe that we are terrorists.

But all these are the reflections of a man who is used to thinking in rational terms. Something quite different is at stake here: not the meaning, not the truth, but the effect [of the trial]. But I do not think that this effect will be profitable for our accusers.

From an interview in *Kultura* (Paris),
No. 10/421, 1982.

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Romaszewski on Trial

A military court sentenced Zbigniew Romaszewski, the leader of the group of underground activists who established the clandestine Radio Solidarity during martial law, to four and a half years in prison. . . . Mr Romaszewski's wife, Zofia Romaszewska, an announcer for the radio station, was given three years in prison. . . . Seven others in the case received sentences ranging from seven months to two and a half years, some suspended.

Mr Romaszewski, a longtime human rights campaigner who helped establish the dissident movement KOR in the 1970s, was a senior official of the Solidarity free trade union before it was banned under martial law.

From April to August last year, Radio Solidarity, though usually jammed by the authorities, broadcast more than a dozen programs encouraging opposition to the military authorities and giving information about demonstrations and arrests. It used taped messages often sent by crude transmitters in high buildings in Warsaw. Clandestine radio stations also operated in other cities, including Wroclaw and Poznan.

On the day the Romaszewski trial opened, supporters broadcast a brief program heard in central Warsaw, praising the courage of the defendants and giving an account of the first session of the trial.

International Herald Tribune, 18 Feb. 1983

The Last Words of the Accused

" It is the custom to say something of importance as one's last words, something that constitutes one's credo for life. Sometimes it is difficult to put it into words, but I will quote a phrase from John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*, which I have recently been reading, and which I think appropriate:

> This you may say of man—when theories change and crash, when schools, philosophies, when narrow dark alleys of thought, national, religious, economic, grow and disintegrate, man reaches, stumbles forward, painfully, mistakenly sometimes. Having stepped forward he may slip back, but only half a step, never the full step back."

Zbigniew Romaszewski

" I just want to make it clear that I do not plead guilty. I am not ashamed of the things I have been charged with. I wish to stress that I am proud of being a member of Solidarity because through it I was a free person for a whole year. I have always valued the human individual, his personal beliefs, his mind, his real knowledge. It is for this reason that I want to thank you, Mr Romaszewski, for KOR, for Radio Solidarity, for consistently showing your honesty, and for risking everything. I feel uneasy because I am reliving the very things that happened to me in the 1950s. The only difference is that now I can speak out, and then I could not. . . . "

Irena Rasinska
(a political prisoner in the Stalinist period)
Tygodnik Mazowsze (published underground), No. 44, March 1983.

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The Kubiak Report

THE text printed below is an excerpt from the 157-page Report drawn up by the Party Commission, appointed at the Extraordinary Ninth Party Congress on 2 September 1981, to examine the causes of the recurring crises in communist Poland. The Commission, which consisted of 34 members and consulted a number of "experts," submitted its conclusions within the designated time to General Jaruzelski's Politburo in July 1982. These were, however, unacceptable: they stressed that the fundamental reasons for the crises (of 1956, 1970, 1980) were the Party's methods of rule (a criticism which can as well be applied to Jaruzelski as to his predecessors), and not subversive actions by the West. The latter explanation is of course a constant theme of official propaganda in Poland, and to an even greater extent in other communist countries. The Report restricts itself to the statement that, although the opposition contributed to the aggravation of the 1980 crisis, it did not create it. It also rejects the "completely discredited slogan of the so-called moral and political unity of the nation," which has indeed been exploded by the repeated outbursts of the Polish people.

The members of the Commission, headed by the "liberal" Professor Hieronim Kubiak, included some other "softliners" such as the Party Secretaries in Gdansk and Poznan, Tadeusz Fiszbach and Edward Skrzypczak, and the Politburo member, Jan Labecki, as well as "hardliners" such as the political generals Baryla and Michta. By now all the "liberal" members of the Commission, including Professor Kubiak, have lost their posts. Kubiak was dismissed from his position as Party Secretary in charge of Cultural Affairs when he submitted his Report condemning the "centralized system of authority" that "initiated the tendency to react with brute force to the protests of the working class, which was the cause of the tragedies of June 1956 and December 1970."

Such a conclusion could hardly recommend the Report to General Jaruzelski. Moreover, the Report disclosed that, contrary to the myths widespread in the West (cf. p. 42), Jaruzelski did not oppose the use of firearms against the workers in 1970; the Report makes clear that he concurred with the decision to use them.

This disclosure directly contradicts not only the disinformation often accepted by the Western media, but also the earlier statement by Gierek, who explicitly absolved Jaruzelski from responsibility for the shooting of workers in 1970, saying that Jaruzelski was "at that time excluded from decisions concerning the use of troops on the [Baltic] coast."

This revelation in the Kubiak Report throws a sharp light on Jaruzelski's career and is consistent with the known pattern of his political behaviour. He has always shown remarkable continuity in his obedience to the "demands of the time." Each of the crises in post-war

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Excerpt from the Kubiak Report: Calendarium of Events

15 December 1970 (p. 87)

Warsaw, 9.00. A meeting of the Party and government leaders took place in Gomulka's office. Those taking part were: Gomulka, Spychalski, Cyrankiewicz, Strzelecki, Jaszczuk, Moczar; Kania, Jaruzelski, Switala and Pietzrak had been specially invited. In view of the situation on the [Baltic] coast, Gomulka proposed the use of arms by the police and the army. Cyrankiewicz supplemented this proposition by calling for the introduction of martial law and a curfew in Gdansk. None of those present raised any objection to these proposals which meant that they were adopted.

Poland was only a stepping-stone in his advance to the top, a progress marked by his invariable conformity with the requirements of the powers-that-be, and his shrewd discernment as to whom they might be. Cautious opportunism and constant submission to the Soviet Big Brother are the two immutable traits in his career.

As an ambitious young officer, he was a protégé of the Soviet General Poplawski (who served in the Polish army when it was under direct Soviet supervision, until 1956). In July 1955 Jaruzelski became the youngest general in the army. His special loyalty was recognized in May 1960 when he was appointed head of the political administration of the army, thereby replacing the somewhat more patriotically inclined General Janusz Zarzycki. His reliability in the eyes of the Party leadership, and of the Soviet rulers, was confirmed and rewarded. In 1962 he became Deputy Minister of Defence; in 1965, Chief-of-Staff; in April 1968, Minister of Defence (soon to show his mettle in the invasion of Czechoslovakia). In December 1970 he was promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo, and a year later, in December 1971, to full membership. In the 1970s he supported Gierek; in February 1981 he became Prime Minister; in October 1981, after the demise of Kania, he became Party Secretary. His role in the coup *of December 1981 was misunderstood by those Western commentators who stressed his "patriotism" and his "unwillingness" to fire at the workers.*

THE Kubiak Report is a highly embarrassing document not only because of the particular revelation cited above, which shows the naïveté *of Western comments opposing Jaruzelski to the system he serves.* The Report also tries to explain the communist regime's past failures by the arbitrariness and incompetence of its previous rulers, but inevitably—particularly in view of Jaruzelski's own methods of rule (which display the same characteristics as those of his predecessors)—it*

* Cf., e.g. " The fact that General Jaruzelski will probably be remembered as a Polish patriot and even as a decent man cannot disguise the fact that the system over which he presides has no room for even the most conditional recognition of an independent and critical intellectual tradition " (*The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 4 March 1983).

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again raises the old question of whether or not the system can be reformed from above.

In October 1956, the paper Po Prostu *formulated the answer by saying that if a car breaks down, the repairs should not be entrusted to the driver who ruined the motor in the first place.*

In August 1980, during the Gdansk shipyard strike, Walesa answered the question by saying that " if the machine is constantly breaking down, it's no good trying to repair it; it should be replaced by a new one. "

It is not surprising that the Report (in spite of its valiant efforts to confuse the issues while appearing to be analytically respectable) has been dubbed " inaccurate, " and that, as Jerzy Nastalczyk, Central Committee member, disclosed in Sztandar Mlodych *(3 March 1983), it was sent back by the Politburo " for additional explanations. " But the continuous rewriting of the Report failed to produce a sufficiently acceptable text, even in its sixth, considerably diluted version.*

One does not have far to go to find the reasons: analytically, it is simply a problem of squaring the circle. The Kubiak Commission could not confront squarely either of the two problems set before it by the Party Congress. The Report's conclusion was expressed succinctly by one of its members, Professor Jerzy Topolski, when he said publicly that the main reason for the recurring crises in post-war Poland is the methods of exercising power. This cannot be admitted by a regime which uses (and even reinforces) these very same methods. The other task entrusted to the Commission—to assess the question of personal responsibility for past misdemeanours—could not be confronted by it at all. Some time ago, the Secretary of the Commission (and a member of the Central Committee), Eugeniusz Duraczynski, announced in Trybuna Ludu *(6 November 1982) that the Report will not produce a " list of named sinners together with a list of their sins. "*

After each crisis in Poland, a reader of the Polish press sees the same monotonous operation at work, in which past sins are replaced by present virtues; a sort of dialectical miracle occurs through the abstract condemnation of the " errors " of the previous period—of Bierut's by Gomulka, of Gomulka's by Gierek, of Gierek's by Jaruzelski. Since de-Stalinization, there have been many " de . . . izations " in communist countries. The new dialectic is: the past is always wrong—the present is always right. There is therefore no need to compile a list of sinners or sins.

The embarrassing elements of the Kubiak Report are likely to share the fate of two previous reports by Party commissions, headed respectively by Szydlak and Gierek, which were supposed to clarify responsibility for the crises of 1956 and 1970: their " findings " were never published and they are not referred to in the Kubiak Report. All three crises are described in detail in the " Calendarium " of the Report, which will not see the official light of day in its original version, if at all. In each of the three cases, the team installed in power afterwards included those who shared responsibility for past misdeeds. Thus, neither Jaruzelski nor, in their

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time, Szydlak or Gierek could have any real interest in their clarification, nor in squarely facing the larger question of the reasons for these recurring crises. Szydlak had earlier been the first to express, with brutal frankness, the basic Party attitude: " We do not intend to share power. "

Nor do they share secrets; they keep them to themselves. When General Jaruzelski proclaimed the state of war, he announced the arrest of a number of previous leaders, who were said to be personally responsible for bringing about the crisis of the regime, and who " abused their posts for personal gain. " Among these were Edward Gierek, Piotr Jaroszewicz, Jan Szydlak, Zdzislaw Grudzien, Jerzy Lukasiewicz, Tadeusz Wrazaszczyk, and others. Their misdeeds, investigated by a special commission headed by General Moczar, were to be subject to legal prosecution. As Jaruzelski said, " We will thoroughly clean up evil, whatever its origin, from Polish life. "

*In spite of such promises, no public trials of these former top officials ensued (with the exception of the trial of the ex-television chief Maciej Szczepanski). The results of the relevant investigations were not published, but stories about them circulated in Poland and the beneficiaries of the regime were getting jittery about the incriminatory evidence which might engulf them too. It is not surprising that they strenuously opposed public revelations of political profiteering, and they considered them to be embarrassing and potentially explosive. **

The dismissal in March 1983 of General Moczar, the anti-semitic hero of March 1968 who collected the compromising material about corruption, seems to have put paid to such fears among the apparatchiki *and to have made the prospect of public prosecutions of the former " owners of People's Poland " even more unlikely.*

This does not necessarily apply to the possible prosecution of the prominent opponents of the system in KOR, although their trial may also be considered an embarrassment to the Jaruzelski regime.

There is one original element in the present situation. When Khrushchev, in his speech of 1956, disclosed the crimes of the Stalin period, he did so after *the Moscow Trials. The Kubiak Report came* before *the trial of KOR became known. There may be little similarity between the two situations, but even so, what is General Jaruzelski actually going to achieve when, in his efforts to demonstrate the sinister forces behind Solidarity, he can only indulge in yet another judicial farce? After all, the conclusion of the Kubiak Report has exposed this farce in advance.*

In an interview in Polityka *(23rd April 1983), Kubiak replied to a question about the chances of the Report's findings being made accessible to the public:*

> *It will not be done in one go, because it cannot be. Neither the state of our knowledge, nor the state of our political life permits it. I*

* Moczar's " secret dossier " was published in *Der Spiegel* (10 May 1983). It not only documented the widespread corruption among former Party leaders, but also revealed that General Jaruzelski himself acquired, in 1980, a house on especially favourable terms.

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think it will be a gradual process. Not a fire cracker for the occasion, but a new kind of political culture dependent on our leaders and our citizens.

On 31 May 1983, at the Twelfth Party Plenum, the Kubiak Commission was assigned the task of publishing the Report in a special issue of Nowe Drogi. *It remains to be seen what they will do to the original text.*

L.L.

Social Crises in the History of the Polish People's Republic: Their Causes, Their Development and Their Consequences

(A draft of the final report by the CC Commission to examine the causes of social conflict in the history of the PPR)

THE Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party stated in its programme resolution:

> It is an essential factor for the credibility of the Party and its platform of socialist renewal that the dramatic events of the country's post-war history should be thoroughly and honestly re-examined. This applies, above all, to the painful tragedies which took place in Poznan in 1956 and in the Baltic ports in 1970. In order to carry out this task, the Ninth Extraordinary Congress instructs the Central Committee to appoint a commission whose brief it will be to " re-examine the circumstances and relevant facts, including personal responsibility for decisions which resulted in the tragic events."

Accordingly, on 2 September 1981, the Third Plenum of the CC appointed the Commission to examine the circumstances, the course and the causes of social conflicts in the history of the PPR.

The following were appointed to serve on the Commission: Kazimierz Barcikowski, Jozef Baryla, Andrzej Burdz, Eugeniusz Duraczynski, Tadeusz Fiszbach, Jan Glowczyk, Ludwik Janczyszyn, Czeslaw Kiszczak, Zbigniew Kowalski, Stanislaw Kalkus, Hieronim Kubiak, Ryszard Kucharski, Jan Labecki, Jaroslaw Ladosz, Marian Marek, Wladyslaw Markiewicz, Zbigniew Messner, Norbert Michta, Jan Mikulski, Miroslaw Milewski, Stanislaw Miskiewicz, Jozef Mitak, Jadwiga Nowakowska, Marian Orzechowski, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Jerzy Romanik, Wieslaw Skrzydlo, Edward Skrzypczak, Maria Studnicka, Bronislaw Syzdek, Romuald Szwengler, Jerzy Topolski, Jerzy Wiatr, Sylwester Zawadzki.

At the Commission's first meeting on 7 October 1981, comrade Hieronim Kubiak, a member of the Politburo and a secretary of the CC, was elected chairman, and comrade Eugeniusz Duraczynski, head of the Department of Learning and Education, became the secretary of the Commission. The Commission's brief was:

— to examine and define the social, economic and political causes

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and development of social crises, tensions and conflicts, particularly those which developed dramatically and had tragic consequences;

—to submit proposals on the ways and means of investigating the socio-political developments, such investigations being an important tool, which would make it possible to diagnose social tensions at the earliest possible stage;

—to lay down principles and devise methods of solving such conflicts in accordance with the programme of the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP.

The Commission assumed at the outset that any analysis of the causes and development of the crises would have to be looked at in the context of the historical events of the post-war period, and that this could only be accomplished by assessing the main directions of the development of the PPR. It was assumed that individual actions and personal responsibility could be examined against a background of social, economic and political conditions and processes.

The Commission divided into four working parties: three to cover the periods: 1948–56; 1968–70; 1976–80, and a fourth team to devise the methodology and produce the final reports. The final reports of the three working parties dealing with the chronological periods are to be found in the volume " Working Papers of the Commission," which forms an appendix to the present report. The working parties organized research by experts, discussed the material submitted by them, and prepared final reports based on the material submitted. Overall, more than 70 experts, specializing in different fields, advised the Commission. They produced 69 reports (listed in the appendix), dealing with individual problems and establishing historical facts and their interpretations, as well as analysing historical processes and the economic, social, and political background of the period. They also prepared seven working-party reports and three final working-party reports.

The Commission had access to the source material in the possession of the CC of the PUWP, the Secretariat of the CC, the Executive Committee of the PUWP, to the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, and to the state archives. In addition, the Commission examined materials and information submitted by individuals and institutions.

During the year, the Commission as a whole met on seven occasions, while the working parties had 18 meetings.

The Commission also initiated research meetings and consultative discussions with a view to widening the scope of its own research and of its social contacts. Three research sessions and five consultative discussions took place.

The Commission experienced a number of difficulties, and its members are aware that the material they have assembled displays some weak points and some gaps. The difficulties primarily concern:

—restrictions of time (the Commission's work had to be completed

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within a year), which hampered the full scientific exploration of the factual analysis;

—gaps in the available sources, resulting from inadequate official documentation over the period of 35 years, and the disappearance of some source material;

—the differing standard of the individual reports and opinions, some of them inadequate and demonstrating the unsatisfactory standing of a number of research disciplines within the social sciences;

—the subjective quality of some of the expert opinion, brought about by the lack of clearly defined criteria for assessment and the absence of a cohesive methodology.

The above difficulties inevitably project on the quality of the final report. While submitting this report, the Commission sees the need for social scientists to continue their research in order that the gaps and the lack of definitive findings be bridged, and our understanding of the causes of social conflict in the history of the PPR increased.

. . .

(*What follows is the final part of the analytical section of the Report*)

III

THERE were basic intellectual flaws in the decision-making required to guide the work of building socialism. The result has been the growth of voluntarist attitudes and incompetence, particularly within the central leadership of the Party:

1. The use of an idealized and not realistic view of the working class and of society went together with the utopian conviction that society could be managed centrally by means of directives that were to be interpreted as orders.

2. The definition of targets in the process of building socialism tended towards generalization and lacked sufficient theoretical support.

3. The results of research were insufficiently exploited. The leadership's own opinion was the only one presumed to be right, while indications which would have made possible the diagnosis of a developing crisis, and allow for a timely adjustment, were disregarded. Thus signs of unrest signalling the crises of 1968 and 1976 passed unrecognized, or were misinterpreted.

The first of the shortcomings we have singled out is quintessential. The leadership of the Party, while proclaiming the leading role of the working class in a socialist state, failed to notice that group 's real growth. In 1980, the protest by the working class adequately demonstrated its importance, and also discredited the slogan which proclaims the nation's moral and political unity on the assumption that all classes now share the same attitude towards socialism, and there is no need to invoke the leading role of the working class in the socio-political process. In the

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political practice of the period 1945–80, there prevailed an ideal image of the working class: it was considered to possess a fully-developed sense of the aims of socialism and be able to put them into practice almost automatically, because it was in its " nature." This is particularly true of the practices in the decade 1970–80. In fact, until the great process of industrialization had been set in motion, the working class, in the full meaning of the word, did not exist in Poland. It developed step by step (and rapidly during the 1970s), but it retained its links with the countryside, and its class consciousness developed only gradually. But the misconstrued picture of the working class continued to be used for the purpose of shaping policy, making it difficult for the Party to reach the workers. Frequently it caused a rift between the Party and the working class, and a division between the leadership of the Party and its rank and file. Inevitably, no more than lip-service was being paid to the institution of socialist democracy, whether within the Party itself, or in relations between Party and government, and Party and society as a whole.

An insufficient grasp of the aims of socialism made a clear and realistic definition of strategy difficult. Such strategy would have had to take into account both the historical factors and the present situation. Instead, the leadership made ad hoc decisions, which, with the passing of the years, became less and less comprehensive in character. The decisions were often forced upon the leadership by crisis situations, or carried out in fear of trouble brewing, without the sense of perspective necessary to assess the developments. These conditions applied markedly to the programme of economic growth adopted in the 1970s. The effectiveness of socialist development was severely hampered by the inadequacy of strategic thinking, due in part to the Party's abandoning of the Polish road to socialism in 1948. In any case, even that idea suffered from an imprecise definition of aims. As is well known, the about-turn in 1948 reflected the deep crisis within the Party. It was solved in a manner which paved the way for the events of 1956, when the conflict again came into the open. In 1948 power changed hands: the sectarian and dogmatically inclined activists, earlier members of " Biuro Komunistow Polskich " in the USSR (H. Minc, J. Berman, and R. Zambrowski), and some home activists, such as B. Bierut and F. Jozwiak, replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had a deeper understanding of the Polish situation, but was accused in 1948 of " rightist and nationalist deviationism." As a result, the creative search for a new strategy gave place to the strengthening of narrowly understood centralism and discipline. The erroneous Stalinist argument, which holds that the class struggle becomes fiercer as socialist society develops, together with the impatience of young activists anxious to achieve their goals quickly in an atmosphere of distrust characteristic of a sectarian outlook, led to the unjustifiably prolonged use of force. The authorities, particularly the army and the Security Services, took actions which violated the law.

After 1956, revisionism came to be considered the principal enemy of

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developing socialism, while dogmatism and sectarianism continued to be regarded with considerable lenience by the leadership, due to fear that more severe treatment might result in the rise of political opposition. In the circumstances, an understanding of social mechanisms, so essential to those in authority, failed to develop: economic reform was abandoned and the groundwork laid down for yet another crisis. The situation was now changing uncontrollably and the leadership tried to adjust to it by adopting tactics of fits and starts, while rejecting a strategy which would have necessitated a more extensive reform of the system. Edward Gierek's attempt to take control of events amounted to presenting a vision of quick prosperity to society, rather than building on a scientific analysis of the situation. Basically, it was a continuation of the previous trend.

The Party about-turn of 1948 resulted in the formation of a centralist system of government which ruled by orders, and which encouraged disregard for both the long-term scientific findings, and detailed expert opinions regarding the current social situation; dogmatism and sectarianism meant that the leadership's distrust of the intelligentsia in a way projected on their attitude to the social sciences, whatever the official pronouncements on the matter. The social sciences were regarded by the Party leadership as servants and instruments of the Party and its aims, while officially they remained part and parcel of the so-called ideological front. This situation turned some social scientists into Party apologists, and restricted the influence of the Marxist approach in non-Marxist academic circles. What was needed in order to make further progress in the building of a socialist state was a clearly defined and objective programme for the social sciences. What happened in practice was that all the attention was directed towards their use for propaganda purposes, and not towards the objective utilization of the results of research. The tendency to drum up propaganda about the achievements of socialism began in 1948 and persisted throughout the 1970s, this " propaganda of success " becoming increasingly irritating to society. It also had a detrimental effect on the intellectually inadequate leadership, who chose to use manipulation rather than strategy as a way forward.

IV

THE lack of adequate knowledge by the leaders made it impossible for them to define correctly the optimum aims and strategy of the Party. The analysis of factors which might have been capable of mitigating the ill effects of the situation, brings out the importance of the methods employed in the recruitment of cadres responsible for implementing the leadership's policy. It also reflects on the fundamental importance of developing socialist democracy as a prerequisite for the working masses to involve themselves willingly in the implementation of the political programme. Participation by the workers would lead to the obliteration of the dividing line between rulers and ruled, and to a society in charge of

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its own development. Progress in building the material base of socialism creates a need for continuous development and the positive modification of the whole system of socialist democracy, of fundamental importance in this context. In a system of genuine government by the people, the risk of incorrect cadre policy preventing the best qualified from filling the right posts is reduced to a minimum. The system of government established in the 1940s and 1950s, a system based on centralization and compulsion, had a specially harmful effect on the recruitment of all cadres, including those to the Party leadership itself.

It could be said that in a strongly centralized system, relaxed only very ocassionally, and then for a very short time, a system furthermore in which the concepts of socialist democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat have come apart, and the worker-peasant alliance has been distorted, the cadre policy was no longer under control. The growth of the bureaucracy, with all its negative characteristics and the consequences entailed, has become a self-generating process. The crucial characteristics of the bureaucracy have proved to be conservatism supported by a clique mentality, a combination of regional and professional self-interest, and an intense dislike of change and reform of any kind in the fear that it might conceivably lead to a replacement of cadres followed by a loss of privileges. The bureaucratic machine, producing a stream of rulings and regulations, frequently disregarding the law but essential to " justify " its own existence, grew apace with the centrally-oriented system of government. The government took all responsibility off the bureaucrats' shoulders; the bureaucrats were content with the situation. The crises of 1970 and 1980 proved that the working class, but, interpreted primitively, as it now was, it was reduced entrenched conservative structures.

When looking at the close links between the self-generating growth of the bureaucratic structures (with a very limited ability for creative initiatives) and the centrally-oriented and coercive system of government, it should be noted that each strengthened the position of the other. The situation seriously distorted the principle of the leading role of the Party, which should represent government by the people led by the working class, but interpreted primitively, as it now was, it was reduced to this: as many posts of consequence as possible were to be held by Party members. The process of selection paid little attention to competence or to moral fibre: other criteria were in operation. The situation inevitably had the adverse effect on Party recruitment: the people who joined the Party were without ideological commitment but had an ambition to progress up the ladder of privilege. A vicious circle developed, inimical to the very principle of the leading role of the Party. The role of the leadership, as it was interpreted now, was at odds with the principles of Marxism-Leninism; it strengthened the conservative trend and further restricted the chances for the proper selection of qualified cadres, while deepening the chasm between the rulers and the ruled. It removed from many capable men and women not in the Party, and from

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members of other parties in cooperation with the PUWP, the opportunity to influence public life, and it created widespread discontent in the process. The harm done was further increased by the fact that in practice (whatever the official statements say) the assessment of cadres was conducted according to a system under which compliance and obedience to one's superiors counted for more than ability and qualifications.

The simplistic interpretation of the meaning of the Party's leading role could also be seen in the much altered system of *nomenklatura*, the subject of universal criticism, which resulted in a routine known as the " jobs roundabout." The system freed a privileged group from having to seek the support of either the workers or of the Party organization. Instead, they were able to rely on their personal connexions with high Party and government officials. The generally practised principle of having people nominated rather than elected for posts in the Party leadership, restricted the responsibility and participation of the Party organization in the matter of selection. The fact that it was unnecessary to seek the workers' views encouraged wrong moral attitudes. It appears that the way in which power changed hands, firmly established in 1948, did more harm than any other of the Party's shortcomings. No mechanism existed to relate those changes at the top to the principle of Party democracy. In fact, each time it happened, the change had to be prompted by a protest of the working class. In any case, the change was never far-reaching enough, restricted as it usually was to the appointment of a new First Secretary in the Central Committee and a few new members to the Politburo. The absence of that mechanism led to the development of autocratic attitudes among the leadership, made their personalities, their habits, convictions and tastes, acquire undue significance, while at the same time it made them less responsive to criticism, whether from the Party or from society as a whole. The career of Wladyslaw Gomulka in the 1960s, and that of Edward Gierek in the '70s, provides two glaring examples of this. Autocratic practices grew in importance as Party democracy shrank by degrees, and power was kept firmly in the hands of a small leadership group and, more particularly, in the hands of the First Secretary himself. By the same token, Piotr Jaroszewicz, Prime Minister and a member of the Politburo, came to wield inordinate power in the 1970s.

TO sum up: since 1948 a concentration of power has become the rule. Party and government posts were often held simultaneously by one person, allowing incompetence to cumulate at twice the rate. This was also a great restriction on the likelihood of adequate public control over the government. In fact, in the 1970s the Supreme Control Chamber was made subordinate to the Prime Minister.

The structure of the Party *apparat* reflected the changes which were affecting the Party as a whole; the collective principle was on the wane. Members of the *apparat* were strictly subordinate to their superiors,

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while their own knowledge and experience were rarely drawn upon. At the same time, the *apparat* made itself independent of the remaining collective organs of the Party; the process of change came to a peak in the 1960s, when division between the Politburo, the Party Secretariat and the Council of Ministers virtually disappeared. As a result, the Party ceased to be a Leninist party, united with the working class and the whole of the nation. The sense of personal responsibility for the running of the country was fast dissolving.

The way the Party functioned was reflected in the way that socialist democracy functioned in the country as a whole: it was in retreat throughout the period, although slogans of democratization used to come to the fore after each successive crisis. Invariably, after a short-lived attempt to change this (e.g. the introduction of workers' councils after October 1956) there was very soon a reversal and things went on as before. To sum up, the growth of centralism and of bureaucratic control contributed to stay the genuine initiatives and social responsiveness which give the working class and all the working population the sense of participating in the making of socio-political decisions. The development of these trends meant that the *apparat* interfered with every detail of the working of the representative and administrative institutions—yet another example of the Party executive organs assuming the function of government. People felt particularly strongly about restrictions placed on the role played by the trade unions, which were increasingly becoming just a façade.

There was a prevailing feeling, particularly in the 1970s, that change was imperative, yet the Party leadership failed to realize that this was the case. Institutions which were meant to provide an economic and political platform for the working class, such as the KSRs, quickly lost their autonomous character. The youth movement became increasingly uniform. The Seym's political prerogatives were not properly safeguarded, and the elections were now more like plebiscites than democratic elections reflecting the social structure and views of society. The opportunities which had opened up for the Party in 1956, when it regained its political authority, have been wasted.

V

THE malfunctioning and, to a great degree, spurious character of the institution of socialist democracy deprived the leadership responsible for building socialism of a mechanism that could have prevented public disenchantment and discontent. It created a gap between the aspiration to participate in government, natural in a developing society, and that which was in fact available to the people. The existence of that gap had influenced the consciousness and political attitudes of the people, and was an important psychological factor in causing the successive crises. The material conditions, or rather the contrast between targets and achievements in economic and social

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spheres, was another important factor. The role the two factors played in different crises varied: in 1956 the primary factor was the breaking of the law by the authorities and the imbalance in Polish-Soviet relations, but in all the crises economic problems came to the fore, especially in 1970, and again in 1980 when the country was already in serious economic trouble. As economic conflicts widened, political demands became prominent.

At this stage we should consider what the most galling shortcomings of the leadership's intellectual understanding were. What was it that most impaired their ability to define and achieve the aims of socialism? We must uncover the reasons for a persistent lack of objective approach, the voluntarist attitudes which resulted in the creation of unrealistic programmes and in repeated failures to attain the desired results, while allowing uncontrolled developments, harmful to the whole concept of central economic planning, to take place. In the 1970s, this process acquired theoretical sanction under the name of the " open plan." The acceptance of such a self-contradictory formula is a good indication of the degree to which the concept of planning had disintegrated.

Because power was concentrated exclusively in the hands of the Party leadership, the leaders' economic thinking defined the policy of the Party in that sphere. In their approach to economic problems, two points stand out:

1. The dogma that heavy industry and industrial production had to be developed whatever the cost, meant that a specific variant of industrialization was accepted *a priori*. The historical justification behind it was the wish to compensate for Poland's past economic backwardness as speedily as possible. But the way it was done was so wrongheaded that it slowed down, instead of speeding up, industrial development and squandered the efforts of the working people.

Investment [in heavy industry] was considered to be a worth-while target in itself, while the leadership failed to see that the investment should result before all else in improving the national standard of living. We are led to believe that the preference for investment was dictated by the propaganda value and the fact that it provided new jobs relatively quickly; but what was needed was long-term thinking about its cost effectiveness, and that was missing. The fact that it was easier to produce a programme of investment than to increase productivity in existing jobs, helped to consolidate the mistaken approach to the whole problem.

A programme of investment is obviously essential for economic development, but it must not overstretch the economy: it is only too easy to fall into the trap of self-generating investment growth, one investment leading inevitably to another (e.g. in the production of machinery for heavy industry), and putting a strain on the economy beyond its capacity, as happened in the 1970s, besides forcing the country into taking up more and more foreign loans. Unrealistic investment (particularly in the industries of group A) went together with a high degree of accumulation; the pattern of distribution of national income restricted consumption by the working class and the whole

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working population, for whose benefit the investment programme was supposedly designed. As a rule, real wages fell before each crisis as a direct result of over-investment, which meant that, contrary to the intentions of the leadership, the working population alone had to bear the brunt of the cost.

The leadership's conviction that it was essential to invest continuously in the industries of group A, resulted in a concern for industrial growth rather than for industrial balance. This was an underlying trend throughout the period, although at times its intensity waned. But even in the 1960s, when the intention was to correct the errors of the six-year plan, the over-investment in capital-intensive industries continued to the disadvantage of the light industries of group B. Continuous growth in demand for materials and energy followed, to the detriment of the economy as a whole and of our export capability.

2. The leadership consistently underrated the role of agriculture in its planning for economic growth. This was one of the principal reasons for the economic imbalance and for shortages such as that of meat—on many occasions the immediate cause of social unrest.

The economic structure of Poland dictated that the greatest care be taken of individual peasant holdings, including the holdings of peasant-workers, whose numbers grew as the industrialization of the country progressed. That group of workers supported the Party from the very beginning. But the leadership chose a different policy, and in the 1970s was showing distinctive preference and support for farms able to process foods rather than for those supplying raw produce. The policy regarding various categories of peasants lacked the coordination necessary to alter the agricultural structure of the country. As a result, uncontrolled, self-generating developments took over, and the agricultural base deteriorated to such a degree that in the 1970s the situation was worse than it had been before the war.

It can be said that the reason for the absence of a consistent agricultural policy, i.e. a policy capable of opposing and controlling spontaneous developments, was over-concentration on the industrial investment programme, ill-judged as it was in both timing and place. Agriculture was regarded as a side issue, a part of the economy in which investment was to amount to less than 20 per cent of the national whole. It has to be admitted, however, that Polish agriculture since the Second World War has shown a very low return on investment and had therefore to be considered a capital-intensive industry; such investment as there was failed to be reflected in the production figures.

There were two main reasons for low agricultural production and, consequently, for the Party's inadequate influence among the peasant population. The absence of a coherent agricultural policy meant that peasants felt insecure and lacked an essential sense of long-term commitment. The failure to supply them with adequate means of production was resented, as they were becoming increasingly aware of their technical needs. The same mistakes were repeated time and again by

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the leadership. An improvement followed each successive crisis (more often than not, even then, solving only individual problems), but soon the old policy, which had previously impaired the growth of production, returned. The private sector of agriculture was particularly neglected. The long-term planners did not appear able to choose either of the possible models: nationalization of the land or cooperative farming. In the absence of official support neither sector prospered. Nationalization resulted in over-large and unprofitable state farms given to over-ambitious, grandiose, production plans, while restrictions were placed on rural self-government and on the economic independence of individual holdings.

WE have discussed the reasons for the crises: errors in the economic sphere resulting from intellectual weakness, wrong mental and moral attitudes, and the nature of the system of government itself, as it was established in 1945 and never fundamentally reformed. The crises were born of a sense of insecurity and of threats to the standard of living, to which the people reacted with waves of criticism of the Party and the government. This happened continuously without any regard for the fact that industrial and agricultural production has increased, that there was undeniable progress towards the transformation of the country into a modern industrial state set up to realize ideas of social justice.

But the impact of progress was invalidated by a social policy trend which directly influenced the people's consciousness, much more strongly than statistical data concerning production or national income. The policy on prices and on pay, dominated by spontaneously developing processes (particularly in the 1970s), proved to be another factor contributing to the generation of crises.

Social policy, since the difficulties of carrying out a programme of forced industrialization had made themselves felt in the 1950s, was characterized by a tendency to restrict the workers' share in its achievements. Gradually many services ceased to be available free, and thus went beyond the reach of the low-paid workers. Prior to the 1970s many workers were paid wages below the necessary minimum. The pensioners resented the system according to which their pensions were calculated. Similarly, the unequal rise in prices and incomes was felt acutely by the workers, affecting both occupational groups and social and class stratification. The differential between the minimum and the maximum pay grew, and was resented by many, as was the practice, common in the 1970s, of allowing special, often undeclared, privileges and pay increases to the higher echelons of the *apparat*. Society was not against the differentials as such so long as it was felt that they were justified by work and talent, but it kept a close watch on the trend for unmerited awards. The system, centralized and bureaucratically run, preferred and rewarded obedience; it brought about an increase in privilege and injustice. Social benefits, mostly paid in kind, were increasingly directed towards the higher income groups, among them the

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representatives of higher officialdom. During the 1970s, the system developed pathological abuses, particularly glaring from the socialist point of view. The inflationary policy at work at the time placed the cost of economic growth on the shoulders of the workers, while private initiative and even speculators prospered. The workers were the first to feel the reductions in the health service, education, tourism and organized holidays, in public transport and also in housing policy, which virtually stopped providing state-financed residential accommodation. Cultural services became less easily accessible, which was naturally much resented in a socialist country where the authorities had raised the level of cultural aspirations through a dynamic spread of education. This only provided ammunition for those who argued that class exploitation had returned, and it made the working class feel outraged by the changes.

A social policy which might be said to have represented the interests of the working class, was practised only at rare intervals; between 1945 and 1948, and later, immediately after each change-over of the ruling team, while the new leadership still remembered previous acts of protest and was anxious to gain public support: in the years 1956–58 and 1971–73. But on each occasion, a return to former economic and social dogmas brought back an economic imbalance and increased social inequality.

It would be wrong to underestimate the role played by international factors in the economic failures and the fall in living standards. These were beyond the control of the Polish leadership. The deterioration of the international situation in 1950, for instance, after the war in Korea had broken out, adversely influenced the six-year plan. But it would be equally wrong to blame the international situation as a principal source of difficulties and unrest, especially in the long term.

VI

IT would also be wrong to ascribe the origin of social conflicts in this period exclusively to the activities of the political opposition. This, while it often exacerbated a developing crisis, would not on its own have been able to cause it. In the history of People's Poland, waves of criticism of the socialist system, and political activity by the opposition, rose to the surface when objective conditions justified their emergence, i.e. when the gap between the declared aims of socialism and the results achieved widened. Such situations proved to be fertile ground for the formation of opposition groups of various persuasions. Their success was, as a rule, a function of the extent to which political planning, with regard to living standards and the working of socialist democracy, had broken down. It is essential to consider separately the origins of each crisis and the course it took. Invariably, the opposition played a greater part in the latter [crisis].

The inauguration of the building of socialism after the war meant that, although there was social radicalization during the war, there still

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remained the enormous task of attracting to it the great majority of the people who could only adhere to the new regime in the course of the realization of socialism. The immediate post-war period, despite the operation of non-socialist and anti-socialist forces, was conducive to that purpose. The enthusiasm for reconstruction went hand in hand with successes which could be credited to the new socialist state. The work of reconstruction went well and carried with it fundamental social changes, including agricultural reform and nationalization of industry. By 1948 production had reached its pre-war levels. The great task of resettling people and creating new economies in the regained territories in the west and the north was accomplished. In fact, the promises of the July manifesto were fulfilled. Considerable scope was given to grass-roots initiative and the political situation was stabilized to a great extent. Conditions then did not encourage the growth of a political opposition. The acceptance of social ownership, and of socialist aims, gradually became widespread, despite existing ideological differences.

The way in which the system functioned during the following period, that of 1948–56, encouraged an anti-government trend, although criticism concerned mainly the system's distortions and did not amount to a call for its overthrow. The intellectual weakness of the then leadership was such that it was unable to form a realistic view of the strength of the anti-socialist opposition. It also failed to realize the importance of the Church in Poland, and consequently did not evolve a policy which would have prevented an unnecessary increase in tension. The Church became a political factor in the public mind, and this feeling hampered the spread of socialist ideas.

When the Party withdrew from its programme of social and political reform which it had promised in 1956, and returned, in the 1960s, to a centralized system operated by methods of compulsion, the grounds for justified criticism multiplied. The situation also encouraged the formulation of more extreme, anti-socialist, programmes. The dogmatic attitude of the Party discouraged debate and genuine (instead of spurious) struggle with revisionism, i.e. with views contradicting the basic assumptions of socialism.

The Party attitude somewhat during the early 1970s, but the deepening economic crisis of the latter part of the decade, and the leadership's incorrect reaction to the working-class protest of 1976, created additional encouragement for the anti-socialist opposition, particularly for KOR and the KPN. Their activity created a mood hostile to the socialist state and to the Party and succeeded in exacerbating the crisis of 1980. The subversive activities of the imperialist centres hostile to People's Poland played a significant part.

When pointing to the presence of objective conditions favouring the emergence of an opposition and of critical attitudes towards the state, the importance of the growth of the bureaucracy and of centralism, and the demoralization of the leadership, must not be underestimated. They all played a role in weakening public trust in the workings of the state. In

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the public mind, the relationship between work and pay had been non-existent; the state was now regarded as an institution to which all demands were to be addressed and on which the provision of everything depended. No account was taken of what was possible in given circumstances. A voluntarist approach by the government made matters worse and the trend to present excessive demands grew, encouraged by an incorrect wages policy disregarding the relationship between pay, prices, and costs.

To sum up, the underlying reason for social unrest was the way in which power was exercised by the authorities, rather than an overall rejection of the political system. The way in which the authorities have wielded power ever since the about-turn of 1948, brought about a deviation from socialist norms by allowing the bureaucracy and the technocratic elite to grow and to govern without being accountable to the people. The working class and working people in general were denied participation in government. This meant that the knowledge and experience of the working population, which might have alleviated the objective difficulties in directing social processes, were disregarded. The centralized system encouraged the trend towards the use of force in settling workers' protests. This resulted in the tragedies of 1976 and 1970. On the other hand, in 1980 the Party and the government drew lessons from previous experience.

Conclusions

The Commission's brief from the Ninth Congress of the Party, and from the Third Plenum of the Central Committee, was to analyse the causes of social conflicts in the past and to interpret them, with the purpose of establishing how potential conflicts could be detected early on so as to prevent them from developing into harmful and dangerous political upheavals. The analysis of the past crises and of the current one, which started in 1980 and has not yet been resolved, led us to the conclusion that in each case there existed objectively valid socio-economic grounds for conflict to develop, while it is also true that the international situation, beyond the control of Polish authorities, played its part. But it was the incorrect policy of the Party leadership and of the government, not external circumstances, which led to the transformation of a difficult situation into a grave crisis. Therefore our practical recommendations must be directed to the Party as the leading element in the socialist state. Whether crises can be avoided in the future and social conflicts resolved in time, and in a way which is compatible with the interests of the working class and conducive to the further development of socialism, will depend on the Party.

The Ninth Congress defined the principles of Party policy. The resolutions amounted to an unambiguous statement of principle which the Party should follow in order to have its policy understood and accepted by the working class and the whole working population of the country. These principles are as follows:

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— social justice is to be the basic guideline of the entire socio-economic policy;
— socialist democracy and socialist legality are to form the guidelines of domestic policy;
— internal democracy within the Party and ideological unity are to form the guidelines of Party life;
— proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism are to be the cornerstones of Party and state activity.

While implementing these principles the Party must gain the widest possible backing from the workers, and on the basis of these principles build a partnership of organizationally independent political forces, which recognize the inviolability of the socialist regime in Poland, of the alliance between ourselves, the USSR and other member-states of the Warsaw Pact, the supremacy of the interests of the socialist state, and the leading role of the Party.

In order for the principles stated by the Ninth Congress to be implemented, a very high standard of ideological preparation must exist both within the Party and outside it. The study of past experience, of our historical achievements, but also of our failures, errors, and defeats, should be included in this task. The conflicts and upheavals of the past are a part of the history of the Polish People's Republic. They must be understood and truthfully interpreted. To achieve conditions in which conflicts of this kind can be resolved before reaching crisis proportions, a true understanding and analysis of all, even the most tragic, past events is a prerequisite. The conclusions arrived at by the Commission should be studied by the Party as a whole, and debate of the subject and its Marxist-Leninist interpretation should be a continuous process. The publication of the results of our work must not become an end in itself, but a stage in research. We now move on to our practical recommendations:

1. Socio-economic contradictions played a dominant part in all the crises of the past; the standard of living of the working people has been unduly low and there has been social injustice, disparity of income and privilege. Careful objective research into the material circumstances of the whole of society, and especially of the working class, needs to be conducted and correct conclusions drawn well in time from any signs of distortions. The Central Statistical Bureau and the Party and governmental research institutions must be obliged to carry out systematic studies on the subject; the Party leadership must regularly assess the socio-economic situation, paying special attention to the ways and means of implementing in practice the principles of social justice.

2. The economic situation should be presented to the nation with truth and objectivity. Difficulties must not be disguised, nor achievements exaggerated, as this would only lead to demands and aspirations which could not be satisfied. We must never again return to the " propaganda of success " of the 1970s, which created harmful distortions in the public

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mind and contributed to the feeling of distrust for the Party and the government.

3. The whole of the educational policy—in schools, in youth and other social organizations, in the armed forces and in the media—must be directed to instil in the people a code of behaviour which includes respect for work, social discipline, realistic and moderate consumption aspirations, and a sense of civic responsibility. An ability to nurture these attitudes should be a necessary qualification for anyone working in the widely-defined field of education. The Party organs in this field have a duty to keep under constant review the conduct of all personnel responsible for educational tasks, and especially of the teachers.

4. A sense of public responsibility is a prerequisite for social discipline and is directly related to the degree of participation by the people in the government of the country. It is therefore essential to introduce political measures which will radically strengthen in the working people the belief that they play a part in the running of the country. We must introduce reforms which allow workers' organizations to play their part in managing their own workplaces and institutions of local government. The voters must be given more say in the choice of candidates to the Seym and to the institutions of local government. The role of the Seym as the supreme organ of our statehood must be strengthened. Political reform is just as essential as the economic reform already being implemented.

5. The leading role the Party plays in public life means that conditions within the Party are of the utmost importance for national life as a whole. The new statute passed by the Ninth Congress expressed the wish of the Party to conduct its affairs along democratic lines. It must be strictly adhered to if alienation between the leadership and the rank and file is not to return, and if the leadership is to be prevented from pursuing policies antithetical to the interests of the Party and the nation. The following must obtain if crises are to be avoided in the future:

— democratic methods of election within the Party;
— a collective style of leadership;
— the supervision of the Party apparatus by elected bodies;
— continuous consultation by the leadership with the basic Party organizations;
— the principle of rotation in the elected bodies of the Party and its apparatus;
— a systematic assessment by the Central Committee of the work of the Politburo and the Party Secretariat.

6. The Party must have at its disposal a mechanism for collecting and analysing signals of potentially critical situations. The necessary information should be collected in a number of centres, independently, so that optimum conditions are created for objective analysis and the exclusion of subjective opinion and group interests. The Politburo should make regular assessments of the situation from the point of view of the likelihood of social conflict arising. Party research institutions

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should be charged with evolving an early-warning system so that the Party and the government are in a position to take steps to prevent unrest from developing into serious trouble.

7. In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism through which we are living, class struggle continues with considerable force. Anti-socialist opposition groups supported by imperialists continue to exist; we must reckon that they will survive for a long time. In the past the Party leadership underestimated the strength of anti-socialist forces; we must not do this again. Revolutionary vigilance and a readiness to fight the enemies of socialism must continue. We must remember that victory in this struggle depends on the Party and the government following policies intelligible to the working masses and enjoying their support. First and foremost, the anti-socialist opposition must become politically isolated and the workers must be convinced by word and deed of the anti-national character of their activities. At the same time, penal repression must be used to make it clear that violation of the constitutional order of the Polish People's Republic will not go unpunished. The Party as a whole must concentrate on the struggle against anti-socialist forces. No member of the Party can be allowed to be passive in respect of his activities. The Central Committee should regularly assess the situation with regard to the influence of the anti-socialist opposition, and the effectiveness of the campaign against it.

8. It is during difficult times that one learns to distinguish friends from enemies. During the present crisis, a number of capitalist countries have pursued a ruthless campaign against Poland, without any regard for the principles of sovereignty. The USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth offer us political and economic aid. A policy of close international alliance with the socialist states is a precondition for preventing crises, or for their quick solution if they do occur after all. We must take care to make our policy intelligible to fraternal communist and workers' parties. We must listen with the utmost attention to the views the fraternal parties may care to express on the subject of our policies, while, at the same time, we must apply Marxist-Leninist principles creatively and independently in the concrete conditions of building socialism in our country.

Translated by Krystyna Bronkowska

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A Confidential Assessment of the Situation

On 16 November 1982, a meeting of senior Party activists and military commanders took place in Warsaw, at which Kazimierz Barcikowski, member of the Party Politburo and Central Committee secretary, General Siwicki, alternate Politburo member, Deputy Defence Minister and Chief of General Staff, and General Baryla, another Deputy Defence Minister and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Army, confidentially discussed the situation in Poland. The following is a summary of their views.

The Political Situation in our Country

On 10 and 11 November the opposition lost its ability to mobilize strike actions and demonstrations in major enterprises. The authorities gained control over the traditional regional opposition centres by isolating the leaders and individual activists, by surveillance and stiff sentences. The official propaganda campaign and disinformation circulated in flysheets prevented mass demonstrations and stoppages at work.

The meeting of General Jaruzelski with the Primate, and the release of Walesa, brought about the intended effect of placating the nation. Western reactions have also been favourable.

Walesa's release will be used to compromise him in the eyes of public opinion as an element in the destruction of the mythology and symbolism of Solidarity. The appropriate services of General Kiszczak are already working on it.

At the same time a large-scale campaign of winning over popular Catholic personalities to the Patriotic Movement of National Salvation (PRON) is going on.

To neutralize public hostility towards the authorities, a " series of smiles " has been organized, i.e. Rakowski's meeting with the actors.

A certain degree of criticism is being allowed on economic and social subjects in a number of selected publications. Outright oppositional articles by Kisiel [Stefan Kisielewski] will appear in *Tygodnik*

> " We are facing great political dangers. Everyone who decides to act must be judged and assessed not on the basis of his intentions, but by the consequences of his actions. If somebody calls for strikes or for street demonstrations, he cannot then justify himself by saying that he did not know what would happen as a result of his action: he takes upon himself responsibility for the consequences of his activities."
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> Speech by K. Barcikowski at the Szczecin shipyard, *Zycie Warszawy*, 27 August 1982

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Powszechny. All such moves are under strict control and their intention is to create an impression of growing tolerance and normalization in public life.

Official propaganda must point to the danger of underground extremists determined to lead the country into bloody confrontation. Under martial law 1,100 sub-machine guns have been confiscated—these weapons could have been used against Party, militia and security functionaries.

The Economic Situation

By the end of the year a further 4 per cent drop in production is expected. Light and pharmaceutical industries have enormous supply problems. A disquieting drop in livestock has been registered.

Many industries are paralysed because of lack of imported materials, machinery and spare parts. We cannot rely on the fraternal nations to help us out of our present exchange difficulties with the West: the Soviet Union has already done what it could and the Hungarians, Czechs, Germans and, in particular, the Rumanians are suffering similar difficulties.

Efforts are being made to obtain new credits. Andreas Papandreou has promised Jaruzelski that he will use his bargaining power with the United States in connexion with the lease of American bases on Greek soil. Comrade Olszowski has had successful talks in India. We are also expecting to sell more arms and military equipment to Libya and Iraq.

The Directions of Political Action

The lifting of martial law on 13 December 1982 was a symbolic gesture which should bring definite gains in our relations, both economic and political, with the West. The demilitarization of industry and communications is not possible. Restrictions on gatherings outside places of work will remain in force. We shall patiently work on the new trade unions. We are not going to abandon the Leninist conception of trade unions as a conveyor belt of policies from the Party to the masses. Inter-factory structures will evolve when the unions can fulfil their statutory duties with the help of people devoted to socialism. Self-government will develop in accordance with the laws of the country. At the same time the position of the management will be reinforced in matters of crucial importance to the state.

We shall attach great importance to the patriotic education of the young in the spirit of the socialist transformation of life. Secularization will be the main criterion for judging the suitability of teachers. We will return to the original structures of socialist brigades manned by the army. The question of those interned has to be settled. Every case will be judged individually, be it dismissal, indictment or pressure to leave the country.

Amnesty: the possibility of partial amnesty for young persons with short sentences is under consideration.

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Annulment: this will certainly not apply to activists in the underground.

We will maintain full readiness to repulse any attacks by anti-socialist elements.

Serwis Informacyjny Malopolska (published underground by Cracow Solidarity), No. 42.

The Government and its Opponents

" A sharp struggle is taking place in Poland about social self-awareness, and about the attitude of the working people to what is happening in the country and in the world. The opponents of socialism are trying to exploit our economic difficulties, all kinds of shortages and worries of everyday life, for their own purposes. Their aim is to bamboozle society by telling it that the past year has brought no positive changes, that we have no programme for overcoming the crisis, that the only prospect in view is a rise in prices and the impoverishment of society.

" The purpose of all this is to instil suspicion of the Party and of people's power, to provoke resistance to its acts, to spread a mood of hopelessness and impotence, and to make difficult the process of stabilization and consolidation.

" The majority of society is aware that our opponents' opinions fall short of the truth. However, one cannot fail to notice that they are accepted in certain circles."

General Jaruzelski, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 22 Feb. 1983

" There are powerful and influential forces in the West which for obvious reasons want to see Poland as the ' sick man of Europe,' as a state whose frontiers can be questioned. There are forces interested in making sure that the overcoming of our crisis should take as long as possible. The worse the living conditions in Poland, the better for Washington. There are people who for their own imperial purposes are ready to ' fight to the last Pole.'

" He who allies himself with these forces, voluntarily or mindlessly, he who listens to foreign propaganda, made for foreign ends by foreign citizens with foreign money, has no moral right to discuss Poland. The strength of the country is determined not only by its military potential, its system of defensive alliances, its level of civilization and the state of its economy, but also to a great degree by the state of minds, the feeling of common national interests and purposes. Aggravating quarrels dividing the nation, intensifying hatred and undermining confidence, cannot serve any Polish interests.

" One cannot succeed by waiting for socialism to disappear. To wait, today means to regress, to act against the interests of the nation. It is in this light that one can see the wickedness of those who introduced into common parlance the notion of ' collaboration.' It is an odd kind of ' patriotism ' that recommends passivity, or even applauds doing harm to one's own state, but allows or even justifies *de facto* collaboration with foreign centres. Let us at last call it by its proper name: it is only one step from playing a fancy game of opposition, to national treason."

Speech by General Jaruzelski, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 1 April 1983

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Past Experience—Future Indefinite*

AMONG the questions we tried to answer in our second report published in May 1980, was the following:

> What should the Poles do to protect and develop the values which made them a nation conscious of its own identity and of its own distinct culture? What should they do to cease being an object of political manipulation and to become a nation in control of its own country, and an independent player in the political arena?

Discussing possible solutions, we quoted a reply to the questionnaire from someone who wrote: " Do everything possible to improve the situation. If you cannot do much, at least do all you can. If you cannot do anything at all, at least analyse what could be done if it were possible and be ready to put such plans into practice when the opportunity arises." At that time, we realized that, as a programme, it did not seem to amount to much. Of course, our group has often been criticized for " minimalism." Between August 1980 and December 1981, our kind of approach must have appeared both morally dubious and unsuccessful in practical terms. During that time everything seemed possible. Now we must return to more realistic positions, which should not, however, be equated with defeat. It is true that since 13 December much hope has been lost. But we know that the world did not come to an end that night and that the future of this country still depends on us all. As the shock, caused by the deprivation of the nation's right to be itself, recedes into the past, we all ask the same questions: how will various social groups respond to this crisis and what should each one of us do to hold on to our convictions? As we again find ourselves at the crossroads of history, a new consciousness, a new way of doing things will have to be found. At present, it is not easy to find out with any degree of accuracy what people are thinking, feeling, and doing, what their expectations are, what they are afraid of, what they would like to do and what in fact are their plans. True, each of us knows well enough what those closest to us are going through: family, friends, colleagues at work, students. In broader terms, however, access to and circulation of information have been severely restricted. We are back to a situation in which to say what one thinks carries a risk. The extensive area between propaganda and gossip belongs to anyone with enough effrontery to identify " the nation " or " the working class " or " society " with himself. But the average Pole has once again lapsed into silence.

It is vital to diagnose as soon as possible the genuine state of national consciousness, to discover in it the dominant trends and attitudes; to recognize how easily it can be distorted in conditions of social

* *Fourth Report: Poland and the State of War,* Chap. 4, " Socio-political attitudes." Cf. " Report on the State of the Republic " in *Survey*, Vol. 25, no. 1 (110), Winter 1980, pp. 3–18.

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disintegration, lack of opportunity for the exchange of genuine views, bitterness, deep frustration, poverty, and uncertainty about the future, coexisting as it does with the surviving Promethean myths and debasing propaganda. Yet it is from this chaos that new political thought, which will co-determine the future of the country, will emerge. It may well be that the devastation in the realm of human thought and feeling will appear even greater than it does in the economy and social institutions.

Today it seems—as far as it is possible to judge from discernable patterns of behaviour, in spite of all obstacles—that a substantial majority, including a very sizeable proportion of the opinion-forming group, has not come to terms with what the government calls " the road to normalization," and what to the people is an attempt to take away everything they have gained since August 1980.

Despite the chaos and disorder, it was a period of rebuilding the national identity, a period during which new independent social institutions were formed, and some institutions, until then devoid of any sort of autonomy, acquired genuine independence. And not only the trade unions, but also professional associations, regional organizations, educational and research institutions, editorial committees, units of workers' self-government: for 18 months each became an arena in which democracy had a chance to develop.

The first practical lessons in democracy took place in conditions of the utmost difficulty, amidst political struggle, in an atmosphere of distrust, against a background of an extremely anti-democratic system. The new initiatives had to battle against the prevailing modes and habits of thought.

Research into public opinion in large enterprises has shown that, until December 1981, there had been a consolidation of essentially democratic values, such as the will to participate in decision-making, the desire to develop various forms of self-government, a rejection of the previous sham façade. Among the characteristics most widely indicated by the answers to the questionnaire were: concern for social justice and resentment of unjust privileges; the wish to free public life of deception and put truth, openness and accountability in its place; a pronounced sense of growing social integration, of belonging and of solidarity, a sense of responsibility for others and—an element of fundamental importance—a pronounced sense of personal dignity.

The picture with which this research provided us is one of a society moderate in its aspirations, firmly set against extremism, hopeful about economic reform and the development of various forms of self-government, a society which accepts the basic premises of socialism. This is a very different picture from that presented by official propaganda at the time, i.e. of a country on the brink of civil war, dominated by " emotionalism " and " confrontational attitudes."

December 1981 has altered public attitudes in ways which are as yet difficult to define. It is noticeable, however, that distaste for and dislike of false claims to democracy and partnership have grown. Certain

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groups, particularly among the young, show a notable radicalization. Research indicates that, whereas before December the generation gap expressed itself in a different tactical approach and evaluation of what was possible (the young were less patient and more optimistic), at present the two generations take a different view of the underlying principle: the older generation is inclined to be resigned, to embrace a compromise with the " real socialism " proclaimed by the authorities, while it seems that the vast majority of the young want to take a firm stand, in various forms, even if the cost of resistance is going to be high. Many young people reject outright all the ideological concepts they were taught at school, including socialism, as compromised.

IT has become clear, after 100 days of the state of war, that what happened between August 1980 and December 1981 will not be easy to erase from individual memories or from the history of the nation. The force used so spectacularly by the government, has a double-edged effect: it paralyses social life and terrifies individuals but, at the same time, because the contrast between the present and the recent past is so marked, it provokes resistance, open or concealed.

It appears that people are not prepared to accept the state of affairs they had found acceptable before 1980. As far as the whole society is concerned, there can be no question of a full-scale reversal of these changes. Increasing repression is met with a growth of passive resistance, which arises spontaneously and takes widely differing forms.

The strikes of the early weeks after the military take-over are one example. They took place despite the overwhelming superiority of the military machine, disruption of communications and severed organizational links. In strategic terms, the strikers lost. It could not have been otherwise. However, in the eyes of many observers, under the circumstances the result of the strikes amounted to the first moral victory, a real show of opposition to the use of brute force and the threat of subjection. The non-aggressive character of the resistance should be stressed: civil virtues are being set against a system based on the military principles of " law and order."

Resistance arises spontaneously: those involved do not just act on orders from a conspiratorial cell or an organized underground movement. The information network of the resistance consists of news bulletins, poems, songs, written statements, all typed by volunteers, or taped by non-professionals using amateur equipment. There are many other types of spontaneous action: flowers placed on graves and at memorials, lighting candles, days of silence in schools, the wearing of symbols of resistance. An idea is born, it is taken up by a group, others join in. The rise of an organized underground, while possible and even likely, is by no means a *sine qua non* for the continuance of the resistance.

The refusal by the cultural and artistic *milieux* to take part in activities which smack of collaboration has been widespread and consistent.

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People refuse to appear on television, they refuse to take part in radio programmes and in propaganda spectaculars, they refuse to write for the officially-controlled press. This phenomenon poses a number of serious problems incapable of simple solution. How far should one go in order to protect the " substance " of our national heritage? At what precise point does this form of protection become self-destructive through abandonment of moral values and cooperation in the building of sham propaganda edifices? When, on the other hand, does political puritanism become sterile? How can such sterility be avoided?

In these altered circumstances various forms of non-official culture received new stimulus. They have become an essential part of life despite their attendant risks.

The current official campaign to muzzle the arts (militarization of television broadcasts, terrorizing of the press, closures of artistic institutions of all kinds and of varying importance) has demonstrated in a flash the authorities' attitude to culture. They clearly regard any genuine cultural activity with dread, and feel threatened by it. The closure of the Congress of Culture and the detention of many participants was symbolic in this respect.

In the foreseeable future our rulers are bound to try to diminish the influence of independent opinion-forming *milieux*. This has in fact begun. The authorities will go all out for the absolute control of the arts, including theatres, which up to now have remained relatively free. They will try to get rid of all authentic artistic phenomena and try to replace them with the ritual façade of their own pseudo-culture.

Their success is unlikely to be complete: the resistance of cultural and artistic *milieux*, well-trained in that kind of warfare, is already evident. Mass culture will remain as sterile as it is now, with the import of all kinds of decorative trimmings on the Czech or East German model. A substantial part of the community is, however, likely to keep away from such artificial cultural forms, which are alien and offensive to its spiritual aspirations.

THE growth of an already functioning alternative culture seems inevitable. It will be based on informal ties and it will certainly not be hampered by a sense of isolation or by amateurism: outstanding figures in the arts are already joining the movement. It has a phenomenally responsive audience to its message of protest; a laugh at the expense of the rulers, an alternative vision of a world at odds with the official logic of force and subjection. The public responds to the literary texts circulated unofficially; some of these are current creations, some are traditional. Nineteenth-century romantic poetry and religious hymns are widely in demand, particularly by the young who obviously find them relevant today. It can be predicted that the influence of the Church and of religious art will continue to grow. It grew throughout the 1980–81 period, has been irrevocably linked with the Polish Renewal, but has acquired even deeper significance since December 1981. Not only does

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the Church stand alone as an untainted and uncontaminated domain in the world of the " hard necessities of the state of war," a domain where national solidarity can be freely expressed, but the Gospel itself has acquired new strength and relevance.

The Church openly condemns the use of force as a political weapon, it also warns constantly against the " disease of anger " which has the country in its grip. Anger is, however, a natural reaction to the use of brute force and to the dissemination of hatred by the officially-controlled media. Even so, we have the right to hope that this society which has chosen democracy will, in the long run, be able to resist the destructive message, that it will refuse to adopt the mental attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the enemies of democracy. Statements made by the leaders of Solidarity now in hiding indicate that most of them are aware of the incipient dangers of the situation.

The moral teaching of the Church, its ethic of compassion, has become a model of behaviour not only for believers, but also for agnostics and atheists. Its impact is universal precisely because the teaching is diametrically opposed to the official pragmatic and " realistic " approach with its maxim of tactics before principles. Inevitably, therefore, at least some elements in the *apparat* are bound to try radically to curtail the influence of the Church, using provocation if need be.

WE can expect a growth in the importance of independent artistic activities. The independent arts will be, as in the nineteenth century, not only a treasury of national memories, not only a weapon in the struggle to retain national identity, but something infinitely more important. The patriotism of symbols, signified by nostalgia for the Polish army, the Polish uniform, the Polish eagle with crown, were all utterly debased when the military junta chose them as its own. Literature, trying to answer the fundamental question of the day: " How should we live? " (a question asked more and more frequently), will have to go beyond its role of moral comforter. It will have to venture into a new, complex, and difficult world, it will have to examine the ultimate problems of Good and Evil, while eschewing easy intellectual simplifications, as well as tactical compromises with the ruling forces of violence.

Direct contact between individuals, conceived as an act of free will, based on a community of interest and feeling, has recently come to acquire an extraordinary importance. People have opened up and, as a result, have come to know one another better than ever before. This trend continues. In the period immediately following the military take-over, informal contacts grew and deepened. Disconnection of telephones, installation of bugging devices and censorship of private correspondence made people seek one another out, venture into unknown houses and flats, spend hours every day exchanging

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information and discussing the political situation. It seems that in the process a new social ethic has been born.

The fundamental tenet of Solidarity—a belief in the solidarity of people threatened by force, exploitation and poverty—has survived and it is expressed in new ways: lists of internees are compiled, they and their families are looked after, weaker members are supported, church services are attended without regard for denominational differences.

Despite fervent attempts, the authorities have failed to re-erect the old barriers of distrust and fear, at least such as those set up under the terror of the Stalinist era and which were evident again in the 1970s. While careful about criticizing the authorities in public, people are openly critical of the conditions in which they are made to live. The work situation varies from place to place and from one institution to another. In some cases, the state of war divided families and disclosed radical differences of opinion between friends and workmates. But the strength of the family, and bonds of friendship seem able, in most cases, to withstand the pressure of disagreement, fear and risk of repression.

AT this juncture, it is possible to pinpoint certain dangers which may make the future work of rebuilding and renewal difficult when the time and opportunity for it comes again. We list some of them here:

1. There is a danger of people opting out of public life and losing their concern for public affairs in the mistaken belief that nothing can be done and therefore events should be left to take their course. In extreme cases this may lead to the decision to emigrate, which has become acceptable to many. Alternatively, it may lead to a rigorous narrowing of interests, so that these include only family and close friends, personal hobbies and the absolute minimum concern required by work commitments. These trends were discernable in the 1970s and are now growing again. They are dangerous as they may easily lead to the increased disintegration of society, and thus make arbitrary rule easier and the further atrophy of all forms of self-government more likely.
2. The danger of polarization among those who remain politically active in resistance. Supporters of various political creeds may, instead of thinking in terms of common interests and needs, come to concentrate on fighting their political opponents in the underground. In order to show their political determination, these people may, in extreme cases, decide to respond with terror to the terror meted out by the government, without regard for public opinion or the realities of the situation. This would be convenient for those elements in the ruling group who are in favour of increasing the level of terror used at present. Among such people, resentment tends to replace reason and divert attention from the substance of our predicament, while what is needed is a degree of social agreement, a sober realization of similarities and differences

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of views, and the chance for concentrating on the pressing problems in our country.

The danger is not only that in their desperation young people may resort to aggression, but that the older generation, while not involved itself, will look upon it with tolerance and tacit support. After all, a large majority, while prepared to wait for the time being, dreams of revenge. And our rulers are aware of it. They hope that exhaustion and fatigue will take their toll. It is more likely that polarization between those who comply and those who are prepared to defy will become more acute. And among those ready to defy, many are indeed desperate and angry.

3. There are some who are only concerned with our chances of immediate survival, with activities which may seem to help, saving our skins for the moment, but are almost certain to bring about disastrous consequences in the not too distant future. Such a short-term perspective by its very nature precludes any durable solutions. The government in particular prefers appearances to a search for constructive and socially desirable solutions. At present, free from the pressure of public opinion, it certainly prefers to repress the symptoms of trouble rather than to remove its deep-seated causes.

4. Another potentially dangerous attitude is that of total refusal, a belief that " the worse the better." This, while understandable in a time of great emotional strain, would be fatal as a long-term strategy. It removes a sense of responsibility for public affairs from citizens and turns them against doing things which are possible, and indeed essential, if the nation is to survive. Yet even today people are beginning to realize the necessity of clearly distinguishing between what is good for Poland and what is good for the ruling authorities, who are in the habit of identifying themselves with the country. The embittered earlier supporters of the reforms are particularly prone to a dangerously sterile attitude, leading either to unnecessary squandering of energy in acts which are ineffective in the present conditions of active resistance, or, as is more frequently the case, leading them to take up a position of total withdrawal, with all its negative social consequences.

All these attitudes and their concomitant dangers have one common feature. They arise from an unwillingness or inability to understand that two fundamental things are necessary in order to build an adequate programme to suit the present circumstances. First, a clear realization of the underlying problems which have not been solved by the introduction of the state of war, and a consciousness that the new situation cannot destroy or deny our national aspirations. Secondly, a clear understanding of the new conditions in which these problems and ideals are to be approached. A critical analysis of recent historical experience must be the first step towards a new strategy. In an extremely fluid situation, in which the " new conditions " are not clearly defined and are changeable, this is not an easy task.

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It is more and more widely understood that what we need is not just moral discipline, but a solid intellectual structure based on a detailed analysis of what has happened in Poland, an analysis in which no argument should be rejected *a priori*. And, while it is obvious that such an analysis has to be done by specialists, no one can be absolved from the duty of political thinking. The historical experience we have been through and which continues, must not be allowed to descend into the shadowy realm of the national subconscious. While we are prevented from discussing these matters in public, let us talk about them among ourselves. We feel annoyed by the official propaganda: let us ourselves arrive at a cohesive picture of the world which corresponds with the facts.

We must not, of course, oversimplify an extremely complex situation. For instance, by no means all those who believe that " the worse the better " do so in the name of absolute negation. Some argue that the radical deterioration of the economic situation may force the government into a genuine dialogue and a real compromise with society. Experience has taught us that the Party only gives way under pressure. There certainly is something to be said for this position. Nevertheless, this attitude is bound in the long run to consolidate negative positions, to contribute to the difficulties of rebuilding the economy, and to disrupt further the social life of the country.

Against a background of the break-up of the economy, and in conditions of political persecution, workers in every field cease to believe that their work has any sense. It is symptomatic of this attitude of passivity that they do only what is absolutely necessary and explicitly demanded, but no more. In the past the managers, the suppliers, the whole workforce, were often involved in personal initiatives which, by bypassing the rules, sometimes resulted in considerable achievements: the introduction of innovative techniques and the prevention of waste and damage. True, there were not enough attempts of this kind, but they did happen. They do not happen any more. For the majority of people there is no point in doing something which makes no sense.

There are still people whose belief in the quality of work is such that it overcomes the circumstances. They still work to the best of their ability, although they are aware that they thus give a certain credibility to the system. Some still hope for the response to be an act of goodwill and an agreement with society. But if that is not forthcoming, this type of attitude is also bound finally to break down. The government will be left with only fear and constraint (either economic or political) with which to motivate people to work.

Finally, it is essential to take into account the ceaseless struggle of the working population to achieve bearable material conditions. Pressures are increasing as a result of universal impoverishment. Dishonesty, outright theft, and all kinds of fraud are increasing alarmingly. It is doubtful whether any amount of terror could reverse the process; corruption is already rampant, even in the army. In the near future,

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while scandals involving prominent political figures may erupt less often, petty theft will certainly be the order of the day.

WHAT we have said so far about social attitudes may seem less than specific and therefore unsatisfactory. It is concerned with potential dangers and long-term perspectives rather than with a detailed programme of action. Many people long for simple recommendations, formulae, even quasi-magical spells, that would bring about a change in our fortunes. But more and more people are coming to understand that no such formula exists. The shape of the future depends ultimately on the attitudes and actions of us all, collectively and individually. The choices we make every day, in matters both large and small, will determine the extent of our liberty.

Our everyday choices are bound to differ, depending on many factors, such as membership of a given social group and that group's moral code. It will be different for workers in an industrial enterprise, for people in commerce, doctors, teachers, journalists, actors, students and schoolchildren. The idiosyncratic rules of the state of war which were supposed to replace all other social norms and agreements, have in fact led to stricter adherence by every group to its own ethical standards, to a new stress on what is and is not morally acceptable in the situation. Some groups arrived at their code of behaviour spontaneously, others through consultation with people of special authority within the group. Many groups have an inner core of people whose authority they trust and are prepared to follow. Informal authority encourages social integration, strengthens society's resistance to attempts to immobilize it, and gives support to individuals.

During the vetting of journalists, the authorities originally demanded from each one a statement on the necessity of introducing the state of war, thus making them define their political position. Of course, what the authorities really wanted was not just to know their political beliefs, but to induce fear into the journalists. Nonetheless, the principle of self-definition is in fact gaining universal acceptance. It is felt that everyone should declare his political position, even if only within his own circle of family, friends and work colleagues. It is also considered fitting to hold views on other people's political conduct. Not to judge them frivolously, not to bandy about the term " collaborator," but to make matters clear. These actions are seen as a way of breaking out from the constraints of being constantly dictated to from above, a step towards regaining a genuine sense of identity.

The problem of collaboration is bound to become more acute in conditions of fear and coercion. Many are facing the problem of what exactly constitutes collaboration. A young factory worker asked to give his own view said, significantly, that foremen who, on threat of being sacked, are obliged to remove illegal posters and leaflets distributed in factories, should not be considered collaborators unless they also actively did harm to their workmates. But were they to go further and take part in

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breaking resistance and workers' solidarity, using pressures and sanctions, even if they did not act as informers, they would be regarded as collaborators. The local militia, officials, teachers, and technicians are similarly judged. Difficulties arise in cases of declaratory public statements, whether these are purely formal and meaningless, or give the impression of genuine support for the government by appearing in the official media or in official celebrations, etc. But one thing is clear to most people: anyone who intentionally endangers social solidarity by his conduct is a collaborator.

IT is generally accepted that, in order to preserve national identity and social solidarity and minimize the threat of the atomization of society by the government, it is essential to maintain an informal system of signals facilitating genuine social communication and agreement. All kinds of things come into it: readiness to come to assistance in a moment of crisis, simple signs of passive resistance, such as wearing the now forbidden badges and emblems, distribution of information, participation in alternative cultural events and, above all, standing up for one's rights and for the rights of others.

It is often stressed that the law must remain law, that in conditions of actual lawlessness it is more important than ever to talk about civil rights, even if it apparently means talking in vain.

It is also generally agreed that while we have to take into account the existence of the state of war, it does not follow that what the *coup* has abolished has been lost forever, nor that what it introduced has become in any way acceptable. This view extends to all walks of life; it concerns a great number of institutions now suspended or closed, suspended civil rights and confiscated institutional property. In particular, it applies to the officially suspended Solidarity (still only suspended, although already the official spokesmen refer to the " ex-activists of Solidarity " with a not quite disarming openness).

Workers in large enterprises refuse, often with an open display of anger, to take part in manipulated debates about the future of the trade unions. Members of Solidarity simply state that Solidarity exists despite the raiding of its offices, the appropriation of its property and records, despite the internment and imprisonment of its leaders. No genuine normalization is possible unless the authorities recognize this.

To judge from reports from various regions of the country, the leaders of Solidarity are only rarely blamed for having been too radical, for having allowed themselves to be taken unawares, for having failed to lead the strike called after 13 December to victory. People understand the realities of the balance of power too well for that. Some workforces blame themselves, however, for not having come out, for not having thus expressed their opposition to what had taken place. The authority of the now persecuted leaders of the strike has greatly increased. So has that of Lech Walesa, whose unyielding silence has impressed everyone.

There is general agreement that special responsibility rests with people

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and groups who are felt at present to embody moral authority. If those people and groups manage to preserve this authority, if they do not compromise their principles by accepting " realism " in the name of a lesser evil, the great majority of the people, and above all the young, will be saved from the two opposite dangers of despair and cynicism. It is felt that, for instance, academic teachers must on no account " lose face." The damage that would do would outweigh by far anything they could salvage by cooperating.

The same applies, perhaps to an even greater degree, to teachers in elementary schools, leaders of trade unions, people in charge of cultural institutions, etc. It is felt that, while they have to look after the institutions and the people they are responsible for, and see to it that their work or study continues undisturbed, they must also provide an example and protect not only the people, but also the values which their institutions stand for, and through their own behaviour set an example to younger and less experienced people. The government expects from them if not zealotry in carrying out their orders, at least a degree of " realism," i.e. passive acceptance of the rules of the game imposed by the authorities. But it is obvious to everyone that those rules are constantly being changed arbitrarily in the narrowly interpreted interests of the ruling group. There is no proof whatsoever that the economic ruin, chaos and social injustice we have to suffer are really the result of our geopolitical situation and the basic premises of socialism. It is widely accepted that such " realism " would amount to the abandonment of national aspirations and principles. It is not possible to save the " national " substance without preserving national dignity, because that is where the very essence of this substance rests.

ALL the dilemmas facing our society are particularly acute for the young. The young are exposed to harassment, yet, at the same time, they lack prospects. At the very start of adult life they have to bear particularly high costs for moral choices. No doubt the authorities will try to bribe young people in every possible way: with flats, with the possibility of advancement, foreign travel, vacuum cleaners, and other such scraps of the " affluent society " which can be made available. In a climate of impoverishment, such temptations should not be underestimated.

But it is the younger generation which identified more closely than any other group with the changes postulated by the aspirations of " Renewal "; the young people were the principal participants and frequently the initiators of it. During that short period, this generation defined its goals quite forcefully, if not always with precision. December 1981 brought an end to a great adventure. A time of hard and difficult grind has begun.

It is to a great extent up to those aged between 15 and 35 today whether the ideas of the movement which began in August 1980 survive. Will members of society accept the subordinate status which is

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now offered them, or will they struggle, with all the means at their disposal, to obtain their rights, and the right of society to self-determination? Will the young choose solidarity or careerism? How many will choose one and how many the other?

Betrayal of the ideals of one's youth is a universal phenomenon, but, in the opinion of a substantial majority of the younger generation itself, it would signify in the present Polish situation an acceptance of a profound and durable lack of any prospect for improvement.

The emergent situation is not comparable with the Stalinist period or with the German occupation, as some slogans and leaflets would have us believe. The threat is different, the intensity of terror is different, so are the present social divisions; expectations of change and of regaining lost freedoms also look different, though admittedly such hopes seem slender and distant at the moment.

The most pernicious danger at present is precisely loss of hope, and the sense of resignation which goes with it. It may take different forms, ranging from quiet to explosive frustration, from anti-social nihilism to brutal conformity. In conditions of economic crisis and the extreme difficulties of everyday life, some people may adopt an attitude of complete apathy, others of utter selfishness.

The government will try to win by exhausting the people. A sense of fatigue is on the increase now, particularly acute among people working in the field of humanities, who have suffered economically more than other groups. The imposed rules and regulations keep on changing, and a sense of dependence on the arbitrary decisions of the government deepens. The psychological war with society blows hot and cold, alternating repression with occasional relaxation. The regulations are softened, life may appear to return to normal but a police patrol may enter your home without a warrant at any time. The security police may detain you whenever they want for an unlimited period, on the basis of " well-grounded suspicion." The theatres may stage classic plays, but at five minutes past eleven an ordinary mortal is liable to be arrested for being on the streets. The impoverishment and curtailment of civil rights are naturally most damaging to those who refuse to conform. For instance, an outstanding journalist who refuses to cooperate with the media becomes a pauper compared with a tenth rate television hack who does what he is told. This applies to academics, artists, and others who maintain an independent stand. It is difficult to predict for how long society will be able to maintain its moral discernment.

It is not impossible that, as happened during the nineteenth century, the struggle for independence will in practice be conducted by a number of small groups. One must not underestimate the possible long-term effects of centrally-directed audio-visual propaganda, and its destructive influence on the minds of individuals and social groups.

The country is thus facing the prospect of an extremely tough ordeal. Hope, which so far has kept on resurfacing every few years, will diminish for an indeterminate period. But society enters this period better

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equipped than it had been in 1956, 1968, 1970 or 1976. It is more united and it has incomparably greater self-awareness. The extent and depth of the resistance movement are likely to be greater than before. Whether the resistance will take the form of widespread protest, a collective explosion of anger or passive resistance, fuelled daily by festering conflicts in every place of work, conflicts incapable of solution, the result is bound to make the economy unmanageable and the country to a large degree ungovernable.

That is why much attention should now be paid to the attitudes of middle and lower officialdom, and especially to the cadres involved in the running of the economy. These people will have to cope with the growing problems. The passage of time may be a significant factor here. As a result of increasing difficulties, society will become even more weary. But so, too, will the *apparat*, locked in a succession of hopeless conflicts. Therefore it is arguable that at least some members of the *apparat*, including even those who euphorically celebrated victory over their own enslaved people, will in time be inclined to come to a genuine understanding with society.

THE outstanding characteristics of the movement which developed in 1980 and 1981 were its moderation and absence of aggression. These characteristics have survived even December, despite circumstances which encouraged the idea of going beyond passive resistance. Nothing has happened to make the Poles abandon their unrealized aspirations, which, for a brief moment, seemed to millions to be close to fulfilment. All the factors which indicate that life in Poland must change are still there for everyone to see, and they make such desires imperative.

It is useless to try to understand what the Poles want in narrow political terms; e.g. the removal of the communists from power or the reversal of the Yalta agreement. *The Poles want to live differently.* To live in harmony with what they understand by human dignity, to exercise rights over the fruits of the labours of their hands and minds. During the last 37 years and, if one includes the years of the partitions and the occupation, for much longer than that, the Poles have shown that they are unlikely to abandon their aspirations and come to terms with the kind of life they can never agree to tolerate.

Translated by Krystyna Bronkowska

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Official Comment

Experience—yes, but what about the Future?

Andrzej Bujnicki

ANOTHER report by the group calling itself " Experience and the Future " became available in the underground distribution network some weeks ago. It is their fourth report, entitled " Poland and the State of War." This event would not be worth writing about were it not for the aura which surrounds the group. The organization operates, it seems, on the borderline of legality: its third report, " Society in Crisis," was published officially in *Zycie i Nowoczesnosc* (Life and Modern Times), a supplement to *Zycie Warszawy*, under the group's own name, although no one seems to have heard of it even having been formally registered. Politicians, academics, artists, and journalists have signed the group's reports and, until now, not one of them has announced that he has severed links with the organization. The circumstances surrounding the publication of those reports, and the quality of the membership of the group, perhaps warrant some attention, more than we would normally spare for that kind of " unofficial publication."

The group claims to be acting under the auspices of " Wolna Wszechnica Polska " (The Free University of Poland). It also claims that over 100 writers, academics, and journalists take part in its work.

The first two reports, particularly the " Report on the State of the Republic and the Road to Reform " which appeared in 1979, seemed a rational enough discussion of the political and economic situation. Echoes of Gierek's slogan of " accelerated economic development " were easily discernible. Take this fragment, for example:

> When considering the last eight years alone, one is struck by the extent and scale of the changes. At least one axiom of the political system has been reversed, if only in theory: the raising of the standard of living and the production of consumer goods have taken precedence over heavy industry. The policy of stable prices and small pay increases has been replaced by a trend to maximalize foreign credits. Domestic policy, until recently extremely cautious, has also been replaced by an unexpectedly bold new line . . . the standard of living has risen substantially, the creation of employment catering for the population growth has been a pronounced success.

It is evident that the reports of 1978 and 1979 accepted Gierek's concept of the " Polish road to socialism " paid for by dollar loans. However, always in the spirit of constructive concern, the authors noted some errors in implementation. They also pointed out discrepancies between official declarations of policy and day-to-day practice. The report went

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so far as to warn against the danger of social conflict which might threaten Gierek's foreign and domestic policy programme.

The group's warnings were not, however, heeded and conflict erupted in the summer of 1980. The group promptly revised its opinions and cut itself off from Gierek's ideology. In its report of November 1981 called " Society in Crisis," the group stated:

> The first five years of the 1970s created conditions of even greater inequality. The vast injection of foreign loans, while making economic growth possible, further strengthened the position of the ruling group, made the equation of power with wealth more obvious, while the economic situation of the bulk of the population deteriorated further.

Both the praise and the criticisms meted out by the report represent an anti-socialist point of view. The leading role of the Party was questioned, to be replaced by dialogue and an attempt to agree " conditions for political stabilization in Poland by all the interested political and social forces, including the Church and the moral and ideological lay authorities." From that position it was an easy move to a proposal for an " armistice government ": " a government of experts may be formed to run the country on the basis of an agreed compromise, which would ensure protection for the political interests of all participating groups." The above is a quotation from " Experience and the Future's " statement of 9 October 1981, " Towards a Constructive Solution."

The October statement was crucial to the whole history of the group. As long as it was possible to weaken socialism in Poland by linking the country to capitalist economies, by building up anti-socialist opposition, the group supported government policy, confining its criticism to examples of glaring abuse. This is how the group achieved popularity and a reputation for objectivity in some circles. As soon as conditions permitted, " Experience and the Future " took off its mask and switched to full support for the anti-socialist opposition, suggesting the formation of an " armistice government." Their statement included an additional and ludicrous suggestion: they offered the services of . . . " a group of negotiators who had no desire to join the government themselves but were respected for their objectivity and were trusted by the people," i.e. members of the " Experience and the Future " group, who else?

In their third report, " Society in Crisis," the group not only turned away from the concept they had been supporting of accelerated growth, they also re-stated in radical terms the dichotomy between society and the authorities: on one side there was Solidarity as the only true representative of society, and on the other side of the barricade the government and the Party. If this was the position gained from Experience, no wonder the Future could only be found in an " armistice government."

The declaration of the state of war diminished the group's hopes for

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the introduction of a legalized opposition and of a gradual transfer of power. It has not, however, put an end to the activities of " Experience and the Future," which has since regaled us with their fourth report, " Poland and the State of War," written in April of this year and widely publicized by Western radio.

Their latest report, like the earlier ones, avoids unequivocal statements and conceals its ultimate goals under the cloak of a great variety of ideas. Despite all concealment, the programme cannot help but be sufficiently revealing to make the group's message clear. The authors question the legality and the usefulness of introducing the state of war and seek a return to the pre-December situation. A catastrophic vision of further economic deterioration is followed by the suggestion that nothing less than Reagan's so-called three points be accepted. These are: the release of internees and those arrested for political activities; the restoration of Solidarity to its pre-December form; and the creation of a forum in which . . . " representatives from the authorities and spokesmen for the principal social groups could meet." The authors admit that " such cooperation would cover all spheres of policy, domestic and foreign. This would only be possible if there were at least a partial return to a situation in which the governed had a say in government, a fundamental change in the concept of power and its prerogatives." The authors do not openly state that it would be impossible to solve the economic crisis without Western aid, but they imply just that by suggesting that aid would only be forthcoming if the political and economic system were to change radically, following the lines laid down by the report, of course!

The political goals are concealed under an avalanche of verbiage. The report also includes an instruction on methods of conducting an anti-government campaign and on various forms of organized resistance: active resistance by the young, semi-active resistance by lower management, and passive resistance by the intelligentsia. This " instruction " must have been the main reason for Radio Free Europe and other Western radio stations being so keen on the " Experience and the Future " report.

On consideration, the central message of the report is an attempt to devise, in light of the failure of the anti-socialist movement, a new formula for an " opposition centre," based on a coalition of some of the more politically mature (and therefore more moderate) elements of that movement with some circles of the intelligentsia and the politically motivated membership of the Church.

The idea behind the " opposition centre " is to destabilize the socialist system from the inside, slowly but surely.

So much for the Experience, clearly considerable, but what about the Future of the group? It is, of course, experience which has taught us that anti-socialist forces are unlikely to win in a contest with socialism. As for their failures—it is difficult to keep track of them.

Glos Wybrzeza (Gdansk), 20 July 1982
Translated by Krystyna Bronkowska

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August 1980–December 1981:

What Next?

Zbigniew Romaszewski

BY profession I am a physicist. My social work as a member of KOR was to investigate cases of official injustice, and later I pursued the same kind of work as a member of the regional Solidarity leadership. My concern was the rule of law. And it is the same kind of concern which prompts me to write this political essay on the current situation in Poland.

It so happens that I am one of those who have escaped arrest and, therefore, I share with others the duty to continue the struggle and to fight for the release of those who certainly would have fought for me, if I had found myself behind bars. At the same time I would like this essay on the conditions of the continued struggle to become itself part of that struggle. I want it to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad for action on behalf of the imprisoned leaders of Solidarity, men and women whose only crime was that they wanted to have a say in matters concerning the future of our country, so utterly devastated by a totalitarian regime.

Solidarity up to December 1981

What was this Solidarity of ours in those pre-December days: a trade union or a political party? The answer is that it was neither. It was not a trade union of the usual kind as exists in the democracies of the West, for the simple reason that such a union cannot exist under a totalitarian regime. The task of a trade union is to protect workers' rights (wages, work safety, general welfare, etc.). However, in a situation where the union must first fight for conditions in which this sort of activity is at all possible (freedom from reprisals, access to the mass media), its activities of necessity assume a political character. It must be said quite clearly that in a state which claims total control over all activities of its citizens, any independent initiative of whatever kind (charitable, religious, cultural or any other) tends to undermine this totalitarian principle and becomes, therefore, political.

Neither was Solidarity a political party, because it contained within its ranks people with quite different political ideas. Broadly speaking they could be divided into so-called pragmatists and fundamentalists. The extreme wings of both these groups have one thing in common: they do not believe in the efficacy of political action. In the case of extreme pragmatists the reason for this is a deep pessimism, euphemistically called political realism. They tend to accept conditions imposed upon them by the state, and preach the necessity of accommodation in order to

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salvage what they call the biological substance of the nation. The fundamentalists, on the other hand, construct programmes on the principle of " everything or nothing," which makes any political solution superfluous. Since their maximal political goals—full independence, sovereignty, freedom, democracy—are both ill-defined and unrealistic, they tend to indulge only in highly bombastic verbiage.

The confluence of these two tendencies has resulted in the adoption of a Solidarity programme which, on the one hand, preached caution and only limited action, but, on the other hand, postulated also, in the long run, the attainment of highly ambitious goals: political pluralism and full national sovereignty. Such a programme was, of course, quite utopian; at best it could be considered a formulation of our dreams, of the deep longings of the Polish people as a whole.

There seems to be no doubt that the emergence of Solidarity in August 1980 was conditioned by the activities initiated by KOR. However, for a number of reasons, partly to do with ambition, partly political, partly because its principles of political action encountered some kind of psychological barrier, the part of KOR in shaping the programme of Solidarity was very limited. The successes of KOR in the years 1976–80 were due to the adoption of the principle that aims must remain commensurate with the available means, while at the same time limited aims were pursued with absolute determination. Political success requires that the demands put forward, and methods of political action employed, be such as to make losses incurred by the adversary in resisting them significantly greater than the cost of conceding the demands.

It is the recognition of this principle by KOR that has made it the object of attacks coming from pragmatists and fundamentalists alike. The former objected because they feared any political action, the latter because it appeared to them to show an unwarranted readiness to compromise. . . . The fact, however, that KOR was, above all, virulently attacked in the official media proves the effectiveness of the stand adopted by KOR, and how dangerous the authorities considered it to be. The quite absurd charge of political extremism was levelled against Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, Henryk Wujec, Jan Litynski and myself, and also against Zbigniew Bujak and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, suspected of being associates of KOR.

The pragmatists are no danger to the authorities. The unrealistic programme of the fundamentalists is rejected by society. But a truly consistent programme and determined political action are a threat to the authorities.

This discussion of the differences between the two main political attitudes is necessary not only as an academic exercise to unravel the causes of the setback suffered by Solidarity; it is also important for a penetrating assessment of the present situation.

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The Internal Situation

It makes little sense to talk about the causes of the setback when ultimate success was hardly a conceivable alternative. Even now it is difficult to point, with any degree of certainty, to mistakes which, had they been avoided, could have resulted in a different situation. It is not known when the decision about the military *coup* was taken and how it was motivated, so there can only be so many personal points of view on the matter, but not a truly objective analysis. Moreover, the whole discussion implies the assumption that it is possible, at least in some of the countries of the socialist bloc, to have institutions that are relatively free from the overall political control of the ruling party.

This is, in fact, confirmation of the view that the system is not it is the only conceivable basis on which any programme of a gradual (and bloodless) evolution of the system in the direction of greater democracy can be construed. It is thus also the necessary point of departure for the political programme outlined in this paper. Any thought now of an armed confrontation is plainly sheer madness, the result of frustration and general hopelessness which in particular affects the younger generation. The prospect of an armed struggle in the future, when the situation is ripe (i.e. some sort of internal decay of the Soviet Union), is, on the contrary, the product of a sense of hopelessness, so understandable in a people who, having lived through the German occupation, have witnessed first the imposition of a regime servile to the USSR, and then a number of unsuccessful attempts to circumscribe this regime with some degree of democratic control. Now the imposition of martial law and General Jaruzelski's speech at the seventh plenum of the PUWP can rightly be considered the final defeat of all attempts at democratization.

This is, in fact, confirmation of the view that the system is not reformable, that the authorities will never accept any form of social self-determination, and that, in view of any threat of this kind, the regime will take recourse to military repression at whatever cost to itself and to the country. The authorities have no intention of entering into any dialogue with the people, and any temporary agreement can be terminated at any moment by the use of force.

All this leads to the conclusion that the situation is not merely difficult, but that it is virtually hopeless. The pessimism of anyone who has the courage to analyse the situation in depth is certainly understandable. However, there are also some other facts which can be reasonably invoked in favour of continuing efforts at democratization.

One of these facts is the existence in Poland of a powerful and truly independent Catholic Church. This is neither a matter of chance, nor is it due to any benevolence on the part of the authorities. It is the result of a long struggle in which the Church, with the support of all of the Polish people, has never accepted (as was the case in other countries of the Soviet bloc) any interference from the state authorities into its own

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affairs. There was a time when the position of the Church was by no means as unquestioned as it is now. Successive onslaughts by the state against the Church were marked by such events as the trial of Bishop Kaczmarek, the internment of the Primate Cardinal Wyszynski, and virulent attacks at the time of the letter of the Polish Bishops to their German brethren (1965), an initiative whose importance for future *détente* in Europe can hardly be overestimated. Let me mention here a very minor but significant incident. It happened in 1979, long before the emergence of Solidarity. My colleague in KOR, Jozef Sreniowski, was arrested. But the militiaman carrying out the arrest said to him: " Don't worry, Sir. Do you remember the situation of the Church? One could neither christen one's children, nor go to church, many priests were in prison. And now? God willing, one day you will also be as free as they are now." The primitive faith of the militiaman is an illustration of two important truths: first, that even the most totalitarian power must strive for some sort of social support, and secondly, that this implies the necessity of tolerating widespread social aspirations, among them the demand for more freedom and democracy. It follows that the indispensable condition and guarantee of success in this struggle for freedom and democracy is the persistence and universality of the struggle.

The International Situation

The Polish situation is closely linked with the international situation. The imposition of martial law was in fact an admission by the authorities of political defeat. The ruling party had lost all social support and as a result suffered far-reaching internal decay. In the circumstances the only mandate on which the group of generals could presume to take power was a mandate from the Kremlin. This meant an immediate internationalization of the Polish conflict. Considering the internal Polish situation, marked by a preponderance of democratic forces, this internationalization is not an unfavourable factor. Besides, even before December the Polish crisis was not a purely internal affair, for the country had all the time been exposed to severe Soviet pressure. However, the imposition of martial law made it into one of the major problems of international politics. It follows that the Polish situation must be viewed not merely in the context of Russian domination, which invalidates all our national and social aspirations, but must take into account the effect it may have on the emergence of a new balance of power in the world at large.

Let us consider the extent of Soviet interests in Poland in the present international situation. For 16 months the existence of Solidarity was tolerated. Throughout this time some sort of normalization was expected, and it seems beyond any doubt that some concessions leading to a degree of democratization were being considered. As it happens, the demoralized and fragmented PUWP was unable to achieve this normalization. It is noteworthy, however, that even in this situation it

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did not come to direct foreign armed intervention, as in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The risks of such an intervention, including the possibility of a rebellion in the Polish forces (it did not come to that only because Solidarity considered nothing but passive resistance), may be taken as an indication of the extent to which the USSR tried to avoid internationalizing the conflict. A major factor was certainly the deepening economic crisis in countries of Eastern Europe. Economic sanctions threatened by the West can certainly not be dismissed as a factor in the present political game. The USSR cannot afford to become economically isolationist. It is not so much a matter of the standard of living of the Soviet people (totalitarian governments can cope with this), as the danger of the widening technological gap which could rather rapidly result in a major upset of the military balance.

In the case of increasing economic sanctions, the USSR would face the following alternatives: either an immediate military confrontation, or the making of concessions that would make it possible to continue the policy of *détente*. The first option is extremely risky for the USSR. The fact that international politics is largely concentrated on Europe, as well as the relative political quiescence of China in recent years, leads many political observers to overlook the fact that the USSR stretches over two continents, and that excessive engagement in Europe carries with it considerable dangers for the territorial integrity of the Soviet Empire in Asia. For the moment China's territorial claims are in abeyance, overshadowed as they are by internal problems; nevertheless the problem exists and may at any moment again become acute.

It may be said that the extreme difficulties (mainly of communication) of military action in the Far East act as a restraint on Soviet aggression in Europe. The Soviet Union is no longer a country of enthusiastic young revolutionaries; it has much to lose, and the aged, but highly experienced, old guard are little inclined to take real risks. Thus, some Soviet concessions in the face of consistent Western pressure, contributing to a renewed normalization of relations in Europe, are far more likely than a risky conflagration with unforeseeable consequences. Demilitarization in Europe would have to be linked to essential changes in the status of the countries of Eastern Europe. A minimal requirement would be the full implementation of the Yalta agreement which, while dividing Europe into two spheres of influence, envisaged full internal sovereignty for the countries of Eastern Europe. This is the process which Jacek Kuron had in mind when he spoke of the Finlandization of Poland. The implementation of this process depends on the complementary cooperation of two factors: the consistent and determined attitude of the Polish people, and active political support from the Western democracies.

The Economic Situation

On the whole, I concentrate in this essay on social and political problems. Nevertheless, the steadily worsening economic situation is of

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such crucial importance that I must venture a few remarks on the subject.

Prior to the December *coup* we were thinking of ways of overcoming the crisis by means of far-reaching economic reforms. Without going into detail it can be said that the various recipes discussed had at least one feature in common: they all tended to shift economic decision-making away from the centre to the people as a whole. Whether it was the idea of workers' self-government or that of extending the field of private enterprise, the overriding tendency was to engage individual people in meaningful economic activity. In fact, it meant bringing into play our last economic reserve—the resourcefulness and inventiveness of our people. In the case of Poles this is a particularly significant factor, for Poles are certainly inveterate individualists and have the ability to cope under difficult circumstances. On the other hand, they are not very good organizers, and willing obedience is not their outstanding virtue. It is these national characteristics which have proved to be the bane of socialist planners and managers. The authorities have never thought of adjusting the system to the national characteristics rather than forcing the latter into the mould of a preconceived economic doctrine. This incompatibility is without any doubt one of the major causes of the increasing paralysis of the Polish economy, and as long as it is not overcome the crisis cannot be overcome either. Martial law has made this critical condition worse than ever. The view, which is commonly held, that working for the hated employer is working against the real interests of society and the individual worker himself, results in widespread apathy where it does not encourage outright acts of sabotage. Under these circumstances, all the positive springs of social activity mentioned above tend to find an outlet in acts of conscious opposition or other illegal activity, just as at the time of the German occupation.

Although illegal economic activities undertaken for profit have a detrimental effect on the already weak national economy and, therefore, raise justified moral objections, in themselves they are also welcome evidence of individual resilience and enterprise. In conditions where the authorities (again like wartime German authorities) act against the interests of society, people have the right to fight for survival in defiance of state regulations.

A major factor that stands in the way of economic recovery is the deplorable level of the managerial class. Selection for managerial posts was always based on the criterion of political reliability (and pliability) rather than professional qualifications. Now the second consideration has been completely abandoned. The blatant insouciance of the military commissars who undertake to run huge industrial enterprises without the most elementary knowledge of economics, is nothing short of astounding. The problem of cadres, nevertheless, is not only that of the managers. Reprisals against all the more active and resourceful members of Solidarity have deprived the economy of tens of thousands of the most valuable workers at all levels.

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CROW has taken only two significant steps. One is the so-called little economic reform, and the other is the increase in prices. As a means of dealing with the crisis both these steps are valueless. Their net effect is merely that the cost of the state of war and general economic malaise is being shifted onto the shoulders of the people, while maximizing the revenue of the state.

The reform postulated by Solidarity was based on the idea of the three " S "s: enterprises were to become self-managing, self-dependent and self-financing. In the little economic reform, only one of these three " S "s remains: self-financing. It is obvious that enterprises which have to rely on centrally-distributed resources and whose functioning is subject to interference from the centre, are not self-dependent. Self-government has been disposed of by the regulations of CROW. In the circumstances the only remaining " S "—self-financing—means in effect that the costs of general disorganization, of the lack of raw materials and resulting stoppages, in fact of economic failure, are to be borne by the workforce.

The same applies to the price rises decreed in February. Some Solidarity experts and economists also proposed a rise, but only as part of an overall economic reform. Their aim was, in the first place, to bring food prices more in line with prices of industrial goods.

This was to act as an incentive to food producers and reduce the consumers' pressure on food supplies. There is no denying that the standard of living in the post Gierek-era was much above what the country could afford. Too much money in people's pockets, combined with chronic shortages, created a classic inflationary situation. Thus, the other aim was to curb inflation. Admittedly, this also meant that the people were expected to pay for the blunders of the Gierek team, but in the context of overall economic reform such a price rise encouraged the prospect of economic recovery.

The price rises decreed by CROW do not serve either of these two aims. First, by maintaining the old price relations by means of vouchers (for industrial goods) they continue to discriminate against the farmers. Secondly, while cruelly draining the surplus of money from the market, they nevertheless fail to close the inflationary gap because the money drained away from the majority flows back into the pockets of the privileged minority (the large pay increases for the military and the police, as well as for some of the miners). In effect, society does not pay the costs of the economic reforms but of the interventionist policies of CROW.

Finally, prior to the December *coup* we reckoned that the proposed reform would be based to an essential degree on further credits from Western banks. Now this source has been effectively stopped because Poland under occupation of CROW is a bottomless pit which no prospective creditor will be interested in. It is quite nonsensical to point to this restrictive attitude of the West as the cause of Poland's present economic misfortunes.

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So far CROW's only achievement is the increased output of coal. This, however, has been achieved by purely extensive methods (four shifts, or a 10-hour working day, with no free Saturdays, special pay or material bonuses, neglect of adequate reconstruction of shafts) and in the opinion of experts this sort of pressure cannot be maintained for long. At the same time there has been a marked fall in production in practically all other industries, and there is a real threat that some enterprises crucial to the national economy will soon grind to a halt for lack of raw materials.

This state of affairs is being confirmed daily in the mass media in the form of apparently cheering communiqués on the availability of power in the country. One of the causes of the industrial crisis was, no doubt, the shortage of power. But now we hear that the index is often as low as three (low figures mean that requirements are being fully met), a level that for many years was unattainable. This means, of course, that the requirements of the main consumer—industry—are unusually low. The reason for this is stoppages caused by lack of materials. These shortages cannot be remedied by supplies from the Soviet Union, largely because Soviet components do not fit the technological processes installed in Poland over the last 10 years or so. It is here that the consequences for the individual enterprise of that one remaining " S "—self-financing—become frighteningly apparent. It leads, among other things, to increased unemployment.

Before December we were quite aware that economic reform would result in at least temporary unemployment for about one million. Of course, this was one of the great headaches of Solidarity. We thought then that this surplus manpower could possibly be absorbed by cooperative ventures, small scale private enterprise, private and cooperative services, in agriculture too, encouraged by an adequate policy of easy credits. Now, it is not true that under CROW the problem has disappeared; it has simply been swept under the carpet. There is evidence that the industrial crisis is much more severe than that which was envisaged in pre-December forecasts and that unemployment is steadily growing. And under conditions of a state of war there is no possibility of the energies of these people being directed into the sort of activities which we had in mind.

The situation is equally tragic in agriculture. An unstable market, combined with the threat of compulsory deliveries, amounts to a massive disincentive. The farmer is more and more inclined to produce only for his own immediate needs. One can imagine the consequences of any attempt at collectivization in these circumstances. Collectivization in the Ukraine in the 1930s resulted in the death from hunger of 15 to 29 million people.

To sum up: it is a truism that the economic situation of the country is more than critical. Nothing done at present promises any way out of the crisis. The deepening crisis will inevitably result in the utter pauperization of the Polish people.

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Any plans for overcoming the crisis must take as their point of departure two essential postulates: the self-determination of society (*upodmiotowienie spoleczenstwa*) and the acceptance of state power by society. Without the implementation of these two purely political postulates, even the most sophisticated plans for economic reform are bound to remain in the field of abstraction.

The Party since August 1980

Attempts to justify the imposition of martial law invariably include statements accusing Solidarity of ever more impossible demands, lack of realism, etc., and, in addition, the absurd charge of preparing a *coup d'état* and/or civil war.

I do not propose to discuss these charges because nobody who is more or less familiar with developments in the 16 months of Solidarity believes them anyway. Their purpose is merely to create among people acting on behalf of CROW (the Party apparatus, the military, the police and security forces) a sense of threat, and in this way to justify the acts of repression. The preponderance of democratic forces in the country is so overwhelming and their rationale so strong that maintaining morale among the henchmen of repression requires the erection of additional barriers of hate to keep them apart from the rest of society.

For the past three months official investigations have been in progress in an attempt to prove these allegations against Solidarity, but they have been completely fruitless. This in itself is evidence that society is remarkably unanimous in rejecting the use of force in solving the nation's problems. There is no doubt that it is the moral splendour and essential moderation displayed by Solidarity which earned the movement its unsurpassed popularity. So much deeper, then, was the shock when the authorities chose to respond to the nation's aspirations with a display of brutal force.

It is not Solidarity which is to blame if a national consensus has proved impossible. There was the will to work out the foundations of a new social order on this side of the social divide. Failure to achieve this is entirely due to those in the power apparatus who saw no room for themselves in a truly democratic order. It was the plain unwillingness of the authorities to come to any understanding that led to the radicalization of the masses and to some of the more exorbitant demands. It is understandable. After all, the very idea of a dialogue between the authorities and the people is something essentially abnormal. It is abnormal when two parties find themselves in opposition to each other.

The more exorbitant demands were not hatched among some " extremist elements " of Solidarity. They were a natural reaction of the rank and file against the incessant prevarications of the authorities. The leadership, aware of the geo-political limitations, resisted these tendencies for a long time. However, the situation within the Union was

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becoming increasingly dangerous. With negotiations leading nowhere, the leadership was facing an erosion of its authority and a split in the Union. The leadership was forced, willy-nilly, to meet the widely pressing social demands half-way.

The question is why the other side, the Party and the government, were so unwilling to come to an agreement. The basic requirements, which they presented to Solidarity as non-negotiable, were met in full. They concerned the safe-guarding of Soviet interests in Poland, the leading role of the Party, maintaining Poland's alliances and the socialist system, and in addition, as a consequence of these, some limitations to the proposed economic reform. It is the latter that proved the most controversial question, but it has never become the subject of really serious negotiations.

So, the question remains. Why? The answer seems plain enough. The Party, internally split and demoralized, was unable to fulfil its leading role and its role as guarantor of Soviet interests in Poland. Its ideological degradation in fact began nearly 40 years ago, for membership of the Party was never an ideological or political commitment. Access to the Party meant no more than access to power and the material privileges associated with power. However, it was in the Gierek era that corruption reached its zenith. I think it was partly due to the departure of the last mohicans of ideology (such as Gomulka), and partly to the economic boom of the early 1970s which gave the unscrupulous excellent chances to make quite astounding personal gains. Officials signing contracts at home and abroad swallowed the bacillus of consumerism and infected the whole apparatus of power, which, not subject to any public control, became a mafia, and cynically exploited society for their own ends. When challenged, they became paralysed with fear which rendered them unable to cope with the challenge throughout the 15 months of the crisis. A way out was open to them all the time, the way the Party had adopted in 1956, that is, meeting social aspirations with proposals for reform going beyond the original demands of the strikers. In this way the Party could have restored, at least to a certain extent, its credibility.

It was not to be. The most modest concessions had to be extorted by strike action and the credibility of the Party was inevitably further eroded. As a result, a mass exodus of the more responsible part of the membership began, and the Party began to fall apart. It seems, incidentally, that the Solidarity leadership's estimation of the Party's capabilities was the most serious political error in its entire career. Many of the experts believed, following the course of events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, that a radical liberalization of the Party was most likely to provoke Soviet intervention and that, therefore, a relatively conservative Party was needed to prevent this. As it so happened, events have proved them right, but at a cost that makes it difficult to praise their approach as particularly prudent.

On this assumption, the Union tended to ignore all the changes that were occurring in the Party and remained studiously neutral with regard

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to them. It was equally uninterested in the movement of so-called horizontal structures and in the emergence within the Party of openly fascist groups, such as the Katowice Forum. In the end, the Union's decision to forgo any strike action in the three months before the Extraordinary Party Congress greatly helped the Party conservatives to quash all attempts of internal renewal, and facilitated the election of a Party leadership which made any further dialogue impossible. Thus, while the danger of Soviet intervention was indeed averted, any chance of achieving a political settlement with the Party was, in fact, destroyed. As a result the Party headed inexorably to its final political defeat, which was the military *coup* of 13 December. Not only did society finally turn its back on the Party, but equally the Party lost the rest of its membership who still had any political sense and self-respect. Only the most servile, or else openly fascist, element remained. This does not quite apply to the small group around General Jaruzelski, which probably does include some people capable of seeing beyond the end of their noses. So far, however, nothing has emerged from this group other than the primitive idea of a strong state acting on the principle "*Ordnung muss sein.*" The thought that the only political base of that group is the most primitive and criminal elements of society is truly frightening. For the time being one can probably still speak of the Jaruzelski regime as "fascism with a human face." At any rate, the greatest obstacle to ever finding a way out of the Polish crisis is, to my mind, not the liquidation of Solidarity (for it has not been liquidated), but the political self-liquidation of the Party. It is imperative, therefore, that there should emerge a political centre which, being acceptable to the USSR, would, at the same time, be capable of resuming the dialogue with the Polish people.

The Emergence of the Resistance Movement

The imposition of the state of war, apart from effectively killing the PUWP, has led to the emergence of a resistance movement practically all over the country. This was by no means unexpected. The method of resisting an invader is familiar to everyone in this country from his earliest days. It is underground warfare. It is a sad fact that for the last 200 years every generation has had to engage in that kind of warfare. The declaration of war against the nation was bound to lead to the emergence of a plethora of conspiratorial groups. The fact that a number of Solidarity leaders have escaped capture may be important for the future development of the movement, but it was in no way instrumental in bringing it about. It was an entirely spontaneous movement, and now there is hardly a place without an active group engaged in collecting money, distributing underground papers, at the very least helping the families of detainees. It has been pretty chaotic so far, and it is impossible to estimate its extent with any degree of certainty. However, the number of underground publications, reliably estimated at some

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1,700, would mean that in size it is at least comparable with the anti-fascist resistance movement under the German occupation.

In view of the widespread radicalism of the workers (viz. the constantly re-emerging slogan " The winter is yours—the spring—ours ") and the steadily sinking standard of living, it has to be assumed that it is not going to peter out; rather it will grow and become even more radical. It seems unlikely that this can be prevented by increasing repression. Reprisals can affect only a relatively limited number of activists, but are quite ineffective against a genuine mass movement. Under the German occupation even the most drastic measures (haphazard round-ups, execution of hostages, concentration camps) notably failed to suppress the resistance movement.

It is important to realise that the strength of a movement of this nature does not depend on the quality of its leaders. The decisive factor is the involvement of masses of people. Under the circumstances, repression may only result in narrowing still further the very limited political base of CROW and provoke a counter-terror. Political stabilization is out of the question.

The Programme of Reconciliation

More dangerous than repression are suggestions emanating from the authorities which envisage the reactivation of Solidarity in a form which would make it unable to resist the planned " Czechization " of Polish society. (I am using this term advisedly in preference to " Sovietization," since the latter seems to me to be closely bound with the specific oriental traditions of Russia and the great power aspirations of the Russians. The system envisaged for Poland, a satellite country, would have to draw rather on the experiences of Czechoslovakia since 1968.) These suggestions are dangerous because, although they do not meet with approval, they are being seriously considered in some defeatist circles of the intelligentsia who deem any other expectations to be unrealistic. This is a way of thinking that has been nurtured in society over many years of communist rule and depends for its feasibility on a systematic perversion of the meanings of words. The very concept of a " limited Solidarity " is a practical impossibility. Either it will be Solidarity or it will be limited. Solidarity is some 10 million people who have agreed to be bound by a number of principles and rules embodied in the statute of the organization. (Incidentally—" is " and not " was "—for after all even CROW has not yet attempted to disband Solidarity.) One of the rules is that the highest authority of the organization is Congress, and only Congress can change the statute, change the programme, elect leaders, etc. Congress may even decide to disband the organization, should that be the wish of the majority, but this cannot be done by anybody else, including the Chairman or the National Commission, let alone an incidental body selected by CROW. This fact is curiously being overlooked by many people seeking

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a compromise formula. In my opinion a compromise formula is possible, but it would have to be approved by Congress. While it might involve changes in the statute, a viable compromise formula would, however, have to keep intact the most essential elements of the statute which make Solidarity what it is, i.e. an independent and self-governing trade union. Such a formula would require the prior release of Solidarity leaders and activists now in prison and the reactivation of the Union at least to an extent that would enable it to hold a Congress. However, this will not be conceded voluntarily. It is a compromise that has to be fought for.

The other misconception inherent in a " limited Solidarity " is the hope that the Union could somehow limit itself exclusively to trade union matters without becoming involved in politics. This hope is entertained by people who have always treated the Union as a political platform and paid little heed to strictly industrial problems. It so happens that in the Warsaw Region I was responsible, among other things, for the unit dealing with wages, working conditions and employment, matters of most immediate concern to a trade union. At the same time, however, these are indissolubly linked with matters of industrial law and economic policy which are eminently political. In a situation where the sole employer has in his hands all sorts of means of pressure and repression, with large scale unemployment looming on the horizon, it is quite incomprehensible to me how the Union can fulfil its task of defending workers' interests without getting involved in politics.

Of course, the Union need not make political programmes or aspire to a share in power, but it does need adequate powers to defend the interests of its members. Without such powers it is no more than a state organ for the distribution of onions, apples and potatoes. Admittedly such functions may also be useful. Interested politicians might well go ahead with initiatives of this kind. Such a union, depending on who runs it and how it will be run, might play the part of another " Pax " or another " Znak " [two widely differing organizations of Catholics], but, please don't call it Solidarity, for the result will be only general confusion to the advantage of CROW. Calling such a union Solidarity is collaboration with the authorities.

Finally, the question of so-called realism. In my opinion any attempt to create a pseudo-Solidarity is even less realistic than dreams of a return to the pre-December days. Realism demands that a concept be acceptable not only to the authorities, but also to a majority of society. A pseudo-Solidarity would have no authority, would be unable to stem the growing radicalism of the workers and would merely compound the process of social disintegration. It is worth recalling the figure of Count Wielopolski* whose famous " political realism " triggered off one of the greatest tragedies in Polish history, the January Rising of 1863.

Realism that takes into account only the wishes of those in power is

* See p. 6.

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not truly realistic. We must strive for an accord that would be acceptable to the people as a whole.

At the moment it is difficult to foresee the exact shape of such future accord. In my opinion we should not even attempt it. While minimalistic demands would only foster, among those in power, the hope that Solidarity could be talked into capitulation, excessive unrealistic demands would, on the other hand, undermine the credibility of Solidarity. The exact provisions of the accord will reflect the actual balance of social and political power at the time of the negotiations. In late August 1980 no one was able to foresee that in a few days Solidarity would be born. Our task now is to create a similar state of public pressure, and this demands determination, consistent effort, solidarity and disciplined action.

The Programme of Social Resistance

Means of action must be devised in the light of the present situation. I have analysed it in some detail on the preceding pages. This leads to some more general remarks.

The night of 12/13 December was not the defeat of a national rising. It was merely a lost battle. We lost our organizational structure and some equipment, but two essential elements of our strength remained intact: 10 million people who are still members of the Union, and their high morale. There is no need to capitulate, and we must prepare, instead, for the next battle. The material losses are of minor importance; in spite of the poverty we are all facing, the readiness to make sacrifices is such that there is no reason to believe that work will be hampered for lack of material resources.

Far more important is the reconstruction of the organizational network, with the added proviso that it must be adapted to the new situation and the kind of action that this situation demands. We clearly need a policy-making centre which, however, does not mean a centralized executive. That would carry with it the danger of premature exposure and destruction. In the executive sphere the movement should remain decentralized and depend on the merits of spontaneous action. The task of the policy-making centre would be to provide general guidelines for action, and tactical advice; in the case of large-scale action involving a whole region or the whole country, its task would be to coordinate activities.

The creation of such a centre has now become a matter of urgency. It might be politically very variegated, since Solidarity is the rallying call of so many political groupings, but this need not be a reason for anxiety. Solidarity has always admitted a plurality of political views, and as long as these various groups are united in wanting the reactivation of Solidarity there should be no particular difficulties in this account. There is, on the other hand, the problem of methods of action, for the advocation of violent methods would clearly go against the spirit

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of Solidarity. Thus, it would be the task of the centre to decide which kinds of action may, or should, be undertaken in the name of Solidarity, and which kinds of action are deemed to be beyond the pale. Guidance in this matter would effectively combat confusion and prevent CROW-inspired provocations.

There have been several attempts to create a national centre, all rather uncoordinated and socially ineffective. What has to be borne in mind is that the situation calls for actions of two kinds: first, short-term reactions against current moves by the authorities, and secondly, long-term preparations for the reactivation of the Union. While the two are obviously related and may reinforce each other, they nevertheless require the existence of two separate kinds of structure: one within the industrial establishments, the other outside them.

The first is necessary because the final confrontation will involve the use, in one form or another, of the strike weapon. It will be the task of the inner structures to see to the technical preparation for the strike, as well as to shape the morale of the workforce. This requires liaison between the various parts of the industrial establishment, an adequate distribution system, in the case of the larger establishments also the publication of its own newspaper. Furthermore, it requires contact with neighbouring factories. Finally, the inner body would be charged with the collection of funds, needed for any action further afield. These inner bodies must be particularly cautious in order to avoid premature detection and liquidation. Too much activity may result in the loss of the most valuable of the activists, who would be needed at the time of greater mobilization.

Unlike the strictly disciplined inner structures, the outer movement should be more loosely organized and, therefore, less liable to premature exposure and destruction. It should have, throughout the country, a number of sanctuaries where those who find themselves in danger could go into hiding. The movement could, however, engage much more freely in establishing a countrywide network of communications, publishing, and prevention of any form of collaboration with the authorities.

The shaping of the morale of the rank-and-file membership is of paramount importance. This is the task of the underground press and independent publications. Apart from the ever present danger of detection, it is hardly possible for this press to reach everyone everywhere. The greatest possible number of local publications is needed, which, however, would make use of centrally provided material. The latter should be distributed in the first place to those who can make use of it, and in this way increase its readership. Apart from being much safer, this pattern has the additional merit of fostering inner-Union democracy, which requirements of secrecy tend to hamper. It is important that a number of local editors should have the possibility of selecting such material for publication as they think fit, and in this way to have a part in shaping the consciousness of the nation. Loose leaflets, which have the power to convey simple information to a large number of

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recipients, are not to be underestimated. They are the most visible sign of the existence of underground structures, which at the same time boost public morale and depress that of the common adversary. Any gap in the information network necessary to coordinate large scale action, whether demonstrations or strikes, could be filled by radio. Efforts to develop an extensive and widely received radio network are, in fact, in progress.

Another important field is action against any form of collaboration with the authorities. The political base of the regime is already extremely narrow and unattractive. Of course, people must live, work and earn money, and some contact with the authorities is, therefore, unavoidable. Full " internal emigration " is an impossibility. It must be remembered, nevertheless, that we are living in a state of war, declared by the authorities on the people, and that the country is occupied by the army, security forces, the police and ZOMO. Contact with the regime is contact with the occupying power, and there is a limit beyond which cooperation becomes collaboration. The situation is different in the case of a worker, a foreman or an official, and different again in the case of a doctor, a journalist or a composer. However, in all cases the limit is more or less clear, and every act of collaboration must meet with social ostracism and condemnation. A collaborationist must know that the price of any benefit he derives from his behaviour is public contempt. What must be avoided is any form of terror, but such actions as public harassment of collaborators in the " Wawer " case are a fully acceptable and even healthy phenomenon.

Finally, a few words about strikes. At the present stage isolated strikes in individual enterprises make little sense, unless they are undertaken for a limited and obviously justified cause which the authorities can concede at a relatively low cost to themselves. The same might be said about strikes of short duration undertaken in protest against a specified injustice, or in order to sound a warning. Above all, they must be well prepared and the risk of defeat must be small. An unsuccessful strike increases feelings of despondency and hopelessness.

What I am chiefly concerned with is some form of general strike. The failure of the general strike in December 1981 has made many people doubt the effectiveness of the strike weapon. It is a fact that the use of force came as a shock, and people panicked. Now we know that practically all strikes in Warsaw were put down by one and the same unit of ZOMO, and there was really no reason not to stage strikes in other establishments or to resume a broken strike once the militiamen departed to their next job. With such knowledge of the tactics of the authorities, we are in a position to work out our own tactics which will render suppression ineffective. The form of strike to be chosen will, of course, depend on the circumstances of the moment and detailed discussions on the subject would certainly be premature. As a matter of fact, it may well be that organizational preparedness alone will impress the authorities sufficiently to adopt a more flexible position with regard to Solidarity's demands.

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What are the chances of ultimate success? I think they are quite considerable. There are a number of factors that may induce a change in the stand of the Soviet authorities with regard to the Polish problem: continuing sharp conflicts within the communist leadership, leading to a protracted paralysis; incessant turmoil within the country fed by the ever-worsening living conditions, and impossible to suppress; unequivocal pressure on the part of the West. Under the circumstances, any kind of political stabilization, even one involving reduced Soviet interference in Polish affairs, may, in the eyes of Moscow, be preferable to a hotbed of unquenchable conflicts in the middle of Europe. This, in turn, would force the Polish leadership to seek a form of accommodation with the Polish people. There are some hard rules of the political game that ensure that such a prospect is more than mere wishful thinking: increased social pressure always favours those who are willing to seek a political solution to a problem.

The condition is causing social pressure to increase. I realize the psychological difficulties inherent in carrying through such a programme to its successful conclusion. There are many who would gladly give their lives for real Polish independence. But the present situation demands something else: determination to increase pressure for wider civic freedoms.

LET me end by saying once again what I said at the beginning of this essay. It is impossible to lead a normal life in a country whose best and most caring citizens are kept in prison. Whatever the cost, it is our moral duty to fight for their release, and nothing but their release can lift this obligation from our shoulders.

15 March 1982

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Letter from Bialoleka Prison

Why You Are Not Signing . . .

Andrzej Zagozda

GENERAL JARUZELSKI told you that those of the interned who pledge to refrain from activities " contrary to the law " will be released. Freedom, then, is a hand's reach away. A few strokes of the pen on the declaration of loyalty will suffice. . . . It is so easy to exchange your barred window, with its sharp outline of barbed wire, for freedom. The iron gates of Bialoleka will open before you, and instead of prisoners' walks you will see the streets of your native city; police patrols walk down them and tanks drive along them. You will see people being checked, cars being stopped and their boots searched, the vigilant eye of the informer fishing out from the crowd people suspected of " violating the regulations of the state of war." You will hear words known to you until now only from history books: " raid ", " *Volksliste*," words that today have been torn out from under the stately patina of time, words pulsating with today's ominous rhythm. You will hear of further arrests, of people being sought, of people hiding, of Draconian sentences.

And if you are capable of mean calculation, you have your first reason for not signing: it isn't worth it. Here no one can " detain " you for " explanations," here you have nothing to fear. It is paradoxical, I know, but if in the morning you are woken by someone banging on the door, you are not afraid of uniformed guests, you know it is only your kindly gaoler bringing you your morning coffee; here you feel no fear when you see an informer with restless eyes; here the spy is harmless. Bialoleka is a moral luxury and an oasis of freedom.

Sometimes they will try to scare you. My friend, a worker from a Warsaw factory, was promised 15 years in prison; another was threatened with trial for espionage; a third was interrogated in Russian; yet another was ordered out of his cell and told that he was going into the heart of Russia (they took him for an X-ray). But all this is bearable. Indeed, I think it is easier to bear than the morally and politically complicated situation on the other side of the barbed wire.

The Polish Primate condemned the practice of coercing people to sign declarations of loyalty. The Pope openly called this violation of human conscience a crime. All condemnation must fall on those who force these declarations out of people, on those who employ that cruel form of debasing human dignity. A young woman, the wife of a Solidarity activist, was arrested and taken away from her sick baby, whom, she was told beforehand, they had decided to place in a children's home. She signed the declaration. My friend was torn away from his mother, who remained alone dying of cancer, and was told that " there will not even

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be a lame dog to make your mother a cup of tea." He signed the declaration. There is no point in giving further examples of the cruelty of some, the helplessness of others, of tragic dilemmas and base blackmail. The decision always lies with the individual voice of one's own reason and conscience; it is difficult to condemn either choice here. Ostracism would in effect be the realization of the government's aims; for it is precisely their aim to break social resistance and human solidarity by creating divisions and conflicts. However, if one takes a position of tolerance and understanding, one cannot thereby assume that the very act of signing the declaration of loyalty is in itself "morally indifferent." It is not. Every declaration of loyalty is an evil, and a declaration into which you are coerced is an evil into which you have been coerced, the only difference being that it is sometimes a *lesser* evil. The act of signing deserves understanding, always sympathy, but never praise.

As yet you know little. Only in a few hours' time they will take you to Bialoleka, where, in your prison cell, your teeth chattering from the cold, you listen to the radio telling you that war has been declared against your nation. It was declared by people who govern in the name of that nation, who in the name of that nation make declarations and sign international agreements, by people who publicly reach out towards reconciliation, while privately instructing the secret police to hunt and arrest us by night.

And then you know for certain that you will not offer your declaration of loyalty to these people, for they themselves are incapable of any loyalty.

The University of Bialoleka

Question: How are you getting along?
Michnik: Splendidly. One of my few talents seems to be to get along in prison. Of course the preparation and training that I had before August 1980 has been very helpful. According to the experts here, the first 15 years are the hardest.
Question: How do you pass the time here in Bialoleka?
Michnik: Mostly by reading the classics, like Plato, Mickiewicz, Rilke, all of them easily more interesting than the prose of Jaruzelski. No doubt about it, prison is an ideal place for further education.
Question: How are you being treated?
Michnik: In our strange prison, which for some curious reason is called an internment centre, the atmosphere is right out of Kafka. Everyone is waiting for trial, without ever finding out what crimes he will be charged with, on the basis of evidence that remains unknown, at the instigation of authorities who are nameless and give no sign of what is likely to happen and when. . . . There is no end of restrictions, which are all stupid. What they're really for is to make your life miserable through little meannesses, so that in the end you will be prepared to sign one of their declarations of loyalty—or decide to emigrate. But where in all the world can you have it as good as here? Where else can you have conversations with a red-headed captain whom nature has endowed with the intelligence of an Einstein, the kindness of a St. Francis and the beauty of a Valentino?

The prisoners' underground newspaper, *Bialoleka Courier*

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You do not yet know what this war means; you do not yet know how the factories and steelworks, the shipyards and mines, will be stormed; you do not yet know of the bloody Wednesday at the Wujek mine. But one thing you do know: such a declaration would be a denial of your own self, would wipe out your life's meaning; it would be the betrayal of people, whose gaze is dead, yet restless, whose mind is blunted, yet skilled prisons, sentenced and interned, the betrayal of your friends who are being hunted and prosecuted, who are in hiding, the betrayal of all those who defend you—in Cracow with a leaflet, in New York and Paris with a public statement. Nothing is definite yet; the road is still open to you. You yourself can still choose, but you know instinctively that to abandon your dignity is not a price that should be paid for opening the prison gates—it is not a price worth paying.

It is contrary to common sense to make agreements of any kind with people who interpret the very concept of an agreement very freely indeed, and who violate common agreements, people for whom the lie is their daily bread. You have surely never met anyone who had anything to do with the secret police and did not feel cheated by them. For those people, whose gaze is dead, yet restless, whose mind is blunted, yet skilled in the art of harassment, whose soul is defiled, yet greedy for social acceptance—for those people you are nothing but material for working over. They have their own particular brand of anthropology: they believe that everyone can be convinced—that is, bribed or frightened. For them it is just a problem of the price paid and the pain inflicted. Although they work mechanically, every slip you make, every fall, gives meaning to their life. Your capitulation is not only their professional success, it is their *raison d'être.*

You are therefore arguing with them about the meaning of your own life, about how there is no meaning in theirs, about endowing every human life with meaning. You are continuing the argument of Giordano Bruno with the Inquisitioner; of the Decembrist with the tsarist police superintendent; of Lukasinski with the tsarist exterminating angel; of Ossietzky with the blond man in the Gestapo uniform; of Mandelstam with the Bolshevik Party member dressed in a uniform with the blue NKVD lapel; you are taking part in an argument that will never end, the argument of which Elzenberg says that the value of your involvement is not measured by the victory of your idea, but by the value of the idea itself. In other words, you win not when you gain power, but when you remain faithful to yourself.

Common sense also tells you that if you sign the declaration of loyalty, you put the whip into the hands of the functionaries. They will wave this whip around and they will threaten you with it in order to force you into making another statement that you will cooperate. The declaration of loyalty thus transforms itself into a pact with the devil: you cannot give even half a finger to those police inquisitioners, for they will immediately grasp hold of your entire arm. You know people whose entire life has been broken by one moment of weakness or moral injudiciousness;

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people hunted down by telephone calls, approached in their homes and offices, blackmailed whenever the opportunity arises for them to go abroad. They have paid for their moment of rashness with a lifetime of fear and debasement. If you do not want to be afraid, do not make agreements with the functionaries.

You feel no hate for the functionaries, only pity. You know how often they suffer from mental illnesses; you know they will feel shame in front of their own children; you know that the sentence of national oblivion will be passed on them.

You remember the history of your nation. You remember that within that history a declaration of loyalty made in prison was always a disgrace; remaining faithful to yourself and to the national tradition was a virtue. You remember people who were tortured and imprisoned for years, yet did not sign such a declaration. And there are others who roam among your memories: those who lost the battle of dignity in prison. Thus you see with the eyes of your soul Andrzej M, an excellent literary critic, your friend, who while in prison wrote a brilliant informer's essay, testimony to a moral death; you remember Zygmunt D, a charming friend, an intelligent man, who broke down once, and for years thereafter continued to inform on his colleagues. So you think with horror of these human shreds, of these people broken to pieces by the police machine, and you still see your future as an open possibility. The choice, then, is yours, but your memory commands you to repeat: you can become like that; no one is a born informer; every day you forge your fate at the cost of your own life.

You have not yet heard the declaration of loyalty on the radio, nor the vile interrogations, the shameful statements; you do not yet know how Marian K from Nowa Huta was tricked—he was a brave and intelligent Solidarity activist; in his statement he wanted to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and unto God what is God's, and he rendered everything unto the police, for he did not stop to think that there are situations where ambiguity ceases to be ambiguous, and where half-truths become lies. But you know that all this is nothing new, that you will not want to explain to these functionaries waving the order of release in front of your nose that it is they who are slaves, and no order of release will free them from that bondage; you will not explain to them that those people swarming in crowded corridors, recently torn from their homes, those worker activists, professors and writers, students and artists, friends and strangers, that those are the people who constitute human and national freedom, and that, for this, war has been declared upon them; you will not want to explain to this functionary, who with sadistic pleasure punched you in the face, the meaning of the essay by Rozanov in which he describes the most significant conflict in European culture as the antagonism of the man who wields the whip to the man who is whipped; you will not, then, explain to him that your meeting is another incarnation of that antagonism. You will not talk to him at all.

Today, if you shout at the functionaries, their pupils will reveal a

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gleam of fear. You will notice this fear and uncertainty under their helmets, through their uniform, from behind the police shields imported from Japan. And you will soon realize that this fear of the functionary's is for you a certificate of hope—of your hope.

For it is over this that the battle is being waged: the functionaries want to squeeze out of us a declaration that we have abandoned hope. The functionaries realize that he who declares his loyalty to the system of lies and coercion, rejects hope for a Poland in which lies and coercion would be condemned. These declarations are supposed to transform us into servile, base creatures who will revolt in the name of freedom and dignity. Thus, by refusing to engage in conversation with the functionary, by refusing to cooperate, by rejecting the status of a collaborator and informer, by choosing the human condition of a political prisoner, you are preserving hope. You throw this declaration of hope, as you would a sealed bottle into the sea, from your prison into the world, among people. If you tell at least one person, you have won.

You know how acute is the feeling of loneliness. You think that you are helpless in the face of this police—and army—machine that was set in motion one December night. But you know, as you stand alone, bound in handcuffs, with tear gas in your eyes, facing functionaries waving their guns, you know, and you see it clearly against the dark, starless night, you know, thanks to your favourite poet, that " the avalanche changes its course according to the stones over which it flows." And you want to be that stone which will change the course of events. Even if it is to be but one of the stones thrown onto the embankment.

(This letter, smuggled out of Bialoleka prison, was written by Adam Michnik under the pseudonym " Andrzej Zagozda.")

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An Underground Debate

Theses on Solving an Insoluble Problem

Jacek Kuron

The Economy

Anyone can see what condition it is in. If we were to accept that the war was started to save the economy, as we are assured by those who started it, then it is a case of saying that the operation was successful but that, nevertheless, the patient died. According to the *official* publication of GUS (the Main Office of Statistics) in January 1982, which was the first quiet month of our war, production fell by 13·6 per cent in comparison with the " strikers' " January of 1981, and by 17·5 per cent when matched with production in December 1981. This is after we have had forced labour on six " free " Saturdays since martial law. If this trend continues, then in five months there will be drastic results. The GUS reports can easily be improved in the future but can we say the same for production? Can its decline be halted? This can be answered by stating the reasons for the economic disaster.

There is much talk of the depression of the workers, the blockade on information due to the war, and the impact of the West's sanctions. The communication clamp-down has been breached and partially lifted, and Western sanctions are only just beginning to bite. These reasons for the economic crisis are so obvious that they overshadow the most important one, which is that the economic crisis did not start in December 1981, nor in August 1980. Those brave enough to speak out foresaw its inevitability in 1976. After August 1980 all interested sides agreed that social and economic life was being crippled by enforced centralized planning and administration. The source of the whole illness can be attributed to the fact that those most involved in social cooperation had no influence on either its aims or directions. The projected reforms of the state and the economy were to alter this.

Meanwhile, 13 December 1981 saw the introduction of militarization at all levels of administration, no matter what the declarations or even the intentions of the initiators of the *coup*. It meant the subordination of all areas of social and economic life to orders issuing from the central HQ. All levels of society are supposed to take orders, execute them, and report back on the situation. This may be good tactics in a war but is fatal as regards social existence. The basic causes of the illness are consequently being exacerbated and threaten eventual death. Even if miracles were to happen, and Polish production became competitive and the West restored its credits, we would merely arrive at a position similar

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to that of the Gierek era. Everything will be rapidly wasted, the more swiftly our life becomes militarized.

Society

Society is at war. Those who declared the war do not try to mystify the situation and pretend this is *not* a war against society. Thanks to the extraordinary self-discipline of the people, we avoid bloodshed. But now we have a classic occupation with all its ingredients—censorship of the mail, curfew, massive raids, house searches, arrests, military tribunals, and the attitude that the whole of society bears common responsibility for what particular individuals do.

The only language the authorities use when speaking to the nation is that of violence, threats, and despairing appeals for calm. What have they achieved and what might they achieve? The despair and hatred of all the people. The fear and submission of some. The determination and struggle of others. The authorities cannot depend on those who are terrorized since their submissiveness will end when the violence used against them ends. Those who are determined will fight, and the more energetically and cruelly they are repressed, the more they will resist. The economy, in ruins, will produce hunger and poverty; the number of the determined will increase. The occupying forces should not delude themselves: partitions of Poland have never lasted long. Nor do partitions destroy the web and tissue of social and economic life; occupation does.

Immediately after the last war the communists drew up and partially implemented a programme of complete Polish democracy, including that of the Polish Peasants' Party. The country was being rebuilt and the regained territories were being administered. These reasons explain why there was no state of war in Poland then, despite the existence of an armed underground movement against the new state. On the contrary, there was considerable evidence of democratic freedoms. If we consider Hungary after 1956 we see how ominous the situation is. There was considerable bloodshed, and those authorities in charge of social life lost control of the situation, and responsibility was taken from them.

Violence breeds violence. Those with little patience and less balanced views will resort to terror, the double-edged weapon. Terror breeds terror, and the spiral of terror cannot be broken by terror. He who sows the wind will reap the tempest.

The Whole Soviet Bloc

The whole Soviet bloc has been profoundly shaken by the events in Poland. The deadly illness of the Polish economy is most advanced, but similar symptoms show themselves throughout the bloc. As an economy becomes modernized, the aspirations of the society increase, as does participation in the international division of labour. Modernization in Soviet bloc countries is essential because of the demands of military

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defence. In weak economic conditions, modernization entails a violent growth in expenditure in order to achieve increased competitive efficiency, which is constantly diminishing as marginal returns become relatively smaller. This is the basic reason for increased dependence on Western finance and the growing acuteness of social conflicts.

We know that the war in Poland started under pressure from the Soviet Union. Its leaders have good reason to fear that the Polish illness may be contagious. But clearly they have miscalculated. The sanctions imposed by the West have limited the possibilities for cooperation, without which the economies of the bloc cannot function normally; and it is unable to bear the burden of additional and costly armaments.

The destruction of the Polish economy has broken a vital link in the bloc's economic structure. The countries of the bloc have to shoulder the burdens of such policies, along with that of a deepening crisis. The patience of a society has its limits. The empire is dying but it is still strong enough for a bloody settling of accounts with Poland.

Should Poland Wait for the Death Throes of the Empire?

With the previous empire in Eastern Europe under German occupation, the Czechs virtually waited for the end. However, that war was being waged in a foreign territory (with considerable participation by the Czechs), and they all knew what they were waiting for. If there is a war now, it is being fought in Poland, and the end of the empire is only a prophecy.

No appeals for calm will divert the young and hot-headed. Such appeals will merely force them into terrorism if they are prevented from using other forms of struggle. Appeals cannot diminish their bitter anger and despair, and this explosive tension could spark off a conflagration at any time. Poverty and violence are the fruits of a state of war, and a healthy society will always respond to violence, and violently imposed poverty, by fighting against it. The only question is on which battlefront will the fight be fought. There are no battlefields at present other than Poland, and history teaches that an oppressor has achieved peace here only at the price of blood and ashes, and even then only for one generation.

Appeals, even from the highest moral authorities, to refrain from certain forms of resistance, will only be heard if they also indicate some other types of action which may lead to solutions of the problem. But the occupation has made all peaceful activities impossible: it has not even left open the possibility for efficient work. No one can bring peace to Poland as long as the occupation lasts. It may be brought to an end by the authorities coming to terms with the nation, or by the nation abolishing the authorities. In the latter case, we would come face to face with Soviet military power.

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National Agreement

National agreement is a necessary condition for a peaceful life, and must be based on an acceptance by all citizens of at least some fundamental values and aims. Since August 1980, the Polish nation has been united as never before. The difficulties arose when the Soviet threat was realized and the nation understood that it had to relinquish some essential parts of its aspirations. We argued about what these were to be, or should be, and we attempted to reach a compromise with those in Poland who represented the interests of the Soviet Union. For the sake of compromise, the majority of Poles accepted the decisive role of those people. We asked only for social control over their actions, and for genuine representation of the Polish nation whenever vital decisions were made. Those people did not wish to compromise.

Instead of building a state with even the most limited democracy, they destroyed the economy and civil administration with their anarchy. Their ambitions were fulfilled when, on 13 December 1981, they smashed all hopes of social compromise, a compromise between society and the ruling class, which is unimaginable today. But the occupation, if it continues, will impel the rulers to disaster. The Polish nation has the right to give the occupying forces what they deserve. However, the Church is opting for a compromise, and the Church is the highest moral authority in Poland. The attitude of the Church will find support with the majority of Solidarity's leaders and intellectuals. For those in power, compromise is risky but to continue the occupation is suicidal.

The Resistance Movement

A well-organized broad-based resistance movement is the only chance for the Poles. Only such a movement can be party to a compromise, and only such a movement can hope to quell terrorism. If the people in government refuse to support a compromise, only a resistance movement can diminish the risk of Soviet intervention, an intervention which would now be the answer to any major social eruption. The strength of the occupying force lies in the extent to which it can spread disinformation among society, and its ability to shift " pacification " troops rapidly from one place to another. For this reason we must now organize ourselves around a central nucleus, and submit to it with absolute discipline. We must organize and construct a competent system for the dispersal of information. We must, however, take into account the possibility that at any moment it can be blocked, and this is why the concrete goals of the movement and its methods of functioning must be generally known.

The Movement's Activities

The activities of the movement, excluding publications, are currently confined to demonstrations. These can take various forms, from leafleting to painting wall-slogans, from longer to shorter strikes, passing

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through various kinds of collective demonstrations. All these forms of activity are significant since they increase the nation's morale, as well as continuously exerting pressure on those in power who might possibly support moves towards a compromise. The ultimate means of such an exertion of power, and the final chance for compromise, would be a general strike. We must state that such activities as are now being carried out are indications of the will of the nation against those who, with premeditation, acted against it.

But if we confine ourselves to such actions and the government compromisers remain silent, we must then face certain disaster. In the course of several weeks, a little earlier perhaps, or a little later, independent local incidents will grow into national ones, spreading throughout the country. The occupying forces will probably be overthrown, but at the cost of a threatened Soviet invasion. That is why the leaders of the movement must prepare the nation for the most extreme concessions in seeking a compromise with the rulers, and for the rapid cessation of the occupation by a common demonstration against it. I think that such a demonstration may take the form of a simultaneous attack against all centres of information and power in the country. It is necessary to make the authorities understand that they have only a limited amount of time in which to reach a settlement.

Expecting the worst, we must now do everything in our power to make the Soviet leadership realize that, with a small amount of goodwill on their part, a Polish national agreement would not—even if it were without the participation of the present government of the Polish People's Republic—upset its military interests, and would even encourage financial profit for the bloc. We also have to make it clear that armed intervention in Poland would be the Soviet Union's final act.

I am not claiming that an organized demonstration, combined with a declaration of goodwill towards the USSR, will guarantee our safety from that power. I maintain only that, if the occupation continues, such action will carry with it the fewest risks. Throughout the many years of my opposition activity, I propagated the principle of avoiding all forms of violence. It is my duty now to speak out, to say that to prepare ourselves for the overthrow of the occupation through mass demonstrations seems to me to be the least of all evils.

Solidarnosc, Information Bulletin (Paris),
no. 14, 29 Mar. 1982

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An Underground Debate

Positional Warfare

Zbigniew Bujak

THE key idea in Jacek Kuron's pronouncement is, in my view, expressed in this statement: " If you don't want a war, prepare yourself for it." This pronouncement is an important contribution to the discussion about the programme of action. Jacek Kuron is a distinguished intellectual with a keen understanding of social phenomena and the ability to predict their outcome. Yet I disagree both with his assumptions and with his conclusions.

His whole reasoning is based on the premise that social outburst is inevitable, due to poverty, violence and a lack of successful methods of action other than open confrontation. In my opinion people are generally aware of the fact that such an outburst would not solve any of the problems we are facing, but would, on the contrary, create a great threat—both of outside intervention, and of the most brutal use of internal forces. Thus society's high level of self-awareness, discipline and organization offers at least a chance of avoiding such an outburst.

The authorities' use of terror is countered by a society with methods of resistance other than violence. This should be the direction of our programme of action; we must try all other lines of action before resorting to the ultimate option.

Therefore I think it is futile to organize a resistance movement " capable of destroying the occupation by means of an organized mass action." Moreover, I believe that such an undertaking is unrealistic: unrealistic first of all because of the police and military state structure, well adapted to breaking and destroying such organizations. The fact that the occupying forces use our language and are on their " home ground " facilitates infiltration enormously. Furthermore, we are surrounded by states with the same political system.

I would also like to question the view that only a centrally-organized resistance movement is able to stem the tide of terrorism. I think the opposite might in fact be true: a movement, once centralized, must receive and execute instructions; if at any point these fail to appear, if they prove to be inadequate or unattractive, the organization might be pushed in the direction of terrorism. The spiral of terror, once set in motion, will, with this type of structure, quickly accelerate.

I favour a decidedly decentralized movement, adopting different methods of action. Only such a diffuse and varied movement will be elusive and difficult to suppress. Its unity will be guaranteed by its common objectives: the lifting of martial law, the release of the interned and arrested, the restoration of rights to unions and associations. I

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disagree that a centralized underground organization would be able, through the threat of a general strike or of an attack on centres of power, to exert enough pressure on the advocates of compromise within the government to force them to work effectively towards an agreement. I believe that such a powerful threat would unite the government camp in its attempt to crush the movement completely. Only that section of the government which would like to see outside intervention would profit. And Moscow might be interested in intervention if it meant a chance to eliminate all the " trouble-makers " and " enemies of socialism." This possibility would be enhanced by the existence of a centralized movement of active resistance in Poland.

One final argument against the idea of a centrally-organized underground is that it would be very difficult to protect and, if it was to be smashed, such a defeat would be yet another major blow to Solidarity and the hopes of our people. We cannot risk it.

TO sum up: to build a Solidarity movement as a monolithic organization prepared for decisive and final action might create the danger of another attempt by the authorities to crush the nation with internal forces. And even if it were possible for us to avoid this, outside intervention would still await us. Therefore I believe that we should adopt the principle of avoiding head-on clashes with the authorities, because the dangers are too great and our chances of success, as I have been trying to show, are negligible.

I believe that " positional warfare," to use a military expression, would be both an effective and safe form of action. This is the type of resistance I would like to advocate.

Individual groups and social circles must build a mechanism of resistance against the monopolistic activities of the government in various spheres of life. Through the existence of a mass organization like Solidarity, and through the activities of independent peasants', craftsmen's, and students' unions, this resistance might become so widespread as to create the possibility of evolving an independent structure for social life.

In factories and other places of work this is primarily a fight for the right to continue union activities. The only method of doing this is, precisely, to continue such activity: that is, to defend the rights of workers by all possible means, including strikes (without strike-leaders). One of the most important aims in the present economic situation must be to guarantee pay rises and family benefits in relation to increases in the cost of living. This kind of union activity will be possible only when the workforce defends its active members against repression by engaging in various kinds of protest actions.

There would exist important elements of independent social life, such as Committees for Social Aid, formed in parishes in order to help the most needy and provide for people dismissed from work (this would deprive the authorities of the weapon of economic blackmail against

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them); independent press and publications (every large enterprise should have its own paper, every large town, its own publishing house); councils of National Education, of Culture and Science, set up by intellectuals, teachers and scholars, would offer access to independent knowledge and experience; a network of centres of the Association of Workers' Universities, whose graduates would become union activists as well as founders and activists of regional and workers' self-governments. Other elements in this structure of independent social life will surely be worked out in the course of action.

The road is not one of rapid and spectacular success, but of long, hard work which demands the participation of a large section of society. But Solidarity, a movement 10-million strong, with nearly a million activists, exists and is active despite martial law. Its achievements allow one to believe that the plan suggested here is feasible. And an uprising—if it became inevitable—would be the last resort in the struggle for a national programme to reconstruct the economy, culture, science, education, and independence.

Solidarnosc, Information Bulletin (Paris),
no. 16, 19 Apr. 1982

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An Underground Debate

The Third Possibility

Wiktor Kulerski

WHAT will happen if the government decides that an economic crisis and unrest are less costly to them than a compromise? If local incidents do not lead to a national revolt that will overthrow the government? If the occupation becomes less spectacular but continues to last for a long while yet?

History abounds in examples of long-lasting decay of authority and extreme social endurance, perhaps even greater in times of poverty and hunger. Should we not, then, prepare ourselves for just such a possibility: evolution and not revolution? But in which direction? This also depends on society. Thus it is not a question of Jacek Kuron's alternative: compromise or revolution, but of a third possibility: a slow disintegration of the system and gradual changes leading towards greater influence of the people over their own fate.

To ensure development in this direction, we need not so much an underground state as an underground society. Not a centralized organization with complete allegiance to it, but a multi-centred movement, decentralized, informal, consisting of mutually independent and loosely connected groups, circles, committees, etc., with large scope for independent decision-making. They would have to provide constant and effective aid for all people persecuted by the authorities, develop the circulation of independent information and free thought, create a network of social communications, ensure the possibility of self-education and additional schooling, provide moral and psychological support.

Such a movement should lead to a situation where the authorities control empty shops but not the market, workers' employment but not their livelihood, state-owned mass media but not the circulation of information, printing houses but not publishing, the post and telephones but not communications, the schools but not education. This kind of social independence could in due time lead to a situation where the rulers would control only the police and a handful of sworn collaborators. No third possibility would then be open: either the government will fall or, instead of a spectacular compromise, the barriers between the authorities and the people will gradually collapse and restraints will be lifted: civil rights restored, self-government and, finally, participation in decisions concerning, above all, economic, cultural and social life, assured. The scope of restored freedoms must be such as to outweigh the risks involved in participating in an underground society. Only then will its attraction diminish to such an extent that some measure of control over

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the life of society as such, will be at all possible. The cost of regaining such influence would be, then, a gradual liberalization and democratization.

In conditions of a modern police state surrounded by similar systems and, like them, supervised by a neighbouring power, a long-term, nationwide secret organization is not possible. Its formation would create the danger of a premature outburst or a premature breaking up of the organization, a defeat which we can no longer allow. That is why only a relatively small group of people can risk the formation of a rudimentary " centre " and, at most, regional centres. An embryonic underground state would be just another potential threat to the authorities. Its influence could spread within the underground society in such a way that—when necessary—a central organization could quickly be formed.

Thus only in the last resort would the underground state find its extension and support in the underground society. Until then the underground society should remain independent and avoid any closer ties with a centralized structure. It enables that structure itself to avoid premature destruction and at the same time protects society from defeat. Then even the destruction of the underground state would be no more than a small setback. The underground society would survive and be capable of making good the loss.

The third possibility is all the more worthy of consideration because of one more danger. Empires torn by internal conflicts, crisis-ridden and threatened from the outside, have more than once resorted to aggression. Aggression allows them, quickly and irrespective of cost, to increase their military potential, to consolidate the masses around the government, and to divert the people's attention from their own tragic internal situation. This is a possibility we cannot overlook. It is a very dubious consolation in our situation to say that "military intervention in Poland would be the last action taken by the USSR."

Solidarnosc, Information Bulletin (Paris),
no. 17, 27 Apr. 1982

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An Underground Debate

Open Letter

Jacek Kuron

AS can be seen from the polemic between myself, Zbigniew Bujak and Wiktor Kulerski, there exist considerable differences in our assessment of the political situation and the methods of action we propose. No matter. What is important is that we understand each other's reasons because only then can the discussion prove at all useful.

As I understand it, your proposal is to build a kind of social movement which, in the days before August 1980, we would have called social self-defence. That is, a movement based on the organization of people from different social groups which allows them to come together to solve the problems that they face. This kind of self-organization can serve as a basis for the development of more general activities; publishing, self-education, programme-making. In my article " Reflections on a programme of action " (1976), I insisted that this type of movement must be based on the full autonomy of local and sectoral action groups. Forgive me for this self-advertisement, but I want to emphasize how close your ideas are to mine. The truth of my assertion was demonstrated in the lead-up to the victory of August 1980, which is now an irreversible victory. Thus, I am not surprised that this idea is now meeting with wide support. In searching for historical analogies we look at everything, and try to take advantage of the experience already gained. But we must not forget that we are discussing methods of action, and these are dependent above all on existing conditions, which are totally different today from August 1980.

What are the conditions necessary for the development of a resistance movement? I see three:

— each person must be able to act;
— their actions must have at least a chance of success;
— the social system within which the movement is being formed must have resources, however minimal, to allow it to develop.

The system which existed under Edward Gierek fulfilled the first two conditions. His team wanted to rule with society's approval. This is why it forced the apparatus to concede to pressure.

Today, the generals and the secretaries have decided not only to bypass the consensus of opinion, but even to govern against it. The basis of their rule is their ability to break up demonstrations, to smash strikes, to arrest, to intern, to beat up, to shoot. . . . The generals and the secretaries are so strong in this sense that they will not give an inch under pressure. All this has already been said and shown in practice. We should not be under any illusions. We should also point out that they cannot

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move under pressure because they have no reserves and hence no room for manoeuvre.

They cannot but lower wages, sack workers, and reduce food rations. And as you know, no social movement—at least not one that considers itself the co-manager of the country—can give up economic demands. We cannot stop the growing economic agony of our country without a true national reconciliation. I began my "Theses . . ." with a justification of this assertion, which you have unfortunately passed over in your polemics.

Thus, in these conditions of martial law, no self-defence or other social movement is possible, no movement which by virtue of its existence would be able to bring about gradual changes in the system.

A NEW mass movement is to emerge underground. It engages in publishing activities, self-education, and above all in all forms of demonstration of will. Will people join this movement with such tasks, despite the risks? In my opinion, no. *Any social movement on a mass scale is a response to important aims which can be achieved through organized activity and in this way only.* Self-education is possible without such a movement. Publishing activity, as an end in itself, only involves a tiny minority of society. Demonstrations cannot bring about any immediate success. They are, of course, very important for morale, inasmuch as they show the strength of the movement. But if this strength is used only to raise morale, it will eventually become impotent.

At present a number of people are involved in organizational tasks. They are building a mass organization which will take on tasks in connexion with the realization of its desired aims. The most limited and, at the same time, the most universal aim is to create conditions in which people can lead normal lives. The tasks that you have put forward cannot, any more than any other local or sectoral activity, bring us even one millimetre nearer this aim. No underground activity, which is always a preparation for something else, will lead to it in a direct way. If you do not explain what the movement is preparing for in practical terms, then you will be left with an organization without aims, but with deception, discontent, and hate. . . . Out of this hate, terrorism is born.

An organization with a central leadership could, within certain limits, prevent acts of desperation and aggression, provided there is such a leadership and it is able to reach all layers of the movement. But a central leadership will lose its control over the movement when it turns out that it has no solution to the situation. Let us note here that the present organizational activity will naturally lead to a centralization of the movement. If the leaders of Solidarity, or even only a section of them, try to stop this process, several centres will emerge and this, apart from inevitable conflicts, will create ideal conditions for provocation.

You say that people can endure a long time yet, and you refer to historical experience in support of this claim. In this instance we disagree on the facts. Last year the GNP dropped by 13 per cent. This year, if we

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obtain significant aid from the East, and some Western credits, then the national revenue will drop by a further 17–22 per cent, according to officially published experts' forecasts. Let us disregard the fact that no considerable help will arrive from the East and that Western credits are at best doubtful. Let us settle only for this further reduction of 20 per cent. This is a disaster unknown in the history of modern societies. Its economic, social, and moral consequences can hardly be imagined.

On what precisely do you base your belief that the Polish people will be able to support calmly such a catastrophe? In a situation, moreover, where the authorities are constantly provoking them with their arrogance and terror? On the fact that they have shown patience from January up until now? Let us leave aside the fact that life is going to get worse in the future. On the contrary, let us note that the maturity of the Polish people, on which we all agree, is nothing less than the confidence that they have in Solidarity. That is to say, in you and in the resistance movement.

The people are containing their despair, anger, irritation, because they have thrown themselves into activities to which you exhort them, or at least so it seems to them. They believe that you know the way and will lead them to victory. But they will soon realize that the slogan " stay underground " is the most costly way to defeat. And what then? Perhaps the government will be able to prevent a national explosion. Perhaps there will be a number of explosions, on a local level, which will be more or less brutally stifled. And on top of it all there are the physical, social, and moral effects of the economic collapse. Even without outside intervention we might witness the destruction of the nation. I do not know whether, as you say, Solidarity cannot afford any more defeats. But I do know that we cannot escape defeat by refusing to fight.

By undertaking to organize Solidarity we, its activists, have taken upon ourselves a great responsibility. We cannot run away from it by refusing to look for answers to the central questions. I am ready to advocate the necessity of maximum concessions from society, in order to avoid the catastrophe which this state of war is bringing to Poland. But these concessions cannot be counterposed to the essential condition for a social compromise; a situation where the authorities communicate with society and not only with themselves (under the guise of different names and persons). In a word, the necessary compromise is conditioned by a society organized independently of the state authorities.

No programme can be built on the hope that the generals and the secretaries will voluntarily agree to a compromise. It has to be acknowledged that violence retreats only in front of violence, and it must be stated unequivocally that the movement will not hesitate to use violence. I had imagined that such an announcement would mention an appropriate time, for example, " in the summer," or " in the autumn." This is the best way to contain acts of desperation and aggression. From that moment on, all demonstrations of mass feeling in the country—lighted candles, minute's silence, hunger strikes, certain

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features of dress, work stoppages—would make the threat more real and show the movement's determination.

I had imagined that the movement would immediately begin all forms of agitation among soldiers and police militia. They should be urged to communicate with each other and with Solidarity. In my opinion, this is the principal task of the movement.

The demonstration, thus announced, could take the form of an indefinite general strike. But in doing that, we would give the generals and the secretaries the chance to attack centres of their choosing, and thus concentrate their superiority of men and equipment in a given place. Unless we can ensure the cooperation of a decisive majority of soldiers and police militia, it would be necessary to combine the strike with attacks on specific centres of information and power, with the inside knowledge of those soldiers and police militia who chose to come over to our side. Another possibility is to announce that such an attack will take place where factory workers on strike are being threatened.

The conjecture that the secretaries and the generals will become even more inflexible because of their fear of attack would be justified if it were possible to believe that anything other than fear would force them to make concessions. When you declare that the movement will not use violence you are misleading them. They think that their position is secure and they will not yield a single millimetre.

Although the authorities have opened discussions with the Episcopate on national conciliation and social agreement, they have only done so to give cover to a practice that is quite contrary to that. The moment a real threat appears, the Church will cease to be a partner and will become the desired mediator. You have seen how the moderate proposals of the Social Council of the Polish Primate are now considered as extremist because they are the only alternative to the official ones. When you come out as a partner, those proposals will become a genuine platform for compromise. It is true that if such a compromise is reached, then those who have been making threats will find themselves on the margins of the reviving social life. It cannot be helped.

I AM not urging you to announce an attack, but to organize the movement's centre and an efficient information network. It is important to emphasize that this will not undermine the authority of individual sections of the movement. But it will limit the danger of provocations and thoughtless actions. Some types of action should be the exclusive reserve of the centre.

Furthermore, I urge you to declare that, if the authorities do not listen to society, if they refuse to comply with its will expressed in different ways, if they do not take action to save the country from catastrophe, if they do not come to an agreement with society, then the movement will be forced to resort to violence.

Finally, I call on you to begin agitation among the soldiers and police militia. You will find a good response among them, and this very fact

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will constitute a considerable danger to the authorities. And, above all, what is needed is a common programme, agreed upon by all the main leaders of the resistance movement.

PLEASE forgive me for playing the philosopher. I know how hard you are working and how considerable have been your achievements. But we have found ourselves in an impasse, and although we probably do not yet measure up to the situation, we have to rise to it. It is up to us to indicate a way out of this predicament which we perceive to be one without solution.

You would not have chosen such a burden, but unfortunately you cannot now discard it. You have an historic chance . . .

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The Dialectic of Opportunism

The Hair-Styles of Mieczyslaw Rakowski*

Leopold Tyrmand

" . . . I no longer believe that the revolution should sit in judgment on the world. I believe only in the revolution which transforms us . . ."

Henrik de Man, *Zür Psychologie des Sozialismus.*

AND quite right too. However, I shall use de Man's proposition in a sense different from the one in which he intended it. The verb " to transform " de Man uses in its positive and directional sense, as if to say: " Let us, instead of making revolution, transform ourselves, become better people." Fine, but isn't it more interesting to consider how a successful revolution transforms us all, different people that we are? Were I determined to seek out finer details, I might easily run the risk of producing truisms. I propose instead to let the brilliant plurality of metamorphoses, their richness and diversity, spread themselves before us in a startling array like an Op-Art painting. This way we shall have no difficulty in avoiding vulgarizations.

I introduce Mieczyslaw Rakowski with a feeling of emotional neutrality. Life has never brought us close to one another. He has always greeted me politely, if without interest, as I have him. What we knew about each other and what we thought has remained unchanged over the years. We were ideological enemies, but there was no hatred between us. I even regarded him with a certain degree of pleasure, despite the general sense of revulsion I felt. There was something vaguely amusing about him which confirmed my more general assumptions, and it is always agreeable to be proved right.

In 1958 the International Press Club asked me to take part in a public discussion of my article in *Tygodnik Powszechny* in which I had suggested that a revision of our concepts of post-war Germany was necessary—the first time this had been attempted in Poland since the end of the war. It had provoked a wave of indignant slogans from the communist press, as well as insults from *émigré* Poles, while *Tygodnik* skilfully dissociated itself from me. I accepted the invitation with the masochistic pleasure of a suicide who becomes ecstatic at the thought of being publicly torn to pieces. In the event, it wasn't quite as bad as that.

* This article was first published in *Kultura* (Paris) in October 1967 (and republished in 1981). In view of the present role of Rakowski as deputy Prime Minister of Poland, it is still relevant.

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True, the Nationalist-Communist coalition sank its teeth into me, but the university students and other youngish people responded with a remarkably pragmatic approach and applauded loudly my most provocative excursions. Rakowski was in the chair, and one had to admit that he performed his duty with the forced but obvious neutrality of a referee who desperately wants his own 11 to win, but never for a moment forgets his position as umpire.

Some years later I suggested to Rakowski that he should print the first part of my unpublished novel. It was a tactical move: the publication of my novel in his journal *Polityka* would be a surrealist event and neither of us took the possibility seriously. In my battle for a passport and for the publication of my book, I wanted to be able to say: " *Polityka* is considering publishing a novel of mine." This throw-away remark, skilfully dropped in various offices in the course of various conversations, made a certain impression. Some time later, Rakowski telephoned and returned my typescript (which he certainly had not read) and we parted with great affability, smiles and *bonhomie* all round. We both understood very well what the game was about. The fact was that Rakowski had also scored a few points in his own game—at that time he was immensely keen to appear as liberal an editor as possible who gave due consideration to every manuscript on its merits. So, even if in his opinion I was too extreme even for a liberal editor, he could not refuse to have a look at my typescript; for then I would have gone all round Warsaw with new evidence of persecution, this time from *Polityka*.

Rakowski is a syndrome, like Kott, Comrade Blatmanowa and Mr Bolo, about whom more later. You may ask why, when attacking other syndromes, I consider Rakowski with a degree of neutrality. The answer isn't simple. Although they represent a dangerously prolific species, Kott, Comrade Blatmanowa and Mr Bolo are just nauseating. Rakowski is a more complex phenomenon. Of course, one could make him into a convenient stereotype, but to what end? Individualization and incarnation better convey the horrors of the transformations which de Man was not himself able to know.

THE history of the hair-styles of Mieczyslaw Rakowski is the history of victorious Polish communism. Rakowski's social credentials are of the best: he is the son of a Pomeranian peasant. At the beginning, the communists loved nothing so much as authentic peasant progeny; in anticipation they had prepared little verses about the Slavonic and truly Aryan sons of the soil, who fought bravely against the deluge of German imperialism, in poverty but unswervingly. The product was consequently healthy, well-built, fair-haired and fetching. When I first saw Rakowski he had on his head what one might call a shock, an enormous crop of blond curls, a veritable thatch of hair. The result was undistinguished, or so it seemed at first, but in fact it was a carefully studied exercise in style. This was the heyday of Stalinism, and Rakowski, together with a chum of his, a certain Wysznacki (later editor of *Stolica*), was apprenticed to

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learn the trade of communist executioner of the printed word, under the then famous butcher Stefan Staszewski, head of the Press Section of the Central Committee, and later a rebel. I had been told about Staszewski many years before by Immanuel Birnbaum, of *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the doyen of European wit. He once remarked, when we were both living in the Warsaw YMCA among the Christian youth: "Staszewski? Take care! A blond Jew—it goes against nature—you can never tell what he'll do next. . . ." In the light of the October 1956 events this proved prophetic. At the time of which I am speaking, Staszewski had not yet become a non-conformist rebel, but was a stooge, while Rakowski called himself an instructor in the Press Section of the Party Central Committee—a title whose significance was lost in the maze of communist euphemisms. His appearance was stylized, with discernment and precision: an effect of unobtrustive " ruralness " was achieved by means of the hair-style and clothes, while the face was designed to radiate the intellectual ardour of a nascent class- and Party-consciousness. Much, sometimes a career, depended on the adroit use of such devices—Rakowski hit upon the right solution. His hair was flaxen, curly yet wiry, bouffant in effect, and it never failed to produce a feeling of solidarity in those with new positions in the Party and government, whose birth certificates were to be found in the registries of the smaller towns of the Republic. He dressed neatly, although he wore shapeless anoraks and overcoats, with padded shoulders, which came down to his ankles. Never a tie. From a distance his appearance was no different from that of the village youth, who looks the same whether in the volunteer militia, a cooperative society, at a " Service to Poland " meeting in the village hall, in the Corpus Christi procession or at a village hop, always associated in one's mind with canoes on the Vistula sands, smoked bacon, " Double-Double " beer, and the slushy tune they play under the paper lanterns which hang among the posters extolling Stakhanovite workers. At that time, the young were thought to personify the beauty of the socialist body; they were much relied upon. It was they who were to Polonize the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia-ridden Party cadre, and bring it closer to the populist image. The cadre, just then, was engaged in laying the foundations of the system amidst dialectical traps. The less gifted among them went into the army and joined the security police as officers; the brighter ones were made to learn about materialism and the theory of surplus value, with much sweating of brow and grinding of teeth. It was very much in vogue to stress the importance of the psycho-physical traits of country bumpkins in the development of the intellect, of culture and of the new Poland. Nevertheless, a certain smile played over the peasant-fresh lips of Instructor Rakowski, unobtrusively supported by a steely glance, from which it seemed that the Instructor knew all too well the theory of the intensification of the class struggle with the progress of socialism. Iosif Vissarionovich could rest assured that the peasant masses of Polish Pomerania would do all that was necessary to raise themselves higher according to dialectical precepts.

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At the time of the debate in the International Press Club, Rakowski's hair was shorter but still flaxen, like a golden fleece, and crew-cut so as not to put off the new administration with an excess of dandyism. He was now wearing a double-breasted, off-the-peg suit bought from a big department store, and a tie. He laughed a lot, mostly at the more radical attacks on official policy. He was most charming and carefully avoided causing me any embarrassment. Despite the surface ease, one could detect an underlying anxiety. It grew from years of failure and turned into the pliability of one who realized early on that a different approach was needed now. He, and others like him, still dressed modestly and with sobriety, but now with a socialist urbanity which somehow protected them from shafts of irony, and made it possible for them to laugh at things to which five years earlier they would have taken a gun. In the extreme complexity of the situation, Comrade Rakowski managed to demonstrate, with grace and to the best of his abilities, something which was difficult to grasp but which was essential to understand in order to survive. And, moreover, he did this more adroitly and with more tact than most. At that time, of course, it was the editor of *Polityka* and the future chairman of the Polish Journalists' Association that I had the pleasure of meeting.

AN historical sketch from memory: when Gomulka came to power, he immediately ordered a retreat from liberalism. But he did it so quietly that only the cleverest noticed it. The less clever, with their ears still buzzing with the music of jazz festivals, failed to notice it (some are still vegetating at a table shared with Janusz Minkiewicz in the Actors' Club, others are enjoying great respect in the town of Lomza, where they now hold an extremely useful position in the local library). Rakowski picked up the directive instantly; he has an extraordinarily sensitive ear. It is by no means out of the question, however, that Gomulka himself whistled the new tune to him from close at hand, since at that time, it was said, they were on closer terms than is usual even within a family. I do not know all the details of the steps in Rakowski's career, but the fact is that immediately after October 1956 he found himself in the floodlights and at the hub of national politics. Everyone drew attention to the intimacy existing between the new Boss and the Press Instructor of the Bierut era. As I said, I don't know for sure how it came about, but I do know that the new job fitted Rakowski to a T.

A very special periodical was needed. And a very special formula to justify the ideological-political swindle which had stripped the Poles of what they thought they had won. It had to be done delicately, with great finesse and with due regard to the latest achievements, in a style which in no way recalled the prehistoric primitivism of a Jakub Berman. This journal would have to forge a new path of novel concepts; it would have to become a super-laundry for old wangles and tricks which have failed so many times in the course of the revolutionary " unfolding " and the building of socialism, and which have still to be constantly cleaned,

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turned, dyed and used anew. Who would be able to think up a new version of the old tricks? That was the message, and the prize would be sizeable. *Trybuna Literacka* was already in existence; this was a Sunday supplement to *Trybuna Ludu*, in which Putrament, Zukrowski and a few others busied themselves trying to salvage Things Eternal and Things of Value from the previous era, as if anything other than their own salaries were worth salvaging. The one genuine journal, *Po Prostu*, had been abolished: the only true agent of change and focus of effort to develop something worthwhile in Polish socialist thought since the days of Rosa Luxemburg. The bankrupt stock was there for the taking; all that was needed was a receiver. But why Rakowski? What were his qualifications, his merits, his abilities? Again I must plead ignorance. I know him only by his fruits. He was given quite a base of operations: *Trybuna Literacka* was merged with *Trybuna Wolnosci*, the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party with a circulation well into the six-figure bracket and much appreciated by the private sector, whose shopkeepers considered its paper ideal for wrapping pickled herrings. Apparently no one found another use for it during the 20 years of its existence. Another paper which was incorporated in the merger was a periodical with the somewhat megalomaniac title *Swiat i Polska* (The World and Poland), known to have been read exclusively by the editor, the proof-reader, and their respective families. The resulting amalgam was accommodated in great comfort in a building which survived the war because the Germans had used its walls as a backdrop against which to shoot Poles, lined up in rows. It took the name *Polityka*.

I do not intend to write a critical analysis or study of *Polityka*. I have not the time, qualifications, and above all interest. But I do know, instinctively and for practical purposes, what *Polityka* is. Firstly, it is an attempt at theft which did not come off. It was intended to steal the position of *Po Prostu* and it failed to do so. Nonetheless, it is not an imitation. It carved out its own image, distinctive if not very pretty. Its original purpose was to rescind the ideas of the Polish October, a programme terrifying in its simplicity. The Poles, according to this programme, had achieved *politically* everything it was possible to achieve; to have gone further would have meant abandoning socialism and that could not have been allowed, not only because the Russians might feel hurt, but because of the incontrovertible fact that socialism was axiomatically a good thing *per se*. Not yet perfect, of course. Therefore we must improve it. But the theory is OK, to be subjected neither to revision nor improvement. Practice is another matter and the main accomplishment of October, which itself was an Enormous and Splendid Achievement, was that we will now be able to discuss it. To discuss, but not necessarily to change. The social model was also OK, there was no question of change there. But in places the implementation was not quite up to the mark, and in such cases we will send our reporters to write extensive reports on them. The economic model was also OK and correct, but, here and there, there were certain faulty details of

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implementation which we will bring out into the open and analyse. Our foreign policy was correct, we were on the right side and we will look among our brothers for those whose sentiments were closest to ours, be it even Togliatti, for what he said was true and beautiful even if it is impracticable from our point of view. We were deeply concerned about social injustice and would expose it without fail. We will pinpoint corruption, dogmatism, nepotism, abuse of authority, stupidity, selfishness and mutual back-scratching, all of which were covered up in the previous period for the sake of a falsely conceived *raison d'état*. Socialism is openness, light, thought, rationalization, science, sociology, public-opinion polls, modernity and the inviolably *correct principles* of social existence. From time to time and here and there, these principles have been broken by weak, inadequate and narrow-minded people, sometimes through lack of understanding and sometimes out of malice. There were occasions when this happened as a result of the complicated interplay of social interdependence or class-conditioning, but the complexity and the mysterious impenetrability of such situations were bound to yield to the rays of the only modern scientific and progressive ideology known to man. That was how, by the circuitous route of the October revelation and enlightened absolutism, *Polityka* returned to the obscurantist intellectual hotchpotch in which, as experience has shown us, it was impossible to build for the future or even to breathe. However, anyone who has lived through the past 20 years, from the village simpleton to Professor Infeld, has it engrained on his mind once and for all that:

— it is the SYSTEM that is bad and rotten, that the people who live UNDER it become corrupt, that it contaminates anyone within its orbit, while the untainted are condemned to be crushed and go under;
— that communism equals humanity deceived. All that generations of dreamers, ideologists and writers proclaimed about it (before it acquired its earthly form) amounted to the abuse of public confidence. They said, poor innocents:
  1. that it would be based on truth (it brought about a sanctification of lies on a scale never known before);
  2. that it would be based on justice (it became a gigantic incubator of large and small injustices);
  3. that it would bring true freedom (it brought about the best organized slavery in every walk of life and every social institution to a degree unknown in the tyrannies of old);
  4. that it would ennoble man, who would be free from exploitation (it degraded man, placed him under the power of stupidity, cupidity and the basest of instincts; it led him to destroy others in the most sophisticated way yet invented).

None of these are, however, problems with which *Polityka* would concern itself, even by way of the most recondite allusion. Socialism is a sacred cow, it is not to be eaten. But one must eat to live. Therefore,

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everyone under the Red Star has to rely on contrivance of some sort in order to survive. As these things go, *Polityka*'s contrivance was simple: substitute a mock problem for a genuine one, or a pseudo-solution where no real one was acceptable, and you're away. As with Orwell, everyone is equal, some more than others, so with matters of concern, " objective " concern being superior to all others. *Polityka*'s " objective " concerns were wide-ranging: Poland and socialism and the human condition and distribution and hooliganism, traffic regulations and midwives and the quantum theory and the quality of lubricants and the health service and some unknown aspects of Pilsudski's rule. " Objective " concern meant that *Polityka* was not to be concerned with *Ding an Sich* (that would be subjectivism at its worst), only with its place in Gomulka's communism. Viewed from the perspective of 50 years of Leninist-Stalinist communism it represented a kind of achievement: " the cult of the individual " and the dogmatism of the past disallowed all such concerns en bloc on the premise that all was for the best in the best of all countries. The simplest empiricism indicates, of course, that morally and socially *Polityka*'s kind of concern amounts to one " Great Big Nothing," in the words of Winnie-the-Pooh. The men of *Polityka* will read these words with bitter resentment: they alone know how many of their initiatives were stopped, how they had to fight for every word, and how difficult it was to achieve even that which someone like myself (" bastard ") can so easily squash, besmear and make into a mockery. The trouble with their superhuman efforts and their bitterness remains the same: they amount to precisely nothing. They have no moral or social significance. It is an essential quality of communism that everyone struggles, panting for breath, with someone more stupid and more vile than himself, but the very universality of the struggle does not make it of value in itself. It is only its direction and quality that place it in some hierarchy of values and meaning. *Polityka* displays positive concern (already emancipated from the constraints of socialist realism) for the man-in-the-street, the grey cooperative, the average machine tool, and the post-October mill-girl, a girl who uses " Lechia " cosmetics and " Przemyslawka " *eau de cologne*, a girl who " poses " a problem— is she, in fact, correctly fulfilled sexually and technologically? This pseudo-factual, pseudo-social, pseudo-responsible substitute for involvement in reality led to *Polityka* becoming the favourite reading matter and the mini-Bible of Mr Bolo. But *Polityka* dreamed of fulfilling another role: it wanted to be the forum and the fount of wisdom for the Gomulka-style progressive intelligentsia, the technological new class, and the neo-positivists of the petrochemical industry.

MR BOLO presents quite a problem: it is difficult to produce a Bolo synthetic portrait, if only because he comes from such a range of social backgrounds. In the early days of our People's Democracy he walked around in a cashmere overcoat, was scented with lavender and tended to be involved in Silesian or Cracovian private enterprise. The

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private enterprise band is, of course, the most heroic social group in Poland; its superhuman struggle with communism, bureaucracy and the exterminating effect of the tax system, surpasses the Greek myths, the battle of sailors with the elements, the pioneers' efforts to combat the cruelty of desert and forest. Such a proud and admirable stance in the war with Public Enemy No. 1 should, should it not, assure the private entrepreneurs of the love and respect of the rest of society? Not a bit of it! Some day soon I intend to devote more time and attention to the problem. Mr Bolo must not, however, be identified with private enterprise alone: there are numerous Mr Bolos among the ranks of doctors, lawyers, technicians and civil servants, especially those engaged in foreign trade. The beaches of the Baltic and the Tatra resorts were once full of Mr Bolos, but no longer: they now spend their holidays in other People's Democracies, or, quite simply, in Paris. Mr Bolo never has any trouble in obtaining a passport, foreign currency or anything else one would need for these occasions. Since October 1956 Mr Bolo has driven a Wartburg, then a Skoda, then a Fiat, and so on—no public transport nightmares for Mr B. Since the Polish October, Mr Bolo has also changed his style of dress: his inspiration derives from Western films, now more widely available. Mr Bolo changed to synthetics, nylon, Orlon, and, of course, to suede jackets.

I think Mr Bolo must, in fact, be a son of August Bec-Walski from the 1940s cartoon, a stereotype of a reactionary, an ex-landowner and bigot; but he was flattened by the Stalinist steamroller and is now a *thoroughly* reformed and perfectly well-adapted individual. After October, Mr Bolo became a king-pin in the so-called small stabilization. Ideologically and socially his background is socialist, and it follows that he is an anti-semite by tradition, but his snobbery has overridden even his anti-semitism and in his dreams he often sees himself walking arm in arm with [the Polish-Jewish writer] Adolf Rudnicki along a crowded resort promenade. In short, Mr Bolo is a wheeler-dealer, one of those who couldn't care less and who knows nothing because he has no wish to know. He could not care less; he would get on just as well in Pilsudki's Poland as in a communist Australia. People of that type silently ducked down for a time during the [1939–45] war for it was too risky a game and the price one might have had to pay was too high, but they rose to the surface again in excellent form under communism, and the species is flourishing in numerous varieties. Were one to tell them the truth about themselves, they would feel deeply hurt. They do not do any harm to anyone, they criticize things as much as anyone else, they tell political jokes and get on with everyone, don't they? And if they are friends with one or other notorious member of the *apparat*, does it matter? What's wrong with that? That's the way it always has been and always will be: the strong get to the top and the wise stick with them. I have been told that I myself infuriated one of the Bolo tribe by openly describing in a book my own stratagems when dealing with the bigwigs of the Security Services. Thus, I apparently " spoiled " the efforts and chances of

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others. How unethical. Humanism, freedom and principles are all " bullshit " to Mr Bolo, but even so he fails to see that crooked dealing is so much a permanent function of a totalitarian system that, even if I tried, I couldn't have spoiled any other " deals." At the weekends Mr Bolo buys his *Przekroj* and his *Polityka*, slips them both into the door pocket of his new BMW, and drives off to Zalew, the newest spot. *Przekroj* makes him feel " in "; *Polityka* absolves him. Thanks to *Polityka*, Mr Bolo feels politically involved, socially concerned. Thanks to Mr Bolo, *Polityka*'s circulation swells.

It is the silent tragedy of *Polityka* that it sees itself as the organ of the descendants of Zeromski's self-sacrificing heroes (now armed with a television set and a motor-bike). In reality it is the organ of the Bolos of this world.

I suspect that the fundamental watershed in the life of Mieczyslaw Rakowski occurred in the early 1960s. As before, he responded instantly to a new variation on the theme of Polish communism. The time of conditioning and instrumentalism was over, we were entering the era of personalities. Everyday history was no longer to be governed by the iron laws of science, by the letter of the Leninist gospel, by the political textbooks, but by a series of trials of strength among the people in power. The personality of the Boss was always dominant, but others were now emerging. There was Kliszko, the Harlequin-Confessor; Moczar, the small-town bully who managed to rise to the provincial level and then higher still; there was Cyrankiewicz, the old snooker-player and card-sharp who had a way of marking the cards in such a manner that they still looked clean. There was Gierek, the king of Silesia, a specially guarded region, generally known as " Katanga." There were the momentary, short-lived successes of Zambrowski and Strzelecki, but the message was filtering through: in order to get anywhere you had to be a somebody. This was the present rule of the game. Best of all, you should be someone in your own right, someone unique, an exceptional individual all round. The difficult part was hitting on the right sort of individual characteristics.

I saw Rakowski again, this time at the première of the student cabaret STS in Warsaw. The venue itself was significant: a favourite of Gomulka's in one of the few remaining shelters of the surviving revisionists, very much emasculated but still rather dicey. This was a completely new-style Rakowski and the change seemed frankly fascinating to me. All in beige, enveloped in Western wools, suedes, leathers and olive-toned shoes, the editor shone, distributing smiles, gracious glances, *bons mots*. Instant ripostes made him a fully-fledged member of that particular *milieu* where baroque bitterness and razor-sharp conversation reigned. There was nothing of Mr Bolo in all this. On the contrary, Rakowski represented Mr Bolo's natural adversary: a swinging beatnik, a rock 'n roller, a frustrated existentialist with a penchant for the chic and, with sufficient foreign currency, he modelled

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himself on the style of Saint-Germain de Près and the heroes of New Wave films. But the hair-style, the hair-style above all! It was the keynote of the whole effect, giving it an absolutely up-to-the-minute slant: the hair was cut short and combed forward at the front, not, however, in a fringe, but in the newest French fashion introduced by Maurice Ronet. How impressive it was! I instantly understood the difficulties which had had to be overcome, and the strength of character required to overcome them in the process of straightening those curly ringlets of yore. But the clothes? The clothes! My God, how did he get hold of them? " Quite simple," said the girl I was with, " through Wilkomirska, of course."

" I have two sons, both from my marriage with Wanda Wilkomirska, the violinist. The oldest is Vladimir, now 28 who teaches Russian in Barcelona. A fantastic boy. He has a talent for languages and he currently speaks eight of them, including Chinese and Japanese. Then there is Arthur, now 24 and married with a child. Arthur was my darling when he was a baby. Something that Vladimir has never forgotten. Yet after my divorce from Wanda, six years ago, my rapport with Arthur became sporadic. He didn't even say to me what he wanted to do with his life. I only knew that he would not use the degree in journalism he had taken at Warsaw University.

" Then last summer we met and he said that he would go to Australia. Afterward, he wrote me a letter where he attacked very strongly my politics, my beliefs. I answered him, but I was so tired and loaded with problems, also a little offended by his accusations, I did not try to explain myself as I should. Besides, I never had any political influence on him, I had it in my mind that he didn't care about politics.

" I now understand that he did. Maybe he was affected by his mother's opinions. Wanda and I disagreed a lot ideologically. She was very active with KOR (the dissident workers' defence committee). Because of this gap we split in 1976. Now she is among the signatories of the petition against martial law. Well . . . I must admit that I haven't many supporters in my family. Also my second wife, Elizabeth, was very upset about martial law. She still is."

Rakowski interviewed by Oriana Fallaci in *The Times*, 23 Feb. 1982

I don't know exactly when Rakowski married Wanda Wilkomirska. I do know, however, that the famous violinist really came into her own at the time I am referring to, when the uniqueness of personality acquired overall importance. The sobriety of village jerkins was left behind: playing the peasant and donning the appearance of a puritan in rustic clothing was now part of the dim and distant past; wealth and its appurtenances became the symbol of achievement. Now it was permitted to have one's own villa furnished with antiques, a small yacht on the lakes, and wallpaper from Hamburg—all this underlined the correctness of development. Obviously, in the circumstances, Wilkomirska was worth her weight in gold. I am told that she is a distinguished violinist, recognized on both sides of the great divide. This may well be the case, I know nothing about it, but I couldn't help noticing that no other musician went abroad quite so often, especially during the Stalinist era. It is no secret that Wilkomirska is from a well-known Party family and

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that from childhood she was the delight of various Komsomols. Under communism, as elsewhere, some are better than others, and a good violinist will be a *better* violinist for being the daughter of old Communists, who made her first appearance on stage in a pretty red Pioneer's kerchief; just as under feudalism, a poet who was also a count was a *better* poet than a poet who was only a villein. The Party had moulded her, she owed everything to the Party, the Party was proud of her. No wonder, then, that she was so often to be found on the lists of artists representing Polish art in the West, that it was easier for her to travel abroad, to buy a car in West Germany and bring it back into Poland without paying duty on it, to exchange it for another model when the fashion changed, and so on and so forth.

The Rakowski-Wilkomirska marriage seemed to me to throw a most interesting light on the mores of our time and constituted the successful attempt by an individual to become financially independent under communism, an attempt worthy of a character in a Balzac novel. It should be made clear that in the Warsaw of Comrade Rakowski, as much as in the Paris of Monsieur de Rastignac, political independence and freedom of manoeuvre, the ability to think for oneself and to commit acts of real and not-so-real non-conformism, are a direct function of financial independence and of being freed from the worries of tomorrow's bread-and-butter. And how all this helps in building up the personality! I'm inclined to think that without the Wilkomirska investment, Rakowski would never have managed that astounding transformation into a *Przekroj* playboy, despite the fact that the sensational new hair-style revealed certain attractive features which had been unnoticeable in the past. There he was, quite a lad, an open smile, strong manly features, a kind of Pomeranian Steve McQueen. It is a fact that middle-aged farmers and such-like, suitably emancipated and coiffed, always had a charm of their own, much sought after in the capitals of the world. Some circles in Poland simply adore having Gramsci read aloud to them by just such a product of *Przekroj*, and Rakowski, dressed to the nines, mastered the style to perfection. It is worth noting, just for the record, that in the past Rakowski the Central Committee instructor, Rakowski the editor and Rakowski the chairman of the Journalists' Association, hated *Przekroj* and all it stood for, and was the first to demand that anyone who followed the *Przekroj* recipe for dress or coiffure be burned at the stake. What caused him to change so? Why such a turn around? Was this change visceral in nature or cosmetic only?

IN the mid-1960s, the situation (very much telescoped) looked something like this: Gomulka and Kliszko were out on a limb, Cyrankiewicz was still available, Ochab was in retirement and around them bubbled a molten magma from which the occasional cry could be heard: " Moczar!," " Gierek!," " the young secretaries! " This last was often interpreted as " Rakowski!," particularly among the

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Americans who take to anything and everything they are told in Warsaw with a childlike innocence. The Americans evolved a theory: as the secretaries to the secretaries of the Central Committee were only taken on after thorough testing, and as it was possible to get a lot done with their help, it followed that they probably formed a definite political force, a potential partnership perhaps: the Young Turks, the Young Secretaries. Rakowski was therefore invited to America, where he spent a few months, was given the red-carpet treatment, and was allowed to talk to President Kennedy. There is no end to the *naïveté* of the Americans. It seems they are still living under the spell of Scheherezade; it is difficult to imagine what they were hoping to achieve from this visit. In any case, at the beginning they were charmed by the swinging appearance and hair-style number three, and swallowed politely the banal slogans about coexistence which were slightly adjusted for different audiences (be it the Department of State or the American Left). They got their just deserts when Rakowski, on his return to Warsaw, published a book with the title *Multi-Storey America*, which he wrote in a style quite different from that which he had adopted in his conversations in America. The book was essentially a pack of lies, gross over-simplifications and an insult to the reader's intelligence. But it won't do any good to accuse Rakowski of writing a bad and silly book: he was not, after all, a genuine writer or journalist, but only a press instructor, an editor and chairman of the Journalists' Association. However, the Americans will never learn that it is not important what a political sponger says when he is in America, but that it is what he says at home that matters. They won't learn, and that is why they may well lose the battle for the world. Heaven help us if they do. The only beneficiary of the whole expedition was, of course, Rakowski: his American grant and the bit of globe-trotting created, in Warsaw and elsewhere, an aura of tolerance and accessibility about him. And that was just what he was after.

Social position, a Party post (Rakowski is a deputy member of the Central Committee), financial security, exotic sex appeal and the fashionable appearance of a swinging Marxist, are trump cards in the formation of a personality with a view to a great career. But there was still something missing, the mixture did not quite gel; the format, the calibre were not quite there. There was, however, the tried and tested technique: if not quite up to the job yourself, join forces with others in the same position. Thus a triumvirate was born: Starewicz, Zolkiewski, Rakowski. They came together, reached an understanding, and hung up their sign: " Liberalism."

What did this liberalism amount to? Everything and nothing at all. Each of the triumvirate, until the moment when he revealed himself to be a neo-liberal, had behind him the beautiful and richly illustrated dossier of a totalitarian bully, a Stalinist hireling, a cynical hypocrite, a servile flunkey. Starewicz and Zolkiewski need no introduction: their names speak for themselves, one in the field of administration, the other in the realm of culture. For 20 years they played out their roles with the

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ruthlessness of Nazi *Gauleiters*, leaving behind a trail of cruelty by command. The liberalism of ideas, conduct and principle was the subject of their lifelong contempt. As young men, they prostrated themselves before violence executed against truth and goodness; it had become their life-blood to worship brute force, which they called reason or necessity, and which they made into an absolute value. In the communist decalogue, liberalism is a mortal sin; the word is a stench to the nostrils, it is associated with mental and physical decay, the putrescence of the body cells and psychological disintegration. What, then, prompted the triumvirs to take such a hazardous step? What provoked their chief instrument, Alicja Lisiecka, to use the term " liberal " in a place as full of malicious gossip as the canteen of the Writers' Association? A term which, if repeated to Gomulka or Kliszko, carried with it the risk of bloody reckonings behind closed doors. They took this risk openly and deliberately. What made them endorse such words? What made them raise the cursed word, like a reptile, above their heads and hold it there for all to see, despite the revulsion they must have felt?

THE fight for Gomulka's inheritance was on. There were a number of challengers. The small-town giant Moczar bulges at the Security Police Headquarters (now computerized), the power rooted in the provincial miasma, heading a force of butchery cooperatives, small fruit-growers, allotment holders and the barmaids from Zamosc, where during the war everyone had someone in the Underground, only nobody now knows what kind of Underground it was. Moczar forges ahead under the banner of patriotism, others fight behind a veil of economics, using truncheons but with the promise of a higher standard of living, fridges for all; some even attack the feudal privilege of the *apparat*. There isn't much room at the top, it's difficult to get in, yet they have to produce an alternative that will be attractive enough. What about freedom, then? What about liberty and slogans, which always go down well among people in Poland who have lost their political bearings, and among the " wet pragmatists " in the intelligentsia who still believe in barter politics: buy here, sell there, give support to one, put pressure on another. The triumvirs' past is, of course, a bit of a drawback. Zolkiewski, an old campaigner of repression, makes you want to throw up when he starts talking about freedom. Among the non-Party members of the Seym, Starewicz is known as the Flunkey: it is well known that he is prepared to act the executioner as and when required by the Master. As for Rakowski . . . How then should they set about it? There is a way, though. If all else fails, there is always the way of Konrad Wallenrod, who acted as a double-agent among the Prussian Knights. The Poles love it. No one has written better on the subject than Adam Mickiewicz, and in no other country do poetry-reading teenagers so admire the biography of a noble double-agent. Perhaps it is just because they have no idea of how to play the double game that the Poles admire it; the presence of Wallenrod looms large in Polish literature, but Polish

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history has no Talleyrand. Yet it is Talleyrand who appeals to many among the intellectual elite, who prefer him to their own relatively simple and straightforward collaborators of the past, the Drucki-Lubeckis and the Wielopolskis. Under communism, with its plethora of moral imbroglios, tolerance of the double game has grown and its social prestige has grown with it. It seems that it is enough for a Party member to have his child baptized in secret for him to feel that he is a latter-day heroic little Wallenrod. Communism, particularly its Polish version, is, of course, ideally suited to Talleyrand-like practices. That is why so often two members of the Party, who are as like as twins, can be regarded in a totally different light by public opinion. In a democracy, people's moral qualities are only tested on special occasions, but under communism this tired litmus paper never has a break; it is put to work day in and day out to make new assessments, always depending on the facts of a particular case, always from the perspective of other people's interests, filtered through the sieve of constantly changing norms of behaviour. Moral ambivalence reigns and no universal norms apply. A person is good for a day, good for a purpose, good for now. Under communism, a politician is not judged by his political programme but by the decency of his day-to-day behaviour. In the eyes of the people, decency is odds in his favour, which, one must admit, is an odd paradox. Elections under communism are highly amusing, not because the whole thing is a sham, but because the voters in all seriousness consider and devoutly hope that the candidate, if elected, will be decent enough a man *not* to do what he promised in his manifesto. The variations on the Wallenrod or Talleyrand theme are infinite, but our triumvirs have gone one better and have thought up an improved scheme.

Nothing new, however. The magic formula used to justify the implementation of 60 years of communism in practice—" He meant well! "—has been tried before. It was first used when it became necessary to explain away the chasm between what Marx and Engels wanted, and what was done in their name in the process of carrying out their ideas in real life. Lenin and Dzerzhinski also " meant well " at a time when one could have washed one's hands in the blood running down the gutters of Lubianka. " He meant well," said the cretins collecting money for International Red Aid before the last war, whenever anyone dared to criticize Stalin for finishing off his closest henchmen. After the war, Hilary Minc applied this formula—this dialectical gadget—with consummate skill. Half of Poland was still repeating " he means well " as the economic magician pushed on towards total collectivization, i.e. grinding the peasants into the ground. Cyrankiewicz's factotums have been telling us for 20 years that " he meant well," but time passes and the formula is wearing a little thin. Nowadays, they often add that things would have been much worse without him, but of this we cannot be sure: we have never yet been without him. We know all too well, however, what it is like with him. Gomulka managed to keep his popularity up after October, his tired lieutenants whispering " he means well " at the

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celebratory banquets, while to anyone with a pair of eyes in his head it was already obvious that he in fact meant as ill as possible. The tune, then, has been tried out extensively and the triumvirs' accolytes were able to play an even more complicated version of it with all the exaltation and wild excitement brought out by careful rehearsal: " they mean well, they cannot show it at the moment, but if you help them and back them in their struggle with the dark butcher from the Lodz Security Police [Moczar], the boorish illiterate, they will rise to the top and practise what they are now preaching."

THE physiology of lying and the function of distortion under communism are governed by their own peculiar laws. The totalitarian lie comes effortlessly, it is resilient and full of life like a toxin; the serum has to be new each time, the difficulties in producing it are considerable. How easily lying came to the SS men at their trials: it was an order, they had to, they did not know. We know that they were turning the truth inside out, but do we know how to disinfect, delouse, filter and unravel what remains of reality? On Gomulka's orders Zolkiewski liquidated the bestially revisionist *Nowa Kultura*—did he mean well then, just " could not do otherwise, but had to do it "? Why couldn't he have gone away for a slimming cure, giving as an explanation that obesity would shorten his life? Why did he accept the commission, and now hints that he did not want to do it, and anyway that he meant well? After " the protest of the 34," Rakowski wrote an obnoxious article in *Polityka* full of stereotyped accusations taken straight out of the Leninist Catechism. Now, courting some of the 34 with his supposedly alternative programme, he gives one to understand that " he had to, it was necessary, superior force, that he didn't mean it, did not want it, that he meant well," and that the rest was just tactics and rules of the game. The myth of the game is one of the most serviceable devices, one of the better gadgets. An entire machinery of false images and carefully planted rumours serves to create the myth of struggle where there is no real struggle. We witness a game played for high stakes when the stakes are sham, there are no conflicting programmes and not one job will be lost over the whole thing. Of course, it does not follow from this that there is no conflict between factions. There is, but this is a totally different kettle of fish: genuine gangs fighting for genuine power stick genuine knives into their opponents' genuine backs, but in public they hug one another, they bill and coo, providing the press with lovely pictures of brotherly slap and tickle. The more someone whispers into your ear how much he is against something, the greater is the likelihood that he is for it. And if he privately lets it be known that he means well, you can be sure that his plans are very nasty indeed. And anyway, where are the guarantees that they have changed at all? We have known the three of them for 20 years: is there anything in their past to suggest that they really mean well now? Why didn't they show it before? Why is it that for the last 20 years they meant so very ill? Why have they never, at

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any time, done anything whatsoever which might indicate an inkling of goodwill? And finally, where are the people to look for the difference between tactics and common sense? The Polish Stalinist school of psychology has considerable achievements to its credit, quite unknown in the West. It has made a very detailed study of the correlation between action, thought and speech in the " real " man. It appears that the truth about a person bears no close causal relation to his actions, speech and thought. Moreover, it seems that actions, speech and thought are not themselves related to one another. Dostoevsky has already shown quite satisfactorily that a person's actions do not reveal the truth about him to any significant degree. Nor is this truth revealed by speech; we all know that an orator speaking from a tribune draped in red does not believe in even a fraction of his own words. Yet, the circumstances in which one can carry out a series of wicked deeds, while thinking that perhaps they are not quite decent or, better still, communicating one's doubts to friends around a café table, no—this doesn't count. No, *this* is no justification. This sensational discovery is a revelation and a triumph for the Polish psychological school of morality. It poses a nice problem for traditional Christian attitudes towards these matters: Christianity was always inclined to absolve those who were unaware of what they were doing; but to be told that someone was innocent because he fully understood the moral error of his ways at the time of committing them, and, even in a state of super-consciousness, discussed them in detail with his friends over a glass of vodka, is really quite a blow. Unfortunately, the cognitive achievements of this particular school of moral philosophy have become part and parcel of the way of thinking of quite a number of Poles. Sufficiently so for our triumvirs and their like to build on them false hopes and use them to diffuse and sublimate their own shabby villainy.

NOWADAYS in Poland one often hears that " so-and-so is having difficulties." It usually means that a man who, until recently, was our mortal enemy, who was ready to annihilate our physical or spiritual existence with the soulless automatism of a programmed mechanism, who was planning it with cold premeditation, while calling it a public duty, social progress or historical necessity, now fawns like a dog, gazing into our eyes in search of understanding and an uneasy false camaraderie. We have seen so many of them. They often succeed in winning our compassion, sometimes even a kind of admiration. Only they never manage to convince us that when their difficulties come to an end (for, obviously, " they meant well ") they will change, become different, better. For we have also seen those who did overcome their little difficulties, who have returned to grace and favour, to power and influence, to new possibilities of action. Yes, we have seen them, and they remained just as they were before—hypocritical worshippers of abominable iniquities.

I heard lately that Rakowski is having some *contretemps*. Difficult to say. I would have to see him. The hair-style would reveal all.

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Postcriptum 1983

I had a brief glimpse of Rakowski on one later occasion, several years after I left Poland. It was in 1973, or thereabouts, and I was living in Connecticut, within easy reach of New York. My friend Jerzy Turowicz, editor of the Catholic journal *Tygodnik Powszechny*, was over from Poland, and I had been invited to the private viewing of an exhibition of paintings by the famous painter Jan Lebenstein, also from Poland. This was opening in one of the more prestigious galleries on Madison Avenue.

Accordingly, I drove into Manhattan with my American wife Mary Ellen, and after collecting Turowicz from the Kosciuszko Foundation, we walked from there to the gallery. Inside, I saw a crowd of people at the centre of the gallery, one of whom held out his arms to welcome Turowicz. Turowicz was pulling me along with him, and so it was that I suddenly found myself face to face with Rakowski in the thick of the crowd. The memory of my article, which *Kultura* had published six years earlier, on " The Hair-Styles of Mieczyslaw Rakowski," flashed through my mind like a red alert. Without a second's hesitation, however, I held out my hand to him. He wavered, turned red, changed expression, but then shook hands. Immediately afterwards, he turned his back on me, and that was the end of our social encounter.

As we drove back, Mary Ellen asked me why that particular individual had so ostentatiously shown his disapproval of my person. I told her who Rakowski was, explained the whole political, social and moral background, and gave her an outline of what I had written about him and why. Her comment was: " It's odd, but at this moment I wouldn't be able to describe his hair-style. It was somehow neutral and unremarkable. Perhaps you made him into too much of a mythological figure in your article, for metaphorical purposes? "

I thought to myself that I too had suddenly become less observant. Could I really not have noticed his hair-style, such an important element in my assessments of him? " That is ominous," I said. " The fact that one hour after seeing Rakowski I don't really know what hair-style he had, doesn't augur well. . . ."

In 1981, when I read in the newspapers that he had been appointed deputy Prime Minister with the task of negotiating with Solidarity, I remembered my remark. A feeling of sadness and discomfort came over me, as it does on each occasion when I see a glint of sin in people's faces, or the shadow of evil among the events of everyday life.

When Rakowski, on behalf of the government, severed negotiations with Solidarity, it was a preliminary step to General Jaruzelski's *coup* in December 1981. His subsequent role as the General's right-hand man during the period of repressions and the de-legalization of Solidarity confirmed the pattern of his previous behaviour. It also confirmed my observation that his hair-style is no longer of any significance. He can now afford to be unconcerned about it. And so can we.

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The Dialectic of Opportunism

Rakowski and Solidarity

LIKE the Vicar of Bray, who changed his religion to suit each new king, Rakowski consecutively supported and zealously praised each new Party secretary: Bierut, Gomulka, Gierek, Kania and Jaruzelski. As deputy Prime Minister under Jaruzelski he presented himself as a bona fide *negotiator with Solidarity, only to become the chief rationaliser of its persecution after the military* coup. *Here are some of his pronouncements before and after the* coup, *and some comments on his performance.*

Rakowski Speaks

" Certain comrades tend to look for the source of all mishaps in Solidarity. You can do this if you want, but you must remember that it is an organization which has millions of working people as members—millions of young workers who really are wonderful people. Solidarity also has Party members within its ranks: several hundred thousand according to some estimates. For the first time since September, considerable sections of the Party have formed *blocs en masse* with Solidarity organizations. They share opinions and assessments on the present situation, and they also have common aims.

" The latest and exceptionally acute phases of the crisis are a direct result of the Bydgoszcz events. You feel like crying when you think to yourself that what happened in Bydgoszcz did not have to happen. In my view, the reason for the sharp public reaction to the events in Bydgoszcz is that the whole nation, or a considerable part of the nation, considers that the law was violated in Bydgoszcz—and not only by Solidarity. And nobody must violate the law in Poland, whatever the circumstances. If we violate the law then this encourages our political opponent—in the shape of the group of radicals active in Solidarity—to do the same. Our opponents can violate the law, although they ought not to. But we can never do this.

" The main reason for our misfortunes is the fact that both the Party base and also considerable sections of the public nurture considerable doubts as to the credibility of our words and deeds. They do not believe that we really honestly want to implement the renewal programme."

Speech at the session of the Central Committee of the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party), 1 Apr. 1981, BBC World Broadcasts

" . . . the Communist Party in People's Poland cannot retain its leading role accepted by the entire society, or its overwhelming majority, by other

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means than the force of its arguments, correctness of its policy submitted to scrutiny within the national agreement."

Interview in Zycie Warszawy, *13 Nov. 1981*

" I was for the introduction of the state of war. I blame it on the elite of intellectuals who went berserk together with Solidarity."

Speech reported in Solidarity Information Bulletin, *No. 10, 2 Jan. 1982*

Journalist: " Do you imagine that it is possible to resolve the socio-political and economic crisis in which Poland finds itself at the moment without Walesa and his advisers? "
Rakowski: " One can imagine anything, including such a situation. But please do not take this remark to mean that there will be no Solidarity and that I have crossed Walesa off. I do ask you not to do this. But you asked whether I can imagine this. Yes, I can imagine various situations, including this one, but this is not to say that it will occur."

Press conference for foreign journalists on 18 Jan. 1981, BBC World Broadcasts

" Brezhnev . . . loves Poland. He understands Poland. Believe me."

Interview by Oriana Fallaci in The Times, *22 Feb. 1982*

" The pre-December [1981] Solidarity, the Solidarity which appeared as a political force, cannot return any more to the Polish scene."

Statement in the Seym, Trybuna Ludu, *4 May 1982*

" We are far from total condemnation of Solidarity."

Statement in the Seym, Trybuna Ludu, *22 June 1982*

Journalist: " What about the question of the reactivation of the trade unions, including Solidarity? "
Rakowski: " There is no unanimity in the broad circles of our society as to what these trade unions should be like. In the first place, there is no unanimity about Solidarity. Many circles believe that ultimately the government will restore all existing trade unions and many supporters of Solidarity are of the opinion that their organization should be restored, although with important changes. That is, it should be a trade union, not a social movement, a union without its anti-socialist elements, without the KOR advisers, yet still Solidarity. Personally, I am not averse to Solidarity (although I am averse to some of its members), but I think that we should not hurry the reactivation of the trade unions because after a shock such as Poland and its working class have undergone, it would be a mistake to reactivate any trade union structures from the previous period, a mistake which would not be so much political as social."

Interview in Gazeta Robotnicza *reprinted in* Zycie Warszawy, *6 Aug. 1982*

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" Our principal duty is to conduct a continuous dialogue with society. Its effectiveness largely depends on our truthfulness."

Interview in Zycie Warszawy, *21–22 Aug. 1982*

" At present the Solidarity activists themselves are shaping the future of Solidarity to a great degree. Many oppositionists are exploiting the name of Solidarity, dragging the union in the wrong direction, to such limits which, when transgressed, will make the hand outstretched fall short of agreement. There will be no room in the future trade union movement for people pushing the trade unions into the sphere of political opposition."

Statement in a television interview, Zycie Warszawy, *30 Aug. 1982*

" I hear that after the introduction of martial law General Jaruzelski said that Solidarity will be allowed to revive. And what now? It is true that he said so. And not only he, but also myself and other representatives of the government. In the first weeks of martial law, the political and state leadership assumed that the mass of Solidarity members would be able to isolate the extremists, that realistically-minded people, and particularly those involved with socialism, would get the upper hand among the leadership of the organization. We thought that they would be able to repudiate sincerely the concepts and practices which caused—because they had to cause—these extraordinary measures. Such were our hopes. Life has demonstrated that they were groundless."

Speech in Pabianice (just before the banning of Solidarity), Zycie Warszawy, *8–10 Oct. 1982*

" There is nothing worse than a cavalier attitude towards facts . . . It is necessary, in my view, to create a situation which will be morally clear and unambiguous."

Speech to Polish actors, Polityka, *13 Nov. 1982*

" We do not want and we are not going to ignore the voice of a single [Polish] citizen."

Reply to Letter Writers, Trybuna Ludu, *8 Dec. 1982*

" From the revived trade unions, we expect actions which are inspired by the spirit of partnership. There is not and cannot be a return to the trade unions situated in the socialist system as a force of confrontation which wants to ' rap knuckles,' to weaken the state. . . . We are aware that the organizers of the new unions have to overcome many obstacles before they can reach the shop-floor. It is obvious to all those whose eyes are open that the new unions are emerging against a background of sharp political struggle: it takes place in many factories. The conscious

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opponents of the new unions, in an attempt to prevent the emergence of a genuine trade union movement, often apply various kinds of pressure to its organizers: conspiracy of silence, social boycott, blackmail, and sometimes even physical violence. All those unionists who do not allow themselves to be intimidated deserve proper recognition of respect."

Trybuna Ludu, *20 Jan. 1983*

Rakowski Perceived

" Here behind bars any gesture of Solidarity and ' solidarity ' is like a breath of fresh air. Thanks for that with all my and my co-inmates' hearts. Any good news helps us to go on living but there are some bad moments too, such as when I hear of the deputy Prime Minister of Poland (Rakowski) speaking to West German magazines about the satisfactory condition of his imprisoned political opponents. He cuts a grotesque figure when he performs that role, and his German interviewer is either too cynical or too naïve.

Adam Michnik, " The Polish War," an article written in Bialoleka Prison, Uncensored Poland—News Bulletin, *No. 9, 14 May 1982*

" A man like Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Poland's deputy Prime Minister, actually called for reforms—in his former incarnation as editor of *Polityka*—well before Solidarity existed. He now feels that he has been deserted by his old friends, just when they are most needed. He thinks that the Solidarity leadership during the negotiations before the imposition of martial law, never even gave him the benefit of the doubt. They never accepted that he too wanted a more open society in Poland."

Hella Pick, The Guardian, *8 Sept. 1982*

" As Polish politicians go, Vice Prime Minister Rakowski is regarded as a ' liberal ' though the exact meaning of such a description among the mini-Quislings serving the Russians in Poland is difficult to explain. Mr Rakowski (whose son has recently chosen to live in Australia) sometimes lets the truth slip from his lips. Not long ago Rakowski addressed a meeting of representatives of the Regional Committees of National Salvation and this was reported in the *Workers Paper* published in Wroclaw.

" Rakowski complained in the first place about Poland's intellectuals who were ' boycotting the authorities and refusing any cooperation with people in uniform.' He accused writers of continuing their ties with illegal organizations and decreed that writers had 'lost the right to regard themselves as the conscience of the nation.' It would be interesting to know how the nation does in fact regard them; how it regards Rakowski we know."

Richard Krygier, Quadrant (*Sydney*), *November 1982*

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Oriana Fallaci: " [Mr Rakowski, you are] the man who a few months before [the military *coup*] had publicly said: ' Methods which differ from the dialogue and the political solution could provoke a national disaster. A process of profound revolution is taking place in this country, a historical change that we cannot do without.' Mr Rakowski, why didn't you resign that Friday afternoon? Is the sweet smell of power so irresistible? "

Rakowski: " That's unfair. Everybody knows that I didn't need this power in order to exercise power. For 20 years I have been a powerful journalist, the editor of *Polityka*, the best political paper in Poland and one of the best in East Europe. One million readers! My opinion counted and with my writing I have been fighting the foolish in my party and in my government long before the others. I have been preaching the need for reforms and of independent unions long before Solidarity."

Interview by Oriana Fallaci in The Times, *22 Feb. 1982*

" There are two ways of looking at Mr Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the Polish Deputy Premier, whose remarkable interview with Oriana Fallaci we published on Monday and Tuesday. On the one hand he is a member of a ruling party which is generally unpopular, which has no electoral legitimacy and which, by last December, had become, as he himself frankly admits, ' Bankrupt, intellectually and politically.' He has remained in his job to serve a military regime which has detained thousands of people, suspended trade union activity and other civil rights. And he speaks as a true Marxist when he utters the chilling remark that ' in politics the individual does not count.' Seen in this light his interview is little more than an attempt to win western approval for military rule.

" On the other hand, Mr Rakowski has been known for twenty-five years as a restless critic of the system in which he has made his career. He has been deeply disliked by orthodox members of the apparatus and widely respected by readers and colleagues as editor of the weekly paper *Polityka*. Although he has survived through many changes, which means that he has made compromises, his credentials as a proponent of the need to liberalize the Communist system are good. He rose during the reformist period of 1956 and was then disappointed. He attached himself to Mr Gierek, who came to power in 1970 with reformism on his lips, and was again disappointed. He saw the formation of Solidarity as offering a new chance to introduce checks and balances into the system and build links between the party and the people. When he was made government negotiator with Solidarity he seized the opportunity and seemed initially to be negotiating in good faith, but then accused Solidarity of unrealistic demands. Yet another disappointment.

" Seen from this point of view Mr Rakowski is in the position of any politician in any system who finds himself in a party or government of which he is critical. How far does he go along with it in the hope of influencing it from within? At what point does compromise become a

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betrayal of principles? The answer is never easy but in eastern Europe there is a factor that is missing in the west. There is no other party to go to, and the rule of that one party is regarded by Moscow as a vital interest. Therefore, unless one believes that Soviet policy can be changed outright, opposition to the system is hopeless. It may often be morally right but defeat is inevitable.

" Westerners with no experience of such limitations should therefore hesitate before passing quick judgments. But this leaves two big questions unanswered. First, is Mr Rakowski telling the truth? Here again, a certain humility is required. We simply do not know. . . ."

The Times, *editorial, 24 Feb. 1982*

" In a fine leader *The Times* suggested that it is still possible to see Rakowski as a disappointed reformer. I wonder what credibility, let alone what practical significance, this claim now has. . . . In practice the relationship between hard- and softliners is more like the relationship between the hard and soft cops working together in a classic police interrogation. Mr Rakowski is the soft cop. . . . But it is worth considering for a moment what a ' liberal ' like Rakowski has in common with his most ' hardline ' comrades, rather than what distinguishes him from them. After all, his record is primarily one of survival in that predatory company. Beginning as a 19-year-old political education officer in the army in 1945, the bright, ambitious peasant's son rose steadily through the central party apparatus in the Stalinist period—getting his hands dirty, but not too dirty. He joined in the reformist surge of October 1956, but not too wholeheartedly. Rather contrary to the impression given by *The Times*'s leader, he was not so much a disappointed reformer as a bright young man who profited from the curtailing of reform. The weekly *Polityka*, of which he became editor-in-chief in May 1958, was set up to replace a genuinely radical and outspoken reformist journal [*Po Prostu*], and heralded the gradual reimposition of conformity. In the sixties it became critical of existing practices, but not too critical.

" Rakowski changed horses skilfully at the end of the sixties, and launched into the seventies with a burst of enthusiasm for the Gierek experiment. Becoming critical (but not too critical) in the middle of the decade, he distanced himself in good time from the doomed party leader. The advancement of Kania and then Jaruzelski brought him ministerial office. . . . His position today might best be described as Apologist Extraordinary.

" Rakowski survives through his trimmer's skill. . . ."

Timothy Garton Ash, The Spectator, *13 Mar. 1982*

" Mieczyslaw Rakowski is probably the most mysterious, contradictory and fascinating leader in the Communist bloc. Formerly a famous ' liberal ' editor, he is seen by many here as the ' most hated man in

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Poland ' for overseeing the death of Solidarity. His comment on that was, ' Making compromises is also an act of courage. . . .' Rakowski is a handsome, wiry man with curly grey hair and an intensity—and, as it turns out, an intent—that in some ways matches Lech Walesa's. He was—he would say, is—a ' liberal,' by Polish standards.

" When he was the highly respected editor of the communist paper *Polityka*, he let a thousand flowers bloom and published what was for that time highly controversial articles. This makes him resent more than anything else the fact that those authors now have abandoned him and consider him a sellout.

" ' I had my own vision; that of a power that incorporated the minimum number of errors, a power that would have constant contact with the nation. . . . As far as that is concerned, I feel I have succeeded in some matters.'

" Can it be that we are seeing leaders of an Eastern bloc nation trying, for virtually the first time in history, to explain their actions to the West? "

Interview by Georgie Anne Geyer in the Washington Times, *6 Jan. 1983*

Stanglin: " Last February you said three steps had to be taken before lifting martial law: stabilizing the economy, resurrecting Solidarity and offering concrete proposals to political groups. By these criteria, how have you fared? "

Rakowski: " We have seen the first signs of economic stabilization and we have had some success in increasing production. These are important changes because all other reforms depend on the economy. As far as reviving Solidarity is concerned, the matter has quite obviously changed. In February we still hoped Solidarity's leaders would take a moderate approach. But the underground became organized and active. The dissolving of all trade unions was a natural consequence of the political processes."

Interview by Douglas Stanglin in Newsweek, *10 Jan. 1983*

" After placing a wreath at the base of the monument [for the victims of the Ghetto Uprising in Warsaw], the PLO representative, Fouad Yaseen, said, ' I have placed this wreath because the Jewish people were victims of Nazism and the Palestinian people are the victims of the new Nazis.' Asked who the new Nazis were, he replied: ' The Zionists and Israel.'

"' I was betrayed,' cried Shlomo Lahat, the mayor of Tel Aviv, who said the [Jewish] leaders had been promised at a meeting Monday with Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski that there would be no PLO participation."*

International Herald Tribune, *20 Apr. 1983*

* See the " Open Letter from Marek Edelman," in *Poland Under Jaruzelski*, Part II, p. 171.

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For Services Rendered

" Candour, who with the charity of Paul
Still thinks the best, whene'er she thinks at all,
With the sweet milk of human kindness bless'd,
The furious ardour of my zeal repress'd. "

" *Polityka*, which has the words ' Workers of the World Unite! ' on its front page, thinks that it is alright to propagate opinions which are foreign to the proletarian communist ideology. Several articles aim directly at forcing the Party either to transform itself, or to abandon its leading role in society. In an interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, the following estimate of the PUWP is given: ' [The Party has] disintegrated. . . . it went bankrupt, intellectually and politically. . . . it was unable to organize the society, to get the country out of the disaster, even to defend the state.'* The months which have passed since this interview have not confirmed this categorical diagnosis. The PUWP, having purged itself of many people ideologically and politically alien to it, prevented the disaster and preserved the socialist state. . . . Many articles in the periodical [*Polityka*] repeatedly pointed to the existence of an alleged organic contradiction between power (always understood as the PUWP) and society. This antithesis is quite incorrect: is it possible to ignore the historical fact that it was precisely under the leadership of the PUWP that Polish society has achieved its high level of economic and cultural development, and that the Polish People's Republic has taken up its important and honoured place in the international community? . . . . The next charge: *Politkya*, it seems to me, is very sensitive to really existing socialism. It always puts these words in well-considered and cheeky quotation marks, exactly as do, say, *Die Welt* or the *New York Times*. In a word, it does so in revulsion of something which is not good enough for Poland and the Poles."

Andrei Ryzhov in *Novoe Vremya* (Moscow), 6 May 1983

" Of the thirteen texts quoted in the [Ryzhov] article, the twelve that we could identify were from last year [1982]. The majority of these were taken from the earlier numbers [of *Polityka*] which came out during the complicated situation in the first months of the state of war. Of eighteen quotations—sixteen are from this very period, one is from this year [1983], and one we were not able to trace."

Polityka, 14 May 1983

" . . . the weeks and months following [the proclamation of the state of war] have proved that the inimical and hostile attitudes among the intellectual and artistic *milieux* are stronger than we then assumed. In a nutshell, all that the state of war authorities were doing was more or less rejected by a large part of these *milieux* . . . I have been closely connected with the creative *milieux* for decades. Although, since taking up my present position [of Prime Minister], a number of my friends and acquaintances have turned their backs on me—I stress that it is only a number—this does not mean that I consider it my duty to paint a black picture of these *milieux*."

Mieczysław Rakowski in *Politkya*, 14 May 1983

* This quotation, originally from an interview in the London *Times* (cf. also p. 186), was reproduced by *Politkya* from Ryzhov's article in *Novoe Vremya*. Ryzhov doctored the quotation; *Politkya* chose not to mention this fact, although it pointed out that Ryzhov doctored several other quotations (from *Politkya*).

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The Dialectic of Opportunism

The Government Spokesman

In the Footsteps of Marx

" I don't care to belong to any club
that will have me as a member. "
Groucho Marx

" The concepts of DiP (Experience and the Future)* had a logical coherence as long as their basic premise was that it is possible and necessary to reform, but not to change, the existing system. DiP has now radically changed its attitude and is starting to proclaim the impossibility of reforming the present rotten ruling regime. If this is the view of DiP's members, then they should fight, emigrate, despise, and brandish their fists—in short, everything but look for an agreement and condone compromise, considering that they believe this to be hopeless. It is a question of simple logic and decency. To put the question in personal terms: I myself, for instance, would never sit at the table with such a political swine † as they consider me to be."

Jerzy Urban (government spokesman),
Tu i Teraz (Warsaw), 9 June 1982

" We wanted to change everything by adapting the world and the people to an assumed model, we wanted to overturn everything beginning with customs, ideology and the arts, through to the economy, social structures, beliefs and morality; a perspective not limited to one country. It was this vision in my consciousness that was for me the highest goal in the early 1950s, when I was prepared to keep silent about the stains on the magnificent robe of socialism, and in 1956, when I rebelled [in *Po Prostu*] against such silences, and perceived socialism already somewhat differently, as a modified but no less expansive and integral idea.

" Today, a quarter of a century later, I look at socialism again somewhat differently. It is for me not a method of realising a completely new, splendid and all-embracing vision, but the most rational system of rules assuring the satisfaction of the basic interests of society. For instance, as a method of combining economic pragmatism with a relatively just way of distributing goods. Socialism has shrunk in my conception to a method of rule and of balancing various social aspirations. I do not feel that I am participating in the swift salvation of the world or in the transformation of man into a creature different from the one he has been over the last couple of thousand years."

Jerzy Urban, *ITD* (Warsaw), 23 January 1983

* See " Past Experience—Future Indefinte," pp. 112–124.

† This is a reference to a satirical verse repeated all over Poland:

" If Mr Urban
Wore a turban,
We would have the Khomeini line
Instead of a Party swine."

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Urban the Urbane

Jerzy Urban *was a leading journalist until he was appointed the official spokesman of the Polish government by General Jaruzelski. Here he argues that it is time the West called off economic sanctions against the military regime* (The Times):

" Solidarity, supported by the West, was determined to become the leading power in Poland and weaken the country's links with the Soviet Union, thereby undermining the peaceful equilibrium of Europe. . . . Happily for Europe, Poland overcame its crisis and we did it our way. The fact that General Jaruzelski was able to restore order using Polish troops proved that the West was wrong. After martial law was imposed opinion polls showed [?] that 69 per cent of Polish adults approved of it and only 20 per cent disapproved. . . . Reagan's demands and the economic sanctions have increased interdependence among the Comecon countries and, above all, our dependence upon the Soviet Union. That turns out to be in our long-term interest, for it is the West that wants East–West cooperation to end."

Jerzy Urban, " Please give Poland a chance," *The Times*, 2 March 1983

" In an apologia written for *The Times* yesterday, [Mr Urban] makes several extraordinary assertions. Solidarity, he says ' was determined to become the leading power in Poland and weaken the country's links with the Soviet Union.' This is untrue. Solidarity always explicitly asserted its desire to work with the Government and always recognized the need to work with Russia. Mr Urban says Solidarity 'ignored the economic advantages of living bang next door to the Soviet Union.' The fact is that Russia has always exploited her European satellites to earn her foreign exchange. The whole of Mr Urban's contribution to yesterday's *Times* casts doubts on his credibility as a spokesman. It is odd that it should have been given such prominence."

" Polish Double-Talk," the *Daily Telegraph*, editorial, 3 March 1983

" A journalist from the Polish Press Agency interviewed the government spokesman Jerzy Urban, about the way in which his statements have been presented by the Western media.

You published an article ' Please Give Poland a Chance ' in the London Times. *Has your plea been heard?*

Urban: I have not made any pleas to anyone. The editors of *The Times* commissioned an article from me in order, they maintained, to present its readers with the position of the other (i.e. our) side. I wrote the article and explained why sanctions against Poland were illogical from the point of view of Western policy. The text appeared in a very shortened form with many distortions. I had given it the title ' Poland does not want to be an active volcano.' The editors changed the title without consulting me. It suggests that, as a result of sanctions, the Polish government has already fallen to its knees and is begging for mercy.

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The old British Times *used to be seen as the embodiment of probity.*

Urban: It is all a matter of how the concept of freedom of expression is interpreted. So far at the Madrid conference, the West has not proposed the thesis that freedom of expression is the freedom to twist someone else's words—but practice is ahead of theory."

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 9 March 1983

Sir, Solidarity's leaders, says Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban (feature, March 2), " did not realize how impotent they were." Imagine the temerity of these union leaders. Armed only with a just cause and popular support they dared to challenge the comfortable assumptions of the political-military apparatus. On Mr Urban's view, they should have recognized that a desire for freedom cannot stand up to the latest weapons provided by the Soviets to their boys on the block. . . .

In the manner of many articulate apologists, he conflates consequences with causes. Solidarity arose precisely because of the Polish government's failure to satisfy the yearnings of its subjects. And martial law was instituted precisely because the government could not or would not satisfy those yearnings. So much for independence . . .

The Times, 10 March 1983 Laurence Grafstein

Sir, In my interview for the Polish Press Agency of March 9, 1983, I said that the editors of *The Times* had tendentiously distorted the title and the contents of the article written by me at the request of the newspaper. . . . Among several distortions of the political meaning of my article I wish to point at just one. I wrote that introduction of martial law in Poland " . . . destroyed Reagan's dreams about an eruption of the Polish volcano and, consequently, his hopes for Soviet intervention opening up a desirable conflict in Europe."

The editors of *The Times* rewrote the thought in the following manner: " Martial law dashed Reagan's hopes about the eruption of a Polish volcano which would cause Soviet intervention and a widespread European conflict."

I wrote that the US President dreamed about Soviet intervention in Poland, while the editors of *The Times* changed the sentence so as to imply that the Polish Government, which I represent, expected Soviet intervention in Poland. It is not true. The change has twisted a politically essential meaning . . .

The Times, 14 May 1983 J. Urban

Sir, I find the concern for the freedom and liberty of the press expressed by Mr J. Urban in his letter . . . eminently praiseworthy.

May we now expect that in accordance with these sentiments the Polish Government, of which Mr Urban is a member, will henceforward restore to Mr Lech Walesa and his friends the right to publish unhindered all the Solidarity publications at present under a ban. . . . ?

The Times, 21 May 1983 Walter Kendall

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The Polish Church and the Government

Dominik Morawski

THROUGHOUT the period of the state of war, from its introduction to the day of its suspension, the Church tried to influence the situation in accordance with an unwritten dogma: bloodshed had to be prevented at all costs and the young, in particular, had to be protected from making unnecessary sacrifices. Poland had suffered too much already. One of the militant priests, Father S. Malkowski, writes in the underground *Tygodnik Wojenny* (War Weekly): " The Church cannot and should not awaken false hopes, it must not precipitate people into actions which can do no more than release pent up emotions." Such pressure often brings a result contrary to the one expected. In the early months, up until the Primate's speech of 26 August 1982, the leadership of the Church worked under the illusion that it was possible to come to terms with General Jaruzelski. It relied on the hope of being able to exploit the differences within the ruling group and its division into hardliners and moderates. That period is over. There is no real division, there is only the General's line executed by the *apparat* under his command. Up until August, the Church hoped for " social accord " as defined by the Primate's Social Council. It came to nothing. The authorities played a sham game of pretence with the Church, misinforming it and feigning goodwill where there was none. They led the bishops on month after month, suggesting that Solidarity could be saved were its statute modified and its scope reduced (so that all coordination at the national and regional level would become impossible).

Today the Church stands behind the idea of Solidarity and its preservation, and for its moral heritage to the right to free association and free choice exercised by working people. The Episcopate does not, at present, see any opening for a free trade union. But what the bishops call an " historic hope " for Poland remains.

It is in the nature of the Polish tragedy that it produced neither an ultimate victory nor an ultimate defeat. Solidarity won first but, for geopolitical reasons, the fruits of victory have been snatched from it. Now the junta of generals and senior security service officers rules over Poland in the name of the Party. The junta is like a name-plate, with nothing but a void behind it.

The strategy, elaborated by Cardinal Wyszynski, taught the Episcopate that the communist leaders are lying in wait for any sign of detectable weakness or uncertainty on the part of the Church in order to turn it to their own advantage. The Episcopate is not, however, closing

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the doors on negotiation, unless it feels absolutely certain that such negotiation would serve as a cover-up only: as at the time when Solidarity was outlawed, just before 6 October, and Primate Glemp refused to meet with General Jaruzelski. The attitude of the bishops is dictated neither by illusion nor disappointment, however bitterly felt. They are aware that the official so-called " raven " plan has as its objective to sow dissension among the clergy, classifying the bishops and priests into the categories of those praised for their realistic approach, and others censured for their " anti-state " politics. Cooperation is extolled; alleged refusal to cooperate is widely criticized. Much of this is being done, it seems, for purposes of propaganda within the country and in order to keep Big Brother happy. Above all, the authorities are determined to subvert the Primate's moral authority among the people.

THE situation within the Church is not the same now as it was when Cardinal Wyszynski was alive. The late Primate enjoyed immense authority and ruled the Church autocratically. Thus he prevented any differences or breaches which would have allowed the authorities to disrupt the coherence of the Episcopate. His successor had not yet been sufficiently " run in " when he had to face the worsening of relations between the authorities and Solidarity in July 1981. The position of the Episcopate has now become " normal " according to the standards of other Churches in the West; within it, there is a variety of opinions about strategy and tactics in the Church's relations with the state. Under present Polish conditions, the Primate is still not in complete possession of the necessary authority. His ordination to cardinal should help, but it will not remove the likelihood of further disagreements. Several times during recent months, the Primate faltered when unable to produce a sufficiently unequivocal statement or formula, or when betraying insufficient psychological insight. In addition, the authorities stage-managed a move to discredit him: at the end of November, he appealed to the actors to stop boycotting television,* only to learn the following day that the Actors' Association (ZASP) was being officially disbanded. The bad publicity such mistakes have given to the Church has, fortunately, been muted and is felt only among the elite of the intelligentsia. It had no permanent effect on the average Pole, who identifies the strength and authority of the Church not with the hierarchy or the person of the Primate himself, but with the army of priests, parish priests, curates, monks, academic and workers' chaplains, and with the immense scope of spiritual and material aid given by the Church to political prisoners, to all the persecuted, the needy and those who have been discriminated against. There is a problem here: society would like to see the Church (and the Primate) not only as the defender of its rights and its spiritual guide, but also as a referee, a leader of the political opposition and a substitute for Solidarity. Of course, these are no more than pious wishes, impossible to put into practice because, apart from

* See p. 201 and also " Three Actors Speak Out," in *Poland Under Jaruzelski*, Part II, pp. 33–34.

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other reasons, they are alien to the religious and social mission of the Church.

THE strategy of the Primate, agreed with other members of the Central Council, embracing the differing trends within the Episcopate, and supported by the Pope, rests on the following assumptions:

1. Strikes and street demonstrations solve nothing and bring more repression in their wake. We should continue trying to achieve a *modus vivendi*, despite disillusionment, and to start a dialogue between the authorities and organized groups which genuinely represent society. A firm stand for the individual and civil rights, on one hand, and a flexible search for compromise on the other: there is no alternative.
2. The Church stands for national and social interests, interpreted more comprehensively than by Solidarity, although it also encompasses the essence of the banned trade union. The Episcopate has been forced to act as a partner in negotiations with the authorities, but only as a stop-gap and a substitute. It is the Church's wish to establish conditions which would allow it to end its political involvement which is irrelevant to its mission.
3. Western sanctions do not help solve the Polish crisis. On the contrary they complicate and slow down the solution, forcing the junta further into the arms of Moscow and increasing the danger of the screw being tightened even more. The sanctions against the USSR are another matter but, in the opinion of the Vatican diplomats and Polish bishops, the Reagan administration failed to take a coherent stand on them.
4. The willingness of the Polish and Soviet governments to agree to the papal visit should be acted upon. The date of 18 June has been agreed; the junta's hand has been forced. The government will, of course, try to restrict its duration and its programme, now under negotiation by a joint government and Church committee. The government is aware, nonetheless, that certain conditions are a *sine qua non*: an amnesty for those under sentence, the release of all political prisoners and the start of a genuine dialogue with society. Naturally there is a risk that the government will try to use the visit to bolster up its credibility, both at home and abroad. It is, however, a calculated risk, and in the opinion of a number of bishops is worth taking. It is outweighed by the advantages of the visit likely to accrue to the weary nation. If the visit does not take place (surprises of that kind are possible), the government would try to shift the blame onto the Church in Poland or the Vatican (and, of course, onto " Western subversive elements "). The Episcopate also bears in mind that within the next few years there will be no grounds (or " religious pretexts ") for another visit by the Pope. Therefore the Church is intent on making the most of

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the current opportunity, pressing simultaneously for a normalization of relations between the state and itself based on its recognized legal status.

The Episcopate approved the decision by the underground leadership of Solidarity to postpone the general strike (or, in practical terms, to cancel it) in order not to disrupt preparations for the visit. The Episcopate hopes that the government will refrain from organizing political trials so as not to provoke further tension.

THE official reaction to the conferring on the Primate of a Cardinal's hat and the confirmation, by Olszowski, that the visit was to take place within the framework of normalizing relations with the Vatican, as well as the whole climate of negotiations between the government and the Church, indicate that the authorities, having outlawed Solidarity, do not wish to start another open conflict. Attempts to neutralize the Church politically and to gain its approval through a variety of concessions, such as the granting of construction permits for churches, permission to travel abroad etc., and concurrence with the Church's humanitarian appeals, confirm this view. The leadership of the Church sees no other solution but to maintain hope for gradual long-term change. In essence, the bishops think that the real solution to the Polish question, i.e. the unblocking of the evolutionary flow, could be achieved only by international intervention. For Poland to return to liberalization and reform, there would have to be support from a genuine negotiating advance between East and West. It is in this context that strategic and military talks leading to a Soviet-American agreement are regarded as a means of dislodging the present deadlock. Constant pressure is necessary, of course, just to get the military dictatorship to loosen the shackles, but the international implications and repercussions on the East-West knot of problems must also be continuously born in mind.

IN the opinion of the Polish Episcopate the Western powers should:

1. stop economic sanctions, unblock credits and allow agricultural exports. The sanctions present a threat to the health of Poles without, however, harming the regime itself;
2. take into account the fact that the Church, if it takes part in talks with the government, does it under duress and that it is absolutely opposed to collaboration, while it wishes to create conditions for dialogue between the government and genuine representatives of the people;
3. refrain from attempts to destabilize the governing system. The Church regards limited stabilization as a chance for moving from the blind alley of the present crisis and for an opening for further pressure towards democratization.

What can the West do? It would be unwise to think that it can do a great

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deal. The minimum which is achievable is to prevent the oblivion of and sense of diminution of the Polish problem; to keep this problem on the agenda and to encourage the unity of the West in its dealings with the USSR. The coordination of their foreign policies by the governments of Western Europe and the USA is the most important factor. Depending on how the Polish situation is likely to evolve, the West should remain flexible in its application of pressures capable of influencing developments. The sanctions are not unduly effective and may even have an effect opposite to the one intended: it would be better for governments to exert political pressure and for public opinion to be firm in presenting its moral and political views. The West should regard the present situation as provisional and not as a final solution. Economic cooperation with the USSR should be debarred if disregard for the Helsinki agreement continues in Poland. " The West," said a leading member of the Episcopate, " should be putting out warning signals, as the Pope is, but they need to be as credible as his are."

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Letter to Primate Glemp

Anka Kowalska, formerly a member of KOR, is a writer and a poet. Her letter, dated 24 April 1982, was smuggled out of Darlowek internment camp where she was being held.

YOUR Grace,

Please forgive the candour and straightforwardness of this letter, as well as its physical appearance. The first two follow from a deep inner need and the seriousness of the situation, the third from the conditions and restrictions of life in internment.

Your Grace, I do not wish to speak as a politician, much less as a politicizer. I am speaking to you quite personally, but also as a member of the Church and of Polish society. Our state is at present being run by criminals. The people have forgiven them many former crimes. Now they have committed—and are committing—a fresh crime. Christianity demands of us charity and forgiveness, but also expiation on the part of those who are guilty of grievous crimes. First we have to call things by their proper names—so that everyone who has been hurt should know that the Church knows about the wrong done to him, although it does not know his name and his individual plight. Next, the guilty ones have to admit to their crimes; only then can we start talking about an attempt at reconciliation. Otherwise there is no deliverance for human souls. There will be no escape from the growing and destructive hatred. For generations we shall again be unable to rise from moral decline. Just to be, to survive, is not of value in itself—it is important how we survive. The Church, of which I feel myself to be a member, professes this principle. On this principle has been based the moral authority of the Church in Poland—also with regard to non-believers. In the teachings of Christ the notions of forgiveness and reconciliation are closely related to those of punishment and repentance. There is no forgiveness without the expiation of the criminal who admits to his crime. The " Theses of the Primate's Social Council " in effect justify crime: imposition of martial law, mass round-ups, lawless and Draconian sentences, the killing of workers defending not their mines and steelworks, but their souls and the Polish social consciousness so recently awakened. . . . Incommensurable wrongs have been, and still are being, done to people, wrongs that not even the most law-abiding court will ever take up and put on trial. They will forever remain anonymous, although they are innumerable. Only the Church can and should talk about them openly, condemn them and their perpetrators. Humiliation and mental anguish, the breaking of consciences and moral backbone, people falling prey to fear, hatred and suspicion, human dignity trampled under foot—and nothing, nothing in return, not even bread. Children left for months without the love and care of their parents, old people living out their days without their

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arrested or interned sons and daughters, and sometimes even dying without them, the suffering of mothers of people in hiding, separated wives and husbands. An interned mother was forced to sign the so-called oath of loyalty as the condition of being allowed to go to her son's funeral. I have seen it myself, just as I have witnessed countless brutal assaults on the souls of hurt, lonely women taken away from their families. They all—we all—turn our eyes and hearts towards the Church. Why does it not raise its voice against those traders peddling in human souls? How can the Church instead suggest that this tortured and betrayed society admit to having been naughty and having behaved improperly, and that it show understanding for its hangmen who lost their temper? Any concessions then granted would be nothing more than a return of some of our inalienable rights—nobody knows for how long, nobody knows for what price and above all, whether or not it would be for real. I belong to those least affected by this crazy war, although I cannot know what is in store for me yet, when and for how long the next prison-van will take me away. My parents are no longer alive—and I was glad of it from the moment I was taken from my home on 12/13 December 1981. My nearest and dearest—those who are interned and those who are not—somehow survive. Although during the entire time of my internment I have not been able to embrace any of them, although I do not hear from them for six or seven weeks at a time—nor they from me—I have been spared numerous atrocities suffered by so many, such as beatings, or conflict of conscience. Perhaps even this time of madness, isolation, anguish, humiliation and harassment will give me thoughts, observations and experiences valuable to a writer. But I have seen, and I see around me, how others suffer, how some are broken and deformed, how the healthy become sick and the sick are cynically deprived of their remaining energy. I can imagine the families of miners and of shipyard workers to whom no one can return their fathers and brothers; they are my brothers. I can imagine the young who will never believe anything as long as they live; they are my children. Who has the right to speak on behalf of all those victims, about an attempt at reconciliation? I cannot believe that the Church is willing to do so. I cannot believe that without calling black " black," and white " white," the Church could call for a beginning to a spiritually fatal process of false reconciliation between the haughty criminals and their—for a long time yet—humble and bleeding victims. I cannot believe that the Church would want to take the side of falsehood, would want to be used to this end by politicians.

With hope and deep regard,
Anka Kowalska

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Primate Glemp Criticized by the Priests

Mazowsze Weekly *(No. 37, 18 Dec. 1982) printed a detailed report of the meeting of Primate Glemp with the priests of the archdiocese of Warsaw which took place on 7 December. This is an extensive summary of the report.*

THE meeting was attended by some 30 priests and lasted three hours. First the Primate spoke for an hour. He began with a negative assessment of Polish national uprisings in the nineteenth century—also of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944—and likened the present situation in Poland to that which followed the defeat of 1863–64. Now, as then, " organic work " was more important than costly struggles. It was important to come to terms with defeats and resume work with new hope. The Primate, however, does not admit the existence of a state of occupation and lack of independence. An inadequate Polish state was better than no Polish state at all.

The Church, he said, had successfully avoided playing a political role and was not a partner to the authorities. It must not become identified with any party, neither is it its task to create a " Neo-Solidarity." The Church could best discharge its responsibility by remaining itself and helping the people to the best of its ability. There was the danger that privileges accorded to the Church by the authorities (building new churches, financial independence) would create the temptation of an easy life and sap the spiritual energies of the clergy. However, it was not for the Church to try to change the system; it must be prepared to carry out its mission under any system. Charges that the Church was too soft were unjustified. It has often protested against the abuse of power, *inter alia* the Primate himself had quoted the letter of the mother of an internee beaten up in Kwidzyn. But it was no good protesting in general terms, and relevant documentation is often withheld by people. We have tried, said the Primate, to prevent young people from coming out on to the streets, and now it is being said that but for the attitude of the Church the protest action of 10 November might have been successful. This was petty politicking.

The Primate described the underground as a struggle without a programme. To say that people expected the Church to encourage them to heroics was blackmail, for the Church is not a popular party, but a teacher. The same applies to the actors' boycott of television.[1] If it ever made sense, it has long ceased to do so. The Primate recognizes that for some it was a moral problem: was it permissible to collaborate with an

[1] " Three Actors Speak Out," in *Poland Under Jaruzelski*, Part II, pp. 33–34.

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evil institution? But no institution is entirely evil, said the Primate, and those who are absent are always in the wrong. It is up to every one of us to change the world.

Primate Glemp's Homily

" We know that creative circles have recently been torn by deep moral conflicts, and that there are many who have decided not to make full use of their potential. It was a moral decision with serious social consequences, since the whole nation is torn by such conflicts . . . Many are asking where we go from here. It would be a travesty of my pastoral duty if I did not attempt to answer these questions, whether or not my answers will meet with approval. I think that those of our brothers who have decided, as a moral protest, to boycott certain institutions should return to them. I ask them to make it possible for us to meet at Christmas in front of our television screens. Let no one who hears or records these words of mine interpret them as a call for collaboration with the regime . . ."

29 November 1982

Uncensored Poland—News Bulletin (London), No. 22, 10 December 1982

In the discussion that followed eight priests spoke. Others wanted to speak, but time ran out. The report does not say anything about the first speaker. The second priest said that people felt the Church made politics together with General Jaruzelski. Why does the Primate give interviews when he knows that his statements will be manipulated? (*Applause.*) The Primate had said that stone-throwing was no argument; he was expected to say that truncheons were no argument either. Priests, who themselves have not suffered, were prevented from supporting people who have. Moral judgments that are being heard were often ambiguous. It would be well if the Primate himself headed a procession of the clergy against the militia, as did Pope Leo the Great against the Huns. Then we should know what it means to be beaten up. (*Applause.*) Why does the Church accept the privileges which the Primate had mentioned? Before December the Church supported Solidarity, conducted services, blessed banners and monuments. Since December the people feel they have been abandoned.

In reply, the Primate agreed that his statements were being manipulated. But it was his duty to speak. Two or three sentences on current affairs were not politics.

The third speaker said that people felt the Church had embarked on a policy of collaboration with the regime and encouraged others to do the same. Would the Primate really sanction a " Catholic " party or " Christian trade unions "? How can one save " the substance of the nation " by sacrificing truth and the Gospel? All this was being done to bring about a visit of the Pope. It might be like a visit to a great internment camp in which the Church took upon itself the task of keeping order. Or the visit might still be cancelled, but the Church would have paid the price of the country's pacification. People feel instinctively that pressure

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is the only argument the authorities understand. Soon the Church, too, might find itself under attack. It would then have to face it with the diminished support of the nation whose resistance it had helped to break. (*Applause.*)

The Primate replied that this was un-churchlike slogan-mongering. He took exception to the phrase about the Pope visiting an internment camp. The visit of the Pope was a matter of overriding importance, and this required peace in the country. As for a Catholic party, the Primate had to receive Mr Walesa to express his support for him. He admitted that the purpose of organizations like Pax, ChSS and PZKS [which have representatives in parliament] was to disorganize the ranks of the Catholic intelligentsia.

The fourth priest asked whether our children would remain Polish and Catholic, or would be made into Soviet-type " Pioneers." (*Applause.*) There were circumstances when religion had a political dimension, and vice versa.

The fifth priest said that religious education is becoming ever more difficult. Since the Primate's speech to the actors, young people have become apathetic and say that it is more important to be human than to be Christian, whereas the Primate always stresses religion at the expense of humanity.

The Primate denounced this attitude as political, and likened it to the pernicious preachings of the " theologians of liberation " in Latin America.

The sixth priest said that what people expected was not a political lead, but the Church's identification with the suppressed nation. The Episcopate spoke a language different from that of the Vatican . . .

The Primate interrupted by saying that this was a most serious charge. He demanded proof. He himself could not divulge the content of his talks with the Pope, but he assured all present that there were no differences between them.

The seventh priest recalled his experiences of the last war and of Stalinist times when the Church had always been at one with the nation. Now the Primate's speech to the actors had been aimed against the nation, and the speaker felt this as a personal tragedy.

The Primate dismissed this as mere philosophizing about history. Foreign politicians may be ready to sacrifice the Polish nation, but the Church, in order to be with the nation, must penetrate the national institutions. The notion of an " occupation " was a personal political conception of the speaker, and he, the Primate, refused to talk politics.

The eighth priest spoke of the loss of dignity of the Church. The statement of the Episcopate of 1–2 December was too weak. Like an old man it merely " deplored " flagrant abuses. We live under a system of constant brainwashing. How, in the circumstances, can the spirit of the young be saved?

The Primate concluded the meeting by saying that it gave the priests an opportunity to learn about the views of the Episcopate and their own

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bishop. It had been frank and thus a source of strength for the bishop. Controversy is a way of shaping our common responsibility. More such meetings in the future would be useful.

PROLOGUE TO GDANSK

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by the Polish Helsinki Watch Committee
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The Homily of Bishop Tokarczuk

Bishop Ignacy Tokarczuk of the diocese of Przemysl, an agricultural region, delivered one of the strongest criticisms of the present communist-military regime's repression in his homily to 350,000 farmers, gathered to celebrate the harvest during the Jubilee Pilgrimage in Jasna Gora on 5 September 1982.

. . . Brothers do not strike; do not raise your hand against your brother. Do not raise your hand against your sister if you want to belong to our nation. Do not excuse yourself by saying that you are following orders: we have learned the lessons of history. There have been people who excused their behaviour claiming that they were obeying orders from above. Orders notwithstanding, individuals are still held responsible for their actions and we shall not forget this.

Thus, the present demands our obedience to God rather than to people. People are ephemeral. But God is everlasting and so is our immortality. Truth and justice are also eternal. But, dear brothers, there is still another reason to hope. It is related not only to the fact that the values and principles in which we believe and towards which we strive are indestructible, but also to the idea that our nation will never give up its love of freedom and justice, of law and order. Our nation threatens no one, wishes harm to no one. It desires neither anyone's territory, nor revenge; but it does want law and order at home, and wants to preserve its dignity as children of God and as human beings. Whoever thinks otherwise, believing that these ideals can be uprooted from the soul of the nation, is greatly mistaken. On the contrary, the nation will pursue these ideals even more determinedly. The Church in Poland has been with the nation for a thousand years and will remain with the nation for good or for bad, because the nation itself is in the Church and the Church is in the nation.

Therefore, let us not be led astray by misquoted phrases from the Pope's speeches or from those of the Primate or of some bishop. These manipulations are intended to cause rifts between the Church and the nation, between workers and farmers. But they will not succeed.

Today, Oh Beloved, we do not want to speak only of painful matters. We also seek concrete solutions. What are they? The good of the nation and the good of the state demand:

— the re-establishment of free trade unions with Solidarity at their head;
— amnesty for all prisoners [of martial law] who have been convicted and sentenced;
— the release of all internees, including Lech Walesa;
— the cessation of violence;
— negotiations with the nation.

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Today, Poland has so many enlightened sons, who are so well educated and so aware of their responsibilities that, with renewed trust, in a new atmosphere, Poland could soon be restored, as we love our Motherland with all our hearts. However, certain prerequisites must be established. There must be a return to truth, justice, freedom, and peace. It is only then that Poles will work, and will kill themselves with work out of a sense of duty and love for the national, social cause.

Man is the greatest treasure. Modern Poles have gone through so much, through more tests of history than peoples elsewhere. And therefore, if they are given opportunities for genuine work, making the restoration of the nation and the country, the economy and our social and cultural life, possible, then everything will return to normal. However Poles will never accept the role of slave or object.

Excerpt from *Committee in Support of Solidarity REPORTS* (New York), No. 10/11, 24 Jan. 1983

Official Counter-Sermons

" At Jasna Gora on 5 September, the Bishop of Przemysl, Father Ignacy Tokarczuk, delivered a sermon contrary, in many respects, to the spirit of accord and cooperation. For example, he said that atheism is the equivalent of rejecting all human values and only gives rise to evil. Views of this kind foment hatred between people in Poland and make coexistence between believers and non-believers difficult, encouraging intolerance. Moreover, the purpose of these views is to present the political authorities of our country in a loathsome light . . . The comparisons drawn by the bishop are completely inadmissible in our public life, because they amount to rousing the crowds, provoking hatred and inciting them against the authorities."

" Observer " in *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 8 September 1982

" Two bishops delivered two different and totally opposing homilies in the same place at almost the same time. The place was Jasna Gora; the time—15 August and 5 September; the authors of the sermons—Primate Glemp and Bishop Ignacy Tokarczuk. The response to these pronouncements in the press was as different as their content.

" The Primate talked about national reconciliation as the highest order of the day, praised the work of the farmers and their positive attitude in these difficult times, presenting them indirectly as an example for others.

" Three weeks later, his subordinate, Bishop Tokarczuk, used quite a different sort of language."

" Skryba " in *Gazeta Robotnicza* (Katowice), 20 September 1982

" The implication of Bishop Tokarczuk's earlier statements is that of a particular perspective on Solidarity. He thinks that criticisms of some of its past activities, criticisms contained in the Episcopal Council's assessment of Solidarity, need not be mentioned at the mass meeting, which he treated as a political forum. Therefore if Solidarity were to be revived—and according to the bishop it should first be revived in the countryside—it is to be Solidarity in its old form; with all its anti-state ballast, its tendencies towards anarchy, ruinous for the country's economy, and with all the consequences for the country, the nation and also the Church, that this would have . . ."

Wlodzimierz Zralek, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 23 September 1982

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Interview with Cardinal Glemp

Question: How does Polish society judge the mediatory role of the Church? Has the dialogue brought about any progress?
Glemp: Yes. The dialogue has undoubtedly produced results. I think that the relative calm in the country now, which I hope will lead to a more stable peace, is a very telling result of the dialogue. The next visit of the Pope to Poland is also due to the dialogue.
Question: Do you think, Your Eminence, that difficulties may arise which would jeopardize this visit?
Glemp: Certainly, difficulties may occur, for instance, if there were to be a repeat of the demonstrations. I may add that, in the present political situation, the opposition is not favourable to the visit because it might benefit the regime . . .

Cardinal Glemp's Sermon in Lublin, 7 November 1982 (an excerpt)

" The Church has a responsibility not only to itself but to many others as well. Therefore it tries to assess facts, deeds, phenomena and events humbly and from the moral point of view. In this respect the Church says that a nation which is being humiliated has the right to protest, is entitled to demand its rights, has the right to be itself.

" I think I was the first to speak publicly about the need to free Lech Walesa. I said that it was wrong, in my opinion and in the opinion of other bishops and of the Church, rapidly to dissolve the trade unions, including Solidarity. We expressed this in a public statement and it is not necessary for me to repeat it. We feel ourselves at one with the nation. We understand how painful all this is and how much bitterness it brings to us. We shall not cease our warnings and exhortations, but no one can demand that the Church deviate from the path of peace."

Vatican radio in Polish, 8 Nov. 1982 (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*)

Question: The top circles of the Party apparently say that relations with the Primate are good, but that relations with the clergy are not. How much truth is there in these allegations?
Glemp: The truth is that many people in the Party are not yet demonstrating their readiness for dialogue, which makes agreement difficult.
Question: How would you assess the activity of Solidarity over the past few years?
Glemp: The role played by Solidarity is recognized unanimously by all those who are attached to freedom, Today, trade union activity is regulated by state decree and Solidarity no longer has a legal existence. This situation creates tensions, particularly among workers and among the young. At present, there is no pluralism in trade union activities whereas it should be the basis for these activities. But if the country were to be calm, one could not exclude the possibility of a return to trade union pluralism.

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Question: What should one think of underground Solidarity?
Glemp: It is difficult to judge. However, I think that the underground struggle misunderstands the reality of the situation.
Question: Your Eminence, in your recent speech in Ursus, you said that the Church is always with the faithful and with those who suffer. This unchangeable role of the Church makes one reflect on events in Poland today, and also in other countries.
Glemp: A humiliated nation has the right to protest. Workers and the suffering young have the right to protest. And when the protest is justified and the matter is clear, the Church knows on which side to stand, and at what price.

from *Gazzetta del Sud* (Reggio di Calabria), 16 March 1983

Who Wants to Stop the Pope?

" At present, relations between the state and Church are the subject of particular attention in Western centres which support actions that can worsen these relations, and that can, in particular, spoil the preparations for Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland."

Chief of the Security Forces (Minister of Internal Affairs) Czeslaw Kiszczak, in a speech to the Seym, *Trybuna Ludu*, 23 March 1983

" The expected pilgrimate of the Holy Father is today turning into a pilgrimage of national hope. In the spirit of this hope, one should expect martial law to be lifted, civil liberties to be fully restored, prisoners sentenced under martial law to be released, acts defined as violations of the legal order under martial law to be consigned to oblivion, and persons dismissed from work as a result of their convictions to be reinstated. . . . The Bishops express the conviction that arrangements will be made for all believers wishing to participate in meetings with the Holy Father to do so, not only without hindrance, but also in conditions worthy of so momentous an event."

Statement by the Polish Episcopate, Jasna Gora, 4 May 1983

" The visit of John Paul II has been announced for next month. Head of the Vatican State, leader of the Catholic Church, our compatriot will be warmly greeted on Polish soil with the respect due to him. Despite the fact that the position of the State authorities in the Polish People's Republic has remained unchanged with regard to this matter, various deliberately fanned speculations persist. Unfortunately, these were further nourished by recent street incidents. And yet not everyone is in favour of the Papal visit; various forces and organizations are acting to maintain our country's international isolation and surround Poland with an impenetrable cordon."

Trybuna Ludu, 9 May 1983

" [The Papal stand] on matters most important for humanity [a reference to the Papal opinion on disarmament] strangely clashes with the news, broadcast by Radio Free Europe on 29 April, that John Paul II supposedly asked the Polish authorities to free all political prisoners before his visit to the homeland. Yet he appears to be taking an ambiguous stand on the issue of missiles with atomic warheads aimed at Poland, threatening 36 million of his countrymen with death; he has, however, a clearly unambiguous stand on the issue of the release of several dozen people who have only recently been granted a reprieve. We think it would be a good thing if, before visiting Poland, the Pope were to make his stand unambiguous on the first, considerably more important issue."

Warsaw Radio, 11 May 1983

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Polish Bishops on the Suspension of Martial Law

A Letter addressed to the Presidium of the Seym of the PPR

THE Polish Bishops, prompted by concern for the good of the country, which is part of their mission, consider it their duty to give their view on the Bill (in the 10 December 1982 version), presented by the Council of State to parliament, on specific laws for the period following the suspension of martial law.

The Bill affects basic civil rights, and needs to be evaluated from the moral point of view. Social peace can be assured only on the basis of laws which respect commonly accepted moral standards and fundamental human and civil rights. It is not possible to maintain the security of the state exclusively by repressive measures which violate these fundamental rights. From this point of view, some of the provisions of the Bill are clearly open to criticism, and are even bound to provoke opposition.

The following provisions are morally objectionable:

1. The idea of binding the worker to the factory is reminiscent of the feudal law binding the peasant to the land. Article 2 of the Bill makes it impossible for the worker to terminate his employment without the consent of the management, even for the most valid reasons. The decision of the manager, moreover, is to be final, without the right of appeal. The list of such factories is likely to be very long, since apart from already militarized establishments, it is also to contain those which are considered to be operationally essential and carry out specific governmental orders.

The situation of the worker is to be further worsened by additional rigours:

a) Anti-humanitarian regulations concerning workers who incur the displeasure of the management and are dismissed; they are also to be discriminated against in their new place of employment (Article 4).

b) The principle of the common responsibility of all workers for participation in illegal strikes and demonstrations (Article 5). This goes even beyond the trade union law of 8 October 1982 which limits responsibility to persons engaged in organizing and running an illegal strike. Is it at all possible for the rank-and-file man to be familiar with all the procedural complexities required by the law to make a strike legal?

2. Regulations which make it possible to punish people in a quite arbitrary manner, in particular the phrase " sowing social discord," which may serve as grounds for dismissing a worker (Article 5) or expelling a student from his school; or the phrase " fomenting public

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unrest," which may be used as a criminal charge against any citizen (Article 12, p. 3). Even worse is the proposed new formulation of Article 282a of the Penal Code which states that " actions undertaken for the purpose of fomenting public unrest " are sufficient for a person to be charged. Such vague formulations may lead to the emergence of a kind of psychological terror, for they may serve as a pretext for quite arbitrary and unjust decisions. It is therefore necessary to define precisely what is meant by a phrase like " fomenting public unrest."

Objections must be raised against regulations which undermine the credibility of the authorities, namely:

1. Regulations which are more repressive than the existing ones, while it is proclaimed that existing rigours are being relaxed. Suspension of martial law implies the removal or relaxation of at least some of its regulations. The Bill, however, envisages the extension of the rigours of martial law to enterprises which, until now, were free of them, and introduces quite new penalties (Article 2, p. 3, Article 5, Article 7, p. 3, Articles 12, 13 and 14).
2. Regulations which, though introduced by way of an Act of Parliament dealing with a transient situation, are intended to remain permanent. Three such regulations are to be incorporated into the Penal Code and one into the Code of Criminal Procedure. The latter, moreover, is clearly unconstitutional, since the Constitution (Article 87, p. 2) guarantees the inviolability of correspondence. The regulation in question allows a prosecutor to tap teiephone conversations and open the correspondence of a suspect without him being informed of the fact, thereby depriving him of any means of defence. This is a new and truly ominous development.
3. Regulations which render ineffective earlier ones achieved in the course of wide social consultations. This applies in particular to the two following problems:
   a) One is workers' self-management. As conceived in Article 7 of the Bill, self-management would be quite ineffective. Its purpose, within the framework of economic reform, was to strengthen the autonomy of enterprises vis-à-vis the state. The institution of self-management which can be suspended at any time on the grounds that its understanding of " economic and social interests " differs from that of the controlling state organ is no more than a meaningless façade (this is all the more so as its right to choose the direction of the enterprise is to remain suspended).
   b) The other problem is that of the expulsion of students from schools. The law on higher education passed by parliament on 4 May 1982 (i.e. under martial law) says that this most severe disciplinary penalty can be imposed only by a disciplinary committee. It often means the complete ruin of a young man's prospective career. Applying it as an administrative measure for such vague transgressions as " fomenting social unrest " offends an elementary sense of justice.

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We present these objections and remarks in a constructive spirit, with the intention of strengthening social peace and the credibility of the authorities in our society. We hope that they will be read and received in the same spirit.

On behalf of the Episcopate of Poland:
Secretary of the Episcopate, Archbishop **B. Dabrowski**
Chairman of the Bishops Conference, Archbishop **Jozef Glemp,**
Primate of Poland, 16 Dec. 1982

Uncensored Poland—News Bulletin (London), No. 4,
25 Feb. 1983

Who Wants to Stop the Pope?

" The evidence of danger from rightist forces and the threat of a counter-revolution have not disappeared. . . . One should not minimize the influence, which still exists, of the destructive activities of opposition groups before December 1981, and the consequences of these activities which are not in the realm of propaganda alone. For instance, a group has been formed inside the Church which does not understand the changes taking place in contemporary Catholicism, refuses dialogue, supports a " crusade " [against communism] and in many cases is trying to organize the public against socialism. . . . Anti-socialist opposition in Poland is not some kind of myth, it really does exist and it has not abandoned its plans; its most important goal is to destroy socialism, tear Poland out of the socialist community and sever the alliance with the USSR."

Jerzy Kraszewski, *Nowe Drogi*,
Feb. 1983, summarized in *Kommunist*
(Moscow), No. 7, May 1983

" Let us consider, for instance, the forthcoming Papal visit. Preparations for it are in full swing. Cooperation between the interested parties—the state, the Episcopate and the Vatican—is proceeding in a satisfactory way, with no hitches. Western propaganda, however, does not find this worthy of any attention. Propaganda needs conflicts; it therefore invented some vaguely-defined groups in the apparatus of power who are allegedly opposed to this visit. For a number of days, the world is accordingly told that there is tension between the Church and the state. Doubt is implied as to whether or not the visit will take place. . . . In the last few days, they have seized upon a tasty new morsel. The journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU, *Kommunist*, reproduced some excerpts from the article by Jerzy Kraszewski in the February issue of *Nowe Drogi* [the journal, of the central Committee of the PUWP]. . . . The assessment of the situation in the Kraszewski article is one that often appears in other articles published in the Polish press, which in turn relies on the evaluations contained in Central Committee resolutions. . . . If, then, what Kraszewski wrote is in fact the daily fare of [Polish] Party writings, why are so many bourgeois journalists so excited about the fact that it was reprinted in *Kommunist*? "

Polityka, 28 May 1983

" Tha Papal visit will be both a confirmation and a test of good relations between the Church and State, now and in the future."

Jozef Czyrek, a member of the Politburo
at the Party Plenum, *Trybuna Ludu*
1 June 1983

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Glossary

AK	—*the Home Army*
ChSS	—*Christian Social Association*
KPP	—*Polish Communist Party*
KOR	—*Workers' Defence Committee/Social Self-Defence Committee*
KOS	—*The Committee for Social Resistance*
KPN	—*Confederation of Independent Poland*
KW	—*County Command (Military)*
MKS	—*Inter-Factory Strike Committee*
MO	—*Civil Militia/People's Militia*
MSW	—*Ministry of Internal Affairs*
ORMO	—*Voluntary Reserve of the Civil Militia*
Pax	—*organization of "progressive" lay Catholic intellectuals*
PPS	—*Polish Socialist Party*
PRL	—*Polish People's Republic*
PRON	—*Patriotic Movement for National Revival*
PZKS	—*Polish Catholic Social Union*
PZPR/PUWP	—*Polish United Workers' Party*
RKW	—*Regional (underground) Solidarity leadership*
RMP	—*Communist Youth*
ROMO	—*Reserve Units of the Riot Police*
ROPCiO	—*Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights*
SB	—*Security Services*
Seym	—*Polish parliament*
SKS	—*Students' Defence Committee*
TKK	—*Temporary Coordinating Commission of Solidarity*
TKN	—*Flying University*
TUR	—*Association of Workers' Universities*
UB	—*Security Police*
Ubek	—*Security Policeman*
Voevodship	—*an administrative region*
Voevoda	—*chief officer of the region*
WiN	—*Liberty and Independence—name of an underground organization formed in Poland in September 1945 after the dissolution of the Home Army*
WOP	—*Border Guards*
WRON	—*Military Council of National Salvation* (WRONa *means "crow"*)
ZOMO	—*Riot Police*

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Our Contributors

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

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

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